The University of Chicago
FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

The Spirit of God in Biblical Literature

A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Literature
in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

(Department of Biblical and Patristic Greek)

By

IRVING FRANCIS WOOD

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
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PART I

THE SPIRIT OF GOD IN HEBREW THOUGHT

CHAPTER I

The Writings before the Exile

MODERN biblical study has usually found little place for the treatment of the Hebrew idea of the Spirit of God. This is not surprising. The subject itself is very obscure. The Spirit of God seems at first sight to be hardly more than "an aspect of God." If pursued until it can become somewhat understood in its historical relations, it is found to be intimately connected with certain conceptions of early Hebrew thought, like that of the angel of Jehovah, and with certain experiences of Semitic life, like that of prophecy, the understanding of whose early significance still remains obscure to us, even after scholarship has given us all the help in its power. Only a long and careful study can clear up its most obvious difficulties. The data for complete explanation are difficult to read, or, in some cases, wholly lacking.

The subject, however, is not of such slight importance as is sometimes assumed. It might be a sufficient claim on the attention of the biblical student that the New Testament conception of the Spirit rests on the Old Testament conception as its basis, and does not admit of explanation without Old Testament aid. But the subject has a value entirely within itself; it furnishes a definite contribution to our understanding of the Hebrew con-

ception of divinity. The Spirit of God was not the simple equivalent of God. Had the Hebrew no independent idea to convey by the phrase, he would not have used it; or if he had found its use in ancestral Semitic language, would not have perpetuated it. It must have been significant for him. It must have added to the range of expression open to him regarding either the nature of God or the relation of God to man. These two great themes are the subjects on which Hebrew thought has added to the sum of the world's religious knowledge, and anything which will help us to understand better the Hebrew ideas regarding them is of great importance to the history of religious development.

The problem of the origin of the conception of the Spirit is, like most problems of religious origins, one whose solution is a matter of inference rather than of direct testimony. The earliest traces of the idea which we can find in literature represent a stage of considerable advancement in its growth. From this we must work back, by the methods known to the study of the history of religion, to earlier stages, and, if possible, to the earliest stage. It follows that a study of the Hebrew conception of the Spirit cannot begin at the beginning; it must begin with the earliest literature, the pre-exilic histories and prophecies, and make its inferences from this to still earlier periods on which no literature throws its light. It is a matter of course that such inferences contain elements of greater or less uncertainty. The whole question resolves itself into a

series of probabilities. It makes the matter still less certain that comparative religion, much as it has been able to accomplish, can formulate mathematically no fixed laws of religious progress which will unmistakably guide us in our researches. It can, however, furnish principles of religious history which create probabilities in specific instances like that furnished by our study. In spite, therefore, of all uncertainties and difficulties there is hope that some progress may be made toward the discovery of the origin and early history of the idea of the Spirit of God.

It seems best for our purposes to treat all pre-exilic prophetic and historical writings together. The examination of the separate writings shows no special progress, except in one or two particulars to be hereafter noticed. They all represent the prophetic school of thought, much of the historic writings being, of course, no less prophetic than the writings we call prophecies. We find in these writings the following distinct uses of Spirit of God or Spirit of Jahveh:

A. The Spirit used of God in the sphere of individual mental life:

1. For endowment with charismatic[1] gifts:

(*a*) Prophecy: Mic. 2. 7; 3. 8;[2] Hos. 9. 7; 1 Sam. 10. 6, 10; 19. 9, 20, 23; 1 Kings 22. 22, ff.; Num. 24. 2.

[1] The term "charismatic," from the New Testament word *χάρισμα*, meaning a spiritual endowment or gift for a special purpose, expresses so clearly a fundamental idea of the work of the Spirit in all stages of the history of the conception that it may well be used in the period of the Old Testament as well as in that of the New Testament.

[2] Wellhausen, Nowack, and Briggs regard as a gloss.

(*b*) Skill in ruling: Num. 11. 17; Gen. 41. 38; Isa. 28. 6.

(*c*) Prowess in war: Judg. 6. 34; 13. 25; 14. 19; 1 Sam. 11. 6.

(*d*) Bodily strength: Judg. 13. 25 (?); 14. 6; 15. 14 (all of Samson).

(*e*) Skill in interpretation of dreams: Gen. 41. 38.

(*f*) Without designation of purpose: 1 Sam. 16. 13, 14a.

2. For guidance, influence, or direction in the sphere of human operations, without the implication of direct charismatic gifts. A conception somewhat broader than 1, generally conceived as looking toward a result in the field of historic movement. A telic use: 2 Kings 19. 7 (parallel, Isa. 37. 7); Isa. 29. 10; 32. 15; 30. 1.

Sometimes this spirit is evil, not as being morally wicked, but as producing a result which is evil. Some of these cases, like that of Saul, contain elements akin to a charismatic use:[1] Judg. 9. 23; 1 Sam. 16. 14b-22; 18. 10; 19. 9[2] (comp. 1 Kings 22. 22).

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[1] Briggs (*Journal of Biblica Literature*, 1900) classifies the references to the evil spirit which came upon Saul under ecstatic prophecy.

[2] 1 Sam. 16. 14b speaks of a spirit from God. All other connected passages say "Spirit of God" or "of Jahveh." This one variation remains to be accounted for. The conception is certainly somewhat different in the two sets of passages. "A spirit from God" seems to be a later idea than "A spirit of God." It may be that the text was originally "an evil spirit of Jahveh," and that an editor, in the interest of later orthodoxy, has changed it to "an evil spirit from Jahveh" by inserting מאת. Possibly he also inserted 14a, in accord with the idea that the Spirit was a divine endowment for kingship. Such an idea he might infer from 10. 6, 10; 11. 6; and 16. 13. That the text has received emendations is generally acknowledged. H. P. Smith (*Commentary*, p. 149) says. "Both רוח אלהים רעה [an evil spirit of God] and רוח יהוה רעה [an evil spirit of Jahveh] seem to me to be ungrammatical, and I suspect that the original was simply רוח אלהים [a spirit of God] throughout this paragraph." A similar change in the interest of orthodoxy is that from God (2 Sam. 24. 1) to Satan (1 Chron. 21. 1).

B. The Spirit used for God acting in the physical world, but for the sake of man:

1. As the basis of physical life: Gen. 6. 3 (?).

2. Acting in the external physical world: 1 Kings 18. 12; 2 Kings 2. 16.

This classification brings out the following noticeable points:

1. The Spirit is used of God acting, never of the absolute divinity, *ab intra.* It is always dynamic, never static.

2. The Spirit is always used of God acting, directly or indirectly, in reference to man. Where used of action on external nature it is still for the sake of man. In the one passage where Spirit refers to the plan of God it is his plan with reference to man. To infer from this set of passages that the Spirit never meant to the Hebrew the absolute divine, God *ab intra,* would doubtless be unwarranted. These writings are not philosophical nor introspective. They do not discuss the idea of absolute divinity, and only incidentally introduce the conception. Their range lies largely in the thought of the activity of God, and especially of that activity in relation to man. It would be wrong to say that the Hebrew of this time never thought of the Spirit as referring to God except as acting. It is right to say that the predominant usage, and, so far as our sources go, the exclusive usage, is for God as acting.

3. The dominant idea of the Spirit in our sources is the charismatic. Of the various gifts which come

from the Spirit the most extraordinary and infrequent are evidently conceived with the greatest clearness as being the direct product of the Spirit. With less clearness and somewhat more rarely other gifts of less extraordinary character are also ascribed to the Spirit. The bearing of this on the problem of the origin of the idea we shall see later.

4. The Spirit as the basis of physical life is rarely found—only once, according to our classification. Again the argument from silence must not be pressed too closely, for the writings have little occasion to deal with the problems of the origin of either physical or mental life. Where we do find it, however, the thought is uniform. The JE story of creation indicates the same conception in its use of the term the "breath" of God ("breath," נשמה, not "Spirit," רוח, but the connection of life with the divine is evidently the same) as the origin of distinctively human life. Hebrew thought regarding the origin of life had already worn its channel for any future philosophical speculation.

The effects in man which were ascribed to the Spirit were the ecstasy of prophecy, skill in ruling and in giving judgment, interpretation of dreams, fear, erroneous decision and action; then, passing by imperceptible shades of difference into physical realms, insanity with accompanying abnormal bodily conditions, prowess in war, extraordinary strength. The one principle which binds this varying group of psychical and physical phenomena together is that they all represent some phase of the

extraordinary. Sometimes it is psychical manifestations which cannot be accounted for in ordinary ways, such as the prophetic ecstasy or Saul's insanity. Sometimes it is only an unusual manifestation of what is in less degree normal, like the traditional ideas of Samson's strength. Sometimes it is merely the unexpected, which seems to observers to happen without sufficient external reason, like the affright of the Assyrian army (2 Kings 19. 7).

Was the fact that a phenomenon was extraordinary and infrequent sufficient in itself to cause the ascription of the event to the Spirit of God? In the naïve condition of thought which the early Hebrews represent it would not be surprising if this were the case. Where great mountains were the mountains of God and the thunder the voice of God it can hardly be otherwise than that every unusual and inexplicable phenomenon in man should be ascribed to the Spirit of God as its cause. In primitive races the god is always the *deus ex machina* which is brought in when other explanations fail. But it is an interesting fact that in our literary sources the Spirit is never used as a cause except of those things which have to do with the affairs of the people of Israel. The personal experiences of the private Hebrew are not ascribed to the Spirit of God, but only those which bear directly or indirectly, for good or ill, upon the progress of national matters, or, at least, of those whose results bear in some obvious way upon the life of considerable portions of the community. This may be partly

because our authors are all prophets and are interested in national affairs. There must be added to this, however, the fact that early religion was always tribal. In their earlier forms religious and public life were the same thing. An individual religion had not yet developed in Israel. Jehovah was a national God, and his relations were with national matters, not with those of individuals. It is true that individual religion was a direct inference from the ethical positions of Amos, Micah, and the later prophets, but not till the exile did the Hebrews make this inference in any clear and complete way. Had it been made before, Ezekiel's elaborate arguments for a personal religion would have been historically out of place.

With this view of the relation of Jehovah to Israel it is easy to see that no religious writer interested in national affairs would demean the Spirit of Jehovah to the, for him, trivial position of a guide in private action. The work of the "seers" in Israel in the earliest literary period, as shown in the case of Saul's appeal to Samuel in the matter of his father's lost asses, is not a contradiction of this. It is true that "the man of God" was expected to assist in the needs of private life, and doubtless his work, like that of all the prophets, was regarded as the product of the activity of the Spirit. But such a public character had a relation to more than individual life. His work, even in the simple picture presented in the earliest Samuel document, was quasi-tribal, in that it might affect an entire com-

munity in Israel. The Spirit was not given to the prophet for his individual behoof or for that of any other single person, but for the good of the people of Jehovah, in whole or in part. He used it in certain cases for the advantage of individuals, but it remained a sort of public possession, whose usufruct rested in the body politic. Every man might use it in case of need, but the motive of Jehovah in the prophetic gift was the benefit of his community, considered as a community. That this tribal religion logically involves an individual religion Israel saw later. That they did not see it in an earlier age only shows that they had not yet passed out of that tribal stage in the development of religion which has been common to all nations.

This helps us in some measure to answer a related question: Were certain phenomena always and everywhere regarded as the work of the Spirit, without regard to their importance or the range of their results? The worship of every wandering band of dervish-like prophets in Israel was, judging from 1 Sam. 10 and 19, regarded as the result of the work of the Spirit, but certainly it did not always have a national importance. But the entire significance of the prophetic order lies in its relation to the community. The order is public *per se;* therefore all phenomena connected with it are the result of the spirit of the god which rules in the community.

More difficult are the problems raised by such a case of peculiar and unaccountable disease as that under which Saul suffered. Would a peasant in

Israel, subject to the same maladies which afflicted King Saul, have been regarded as the victim of a "spirit from God"? Was it the national importance of Saul which caused his suffering to be ascribed to a spirit? One cannot be dogmatic on this point, for we have no case in the literature which will decide the question for us. The general principle of the unity of religious and public life would seem to give the events of the life of the king a religious significance which those of a peasant would not have, but the distinction between public and private life is not easy to draw. Private conduct was early recognized as having public bearings, as in the story of the sin of Achan, and private misfortunes as due to public faults. Even apart from this connection popular religious thought assumed a relation between God and the private individual before the leaders of religion were ready to recognize it. Sometimes the strength of "orthodox" thought compelled popular religion to go outside the tribal religion for this relation, when it became illicit religion or "black magic." Possibly this is partly the explanation of the cult of the familiar spirit (אוב), in Israel at the time of Saul. But the care of the god for his people furnishes a ground of private relation between them to which men have never been quite oblivious, however little their literature has recognized it. One cannot feel at all sure that the peasant suffering from a disease kindred to that of King Saul would not have been supposed by his neighbors to be afflicted by the Spirit of God,

without thought of any immediate connection between his malady and the welfare of the community. The literature, however, presents us with no such case.

In the case of traditional matters, like the warlike valor of Gideon or the strength of Samson, it is easy to see how the importance of the work of these heroes for national progress may have led naturally to the ascription of their peculiar qualities of leadership to the Spirit of God. The same was the case when, looking forward to the ideal ruler of the future, the prophet pictured the Messiah as possessing powers of leadership which were to be the gifts of the Spirit of God.

There is no evidence that any warrior or ruler of pre-exilic time claimed for himself personal guidance by the Spirit of God. But why should he not, as well as the prophet? In general his work had a much more obvious relation to public welfare. We must not forget that we usually have in view only the mountain tops of Hebrew prophecy. Beneath the lofty prophets of individual fame there lay a great substratum of obscure and sometimes ignoble professional prophets, most of whom were very insignificant by the side of the great warriors and rulers. Yet they claimed the Spirit of God, and the warrior and ruler did not. Obviously the difference was not wholly a matter of public importance. It must have lain, then, in the difference of psychical experience between the two. The mental and sometimes physical phenomena which attended

prophecy were entirely different from anything experienced by the warrior or ruler. They were unaccountable by ordinary means, and demanded a supernatural explanation. We must return to this prophetic experience later. Now we can say, in answer to the question under discussion, there are certain phenomena always and everywhere ascribed to the Spirit, namely, those of prophecy. But the entire purpose and significance of prophecy lies in its actual or potential public character. The human experiences which are assigned to the Spirit of the national God as a cause in Hebrew literature, then, contain two elements: they were inexplicable by nature as the Hebrew knew it, and they had a national character.

Another element in the idea of the Spirit is brought under consideration by the question, Was it regarded as adding to man's natural powers, or as always endowing those upon whom it came with powers wholly new? Gunkel[1] holds that it was not conceived as adding to natural powers: "The working of the Spirit is not in any way the enhancing of a nature common to all men, but is plainly supernatural and therefore divine." Certainly in some cases we must agree with Gunkel that the powers were wholly new. The wrapt ecstasy of prophecy was not part of the normal life of man. That it was not regarded by the people as normal is shown by the use of התנבא, "to act the prophet," to indicate the conduct of a madman. The

[1] *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, 1899, p. 22.

whole content of the picture of the prophet is that of one moved by an external power. Duties and missions are forgotten under its influence (1 Sam. 19. 18-24). There is a compulsion in it. "The Lord hath spoken, who can but prophesy?" In the later pre-exilic time the prophet is in many cases a clear-eyed, reasoning statesman, yet still the element of compulsion remains. He is moved by a power from without. His words are the result not of a heightened human reason, but of a divine power, external to himself. As the obligation changes from the older, cruder physical compulsion it takes on the still stronger form of moral compulsion. Prophecy in Semitic life is by its nature a power external to man's consciousness.

But when the Spirit is conceived as acting in fields in which man has natural powers, as wisdom, strength, skill in ruling, it is entirely gratuitous to suppose that the Hebrew thought of it as introducing a new power *ab extra*. Why should it? What relation would the new superhuman power be conceived of as bearing to the natural human power? Would it take the place of the human power, rendering it for the time inoperative, or would it add a foreign element, like a mercenary army assisting a native troop? It is by asking such questions that the difficulty of the position Gunkel holds is best realized. There is nothing in either the sources or the situation itself which compels us to take any ground except the natural one that the Spirit was conceived as supplementing or-

dinary human powers, so that they might meet extraordinary demands.

On the one hand, then, we have the Spirit giving superhuman powers; on the other, aiding and augmenting human powers. The point of distinction between them is this: Powers which were in themselves abnormal were regarded as caused by new endowments, which were the direct result of the Spirit; while powers which were in themselves normal, but which were developed to an extraordinary degree, were ascribed to the Spirit in so far as they exceeded the usual and normal condition. The seeming discrepancy between the two classes of cases causes no difficulty. The discrepancy is in the nature of the phenomena. The conception of the action of the Spirit remains the same. The Spirit is regarded as the cause of the extraordinary and unusual in mental life. We have already seen, however, that the explanation of augmented human power as caused by endowment of the Spirit is never assumed by anyone, but in every case is ascribed by others to a traditional character, like Gideon or Samson. For the purposes of living religious experience the Spirit is in this period always conceived as an external power acting supernaturally upon the person.

A question of greater importance is whether the operations of the Spirit in early Israel always had a religious value. Here there has been a difference of opinion. Most have held that even in the Old Testament the work of the Spirit had always

a religious significance. Gunkel, who says that this has been the opinion "fast regelmässig aufgestellt" (page 15), cites for it Wendt, Pfleiderer, Kleinert, in the *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.*, 1867, and Schultz. To these we may add Davidson, in the *Expository Times*, October, 1899, who says, "The Spirit given to men such as Gideon, Jephtha, Samuel, and others was this theocratic redemptive Spirit [perhaps even Samson's inspiration may be brought in here]; it was Jehovah operating in men for redemptive purposes, saving and ruling his people." Gunkel, however, takes a different ground (page 16). He admits that in many cases the action of the Spirit has significance for the purposes of God in Israel, but denies that it is so in all. What meaning for these purposes, he asks, could Samson's slaughter of the lion in the vineyard have? (Judg. 14. 6.) Or what religious value is in the spiritual manifestations related in 1 Sam. 10. 6, ff.; 19. 20, ff.? He directs special attention to 1 Kings 18. 7, ff., and 2 Kings 2. 16, ff., as cases which have no conceivable religious significance.

One queries whether either side has quite penetrated to the region in which we must find the true answer. The question they discuss is, Would the developed religious ideas of the nineteenth century, or at least of the New Testament, find their wants met in these phenomena? Doubtless they would not. But, after all, that is not the question. The real problem is much more difficult. It is, Were these manifestations regarded by the Hebrews as

of religious significance? This demands for its answer an appreciation of some elements in the Hebrew religious consciousness.

We must remember two things: first, that religious values are not always, from the point of view of our ethics, moral values; and, second, that religious values, in the cruder stages of civilization, often attach themselves to any extraordinary phenomena. Witness the power of the merely unusual in the determination of sacred objects and places. The fact that a certain spring in Ceylon issues from the ground at the seashore below the level of high tide has been sufficient to make its waters sacred. Witness the "power" and the "holy laugh" in revivals in our own country. The "special providence" which plays so large a part in the religious experience of many is often little more than a modern form of the belief that the unusual is specially divine. All this opens up the possibility that all the phenomena ascribed to the Spirit in our sources may have had a religious value. To prove that they did have such a value is somewhat more difficult. With regard to most of them, however, the case is clear. Prophecy was always religious. It formed the most direct link between God and man. All cases of extraordinary wisdom or skill in war or government are for the direct behoof of the people of Jahveh. Remembering that early religious significance is largely—at a certain stage exclusively—tribal, these must all be classed as religious. The case of Samson is governed by the same considera-

tions. His strength was an element in the conflict between the Philistines and the Hebrews, for the sake of which the editor of the present book of Judges preserves the stories of his prowess. The fact that this strength was once, according to the story, used in the slaughter of a lion does not take the work of the Spirit which gave it outside of the realm of religion. Somewhat akin is the evil spirit which came upon Saul. The editor of the books of Samuel wishes to show that all the events of Saul's reign were designed by God to prepare the way for the ascent of David to the throne. The editorial purpose accounts for the preservation of these stories of Samson and Saul. Both seem to be derived from popular folk-tales, which probably already contained the supernatural elements, and for the people the extraordinary and inexplicable, when related to the public welfare in any way, needed no special significance to make it religious. The very fact that it was inexplicable showed that in it the god was approaching his people, and this approach might be for evil as well as for good. 1 Kings 18. 7, ff., and 2 Kings 2. 16, which Gunkel so strongly emphasizes, are both to be interpreted as attached in religious significance to the conception of God's relation to the prophet. So realistic was the belief in the divine control of the prophet that the Spirit might be expected to transport him bodily at will, even without the prophet's desire and to his bodily harm. Such a conception is not religious when detached from the connected thought of the whole

meaning of the prophet's work. Neither has the organ prelude in a modern church any religious significance apart from the rest of the service. We have no right to make such detachments. A concept must be taken for religious significance, in either ancient or modern times, in its whole content, not with isolation of its component parts.

It is true that nothing is more difficult than to reproduce exactly the religious values of another age, but our sources seem to show no case in which a phenomenon ascribed to the Spirit may not be supposed to have religious content. When we recall that we are here dealing with phenomena which, by the very terms of their description, are placed in connection with the national God, the conclusion that the working of the Spirit always had a religious value for the early Hebrews becomes strengthened until it amounts to a practical demonstration.

Did the Hebrews make a clear distinction between Jahveh or Elohim and the Spirit of Jahveh or the Spirit of Elohim? There is no reason to suppose that, in the times we are considering, they did. All the phenomena ascribed to the Spirit were also ascribed directly to Jahveh and Elohim. The narrative of the oracles of Balaam is instructive on this point (Num. 22 to 24). The story is a composite of J and E, though the points of division are not always clear. Addis[1] suggests that the ancient poem at the basis of the two accounts may

[1] Article "Balaam" in *Encyclopedia Biblica.*

go back in its kernel to the time of Solomon, while he places the poems as we now have them not earlier than the beginning of the work of the literary prophets. In any case they represent popular thought. The J portion uses the Spirit of Elohim as the agent of prophetic inspiration (see Num. 24. 2). E uses the following phrases to express the same fact: "Elohim came to Balaam by night" (22. 20); "Elohim met Balaam" (23. 4); "Elohim came unto Balaam" (22. 9); "Jahveh put a word in Balaam's mouth" (23. 5); "Jahveh met Balaam, and put a word in his mouth" (23. 16). (In the last two passages "Jahveh" is to be assigned to R.) Prophetic ecstasy is, as we have seen, the one kind of phenomenon which is most characteristic of the Spirit. If it can be ascribed to either God or the Spirit of God, it is difficult to suppose that the same might not be done with any other class of the works of the Spirit.

The most difficult group of cases is undoubtedly those which ascribe evil to the Spirit of God or to a spirit from Jahveh, as 1 Sam. 16. 14, ff. Yet when the appendix to Samuel (2 Sam. 24. 1) says that "Jahveh moved David against Israel to number them" the idea is essentially the same. "I make peace and create evil" (Isa. 45. 7) is an exilic phrase, but the idea belongs to the old Hebrew range of thought.

In some cases possibly we may see a preference of authors for one or the other form of expression. In the stories of the judges the heroism of the dif-

ferent judges is frequently ascribed to the Spirit of Jahveh. (See Judg. 3. 10; 6. 34; 11. 19; 14. 19. Compare 1 Sam. 11. 6, which belongs to the same range of thought if not to the same cycle of stories. See Smith, *Samuel,* page 76.) The editor of Judges, though he summarizes the whole period in 2. 11-18, does not use the term, but says that "Jahveh raised up judges" (2. 16, 18). "Jahveh raised up a saviour" (3. 9, 15) also comes from the editor, while "the Spirit of Jahveh came upon him" (3. 10) is probably preserved from the sources of the Judges stories.

Parallel to the use of the editor of Judges is the usage of the editor of Kings, where the Spirit is never regarded as the source of prowess in war. One questions whether here we may not have an element of progress from the earlier and more naïve conceptions of the tales of the judges. It is of interest in this connection to note that the crudest Hebrew ideas of the relation of the Spirit to mental and physical phenomena are found in these tales of the judges, in the Elijah stories, and in the earlier document of Samuel. All these are among the earliest portions of Hebrew literature. They bear marks of the popular story of the East, and may be supposed to represent popular conceptions. Seemingly in the ideas of the Spirit, as elsewhere, the prophets refined and spiritualized popular religious ideas.

But if there is no clear distinction between God and the Spirit of God, can we still find at the period

of Hebrew thought with which we are dealing any special classes of phenomena habitually ascribed to the Spirit? Was there any tendency toward the differentiation of the work of the Spirit from that of God? Let us take the sources which use the term most frequently, the stories of the judges and the earlier documents of Samuel. The cases of use are:

Judg. 6. 34: The Spirit of Jahveh came upon Gideon, and he made war upon Midian.

Judg. 13. 25: The Spirit of Jahveh began to stir Samson.

Judg. 14. 6: The Spirit of Jahveh came upon Samson, and he rent a lion.

Judg. 15. 14: The Spirit of Jahveh came strongly upon Samson, and he performed feats of strength.

1 Sam. 10. 6, 10: The Spirit of Jahveh came strongly upon Saul, and he prophesied.

1 Sam. 11. 6: The Spirit of Jahveh came strongly upon Saul, and he led Israel to the relief of Jabesh.

1 Sam. 16. 14: An evil spirit of Jahveh came upon Saul.

1 Sam. 16. 15, 16: An evil spirit of Elohim came upon Saul (so 19. 23, except with omission of "evil," רעה).

1 Sam. 18. 10: An evil spirit of Elohim came strongly upon Saul, and he prophesied.

1 Sam. 19. 9: An evil spirit of Jahveh came on Saul, and he attempted to k'll David (Budde, Wellhausen, Driver, and Smith agree in emending to "Elohim").

The above list includes only passages from J and E, according to the analysis of Moore's *Judges* and Budde's *Samuel*. The careful reader will observe that various passages of the books using the Spirit of Jahveh or the Spirit of Elohim are omitted. They are those assigned to later writers. In some cases they are obvious imitations of the usage in the surrounding narratives (comp. Judg. 14. 19) or in kindred accounts (comp. Judg. 3. 10). In at least one case (1 Sam. 19. 20, 23) we probably have some elements of an early source preserved in a later section (see below). The complete list of the remaining passages is as follows:

Judg. 3. 10: The Spirit of Jahveh came upon Othniel, and he judged Israel (Imitation of kindred accounts).

Judg. 9. 23: Elohim sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem (E^2).

Judg. 11. 29: The Spirit of Jahveh came upon Jephthah, and he made war upon Amon (Post-exilic addition. Imitation of kindred narratives. See 6. 34).

Judg. 14. 19: The Spirit of Jahveh came strongly upon Samson, and he slew thirty men of Askelon (RJE. Imitation of other Samson stories. See 14. 6; 15. 14).

1 Sam. 19. 20, 23, is assigned to a late date by Budde *et al.*, but the conception of prophecy which it shows is certainly early. Perhaps its present form and exaggerated supernaturalism is late (see 23, where the Spirit seizes upon Saul before he comes

under the influence of the prophets). The essence of the account, however, must be early. It shows a very vivid recollection of early forms of Semitic prophecy. It would seem to be a proper witness to early popular conceptions of the Spirit.

These passages which represent directly or by reflection early popular thought show that the unusual in mental and physical life, for which no natural cause could be found, was, when connected with national progress, assigned to the Spirit. While the early stories show a preference for the use of the Spirit, they also assign kindred phenomena to the direct action of God (see 1 Sam. 9. 15; Judg. 6. 14, 25). That it is exactly the same phenomena as is the case in the Balaam stories noted above is not so clear. Revealed knowledge, theophanies, and commands lie in a different category from prowess in war, physical strength, or prophetic ecstasy. This group of conceptions was surrounded by a penumbra which gradually faded off till the distinction between the operation of God and of the Spirit of God was completely obscured. That the whole conception of the Spirit grew up out of the root idea of the unusual in mental and physical life seems, however, quite clear.

CHAPTER II

The Origin of the Conception

ANY attempt to find the origin of a religious conception must take its point of departure from the central form of the idea in its earliest discoverable expression. That meaning may be many stages in advance of its original conception, but it will be at least on the way along which we must retrace our steps to reach the original conception.

Another aid in the study of origins which is sometimes—not always—of great value is the meaning of words, the etymological aid. All who are familiar with the history of Aryan mythology know the great assistance which it has rendered there. The battles which have raged about the question of its application do not touch the fact of its real value. Both these two aids of research we may use in our study.

The central thought of the popular interpretation of the idea in its earliest attainable form is that of the Spirit as God acting in the extraordinary and infrequent phenomena of human life. This we may well take to have been a part of the original idea. Early man did not consider it necessary to bring in the divine to explain the ordinary. He accepted that in a childlike way as a part of the expected. The unexpected demanded explanation,

and to that he applied the idea of divine aid to account for its existence.[1]

We have seen how wide was the range of activities covered by this seemingly contracted term even in the earliest literary period; we might indeed say in the pre-literary period, for much of the folklore had certainly hardened into the main lines of its structure before it came to the hands that wrote it down. The term covered deeds of war, bodily strength, prophecy, unaccountable disease—in fact, anything inexplicable which could be thought of as in any way connected with tribal or community advantage. Is it possible to push our investigations behind this somewhat promiscuous mass, and find some one class of phenomena which was probably the central point from which all the rest radiated? That there was such a central point we may be sure. It is hardly possible that from the earliest use of the term any unusual human phenomena whatever, if only it was of tribal significance, might be assigned to the Spirit.

Indications point toward prophecy as being the central point around which the conceptions of the Spirit's activity were built. Early Hebrew prophecy had no lofty religious content and manifested itself in no lofty mental results. It was essentially an experience which carried the prophet outside of himself. In the earliest Hebrew literary period it could be induced at will by the mental excitement of music—that intoxicant of the emotions which has

[1] Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 19.

inspired so much of religious feelings and their results in both the ancient and the modern world[1]—or might come unwittingly by the very contact with the experiences of others (1 Sam. 10. 10; 19. 18-24).[2] It seemed obvious that such facts could be accounted for by no human means. It must be the god in the man.

Here Hebrew thought is in the same range of ideas as that of all early nations. Everywhere an essential element of religion has been the idea that God could communicate directly with man, that man could speak words and do deeds that were directly inspired by God.[3] Peculiar mental and physical conditions which were inexplicable to him easily passed for the states in which the god was giving his special communications. To this range of ideas belongs a wide circle of religious conceptions, including some which are by no means yet outgrown. In fact, the idea of the direct communication of God with man is the essential thought of religion. Without it no religion worthy the name is possible. Here belong, along with the Hebrew prophet, the shaman of central Asia, the medicine man of the American Indians, the Greek oracle, Socrates's belief that he was guided by a dæmon, and, not less, the modern Christian conceptions of conversion.

[1] 2 Kings 3. 15. The cycle of Elijah-Elisha stories represents the older type of Hebrew prophecy.

[2] The writer remembers observing in a mosque of the "howling dervishes" how a group of women, ranged outside the windows of the central cupola, were gradually brought under the spell of the motion of the worshipers below until their heads and bodies were swaying in perfect, though seemingly unconscious, unison with every form of the varying contortions of the band of dervishes beneath.

[3] Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 50, ff.

Hebrew prophecy is but the representative of this great universal religious idea. It is natural to suppose that from this early and universal conception proceed other ideas of the communication of God with man.

But why the Spirit? We have seen that, so far as we may judge from our earliest sources, this influence was sometimes assigned to God himself. There is no reason to suppose that this was not true in Hebrew thought earlier than our sources. Why, then, the idea of a Spirit at all?

The first answer to be suggested comes from early Semitic religion. It is evident that early Semitic religion was full of divine and semi-divine beings. Schultz regards the Elohim of the early Hebrew writings as plain traces of such beings (Gen. 1. 26; Exod. 23. 23; Gen. 6. 1, ff.; Psa. 29. 1, etc.). He says, "It is reasonable to suppose that these represent the gods of the old Semitic religion, who have shriveled up into subordinate heavenly beings."[1] Nor are we left to Old Testament sources alone. The Arabic *jinn* seem to be representatives of kindred early Semitic conceptions. One is compelled to believe also that the early and extensive cult of the *zi* in Babylonia was not without its influence on Hebrew thought, even if its origin be Sumerian rather than Semitic. That all this mass of divine beings was simply blotted out of existence by the rise of Mosaism we can no longer suppose. The history of religion does not progress that way. No case

[1] *Old Testament Theology*, II, 215, Eng. tr.

parallel to such a result can be found. Moreover, the passages cited above show that these beings had a long existence as subordinate to Jahveh. Now, in the process of syncretism which every religion is liable to undergo one of two things takes place: The divine beings which are for any reason of less importance may be absorbed into the personality of the more important, and become mere phases of their manifestation. This is partly the history of syncretism in Egypt and Babylonia and in some of the Vishnu avatars of modern Hinduism. Or these lesser divine beings may become the servants and messengers of some of the greater gods. Instead of losing their personality they are, in anthropomorphic fashion, set in personal relations to those who have usurped their place. This we find in Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece. It is a peculiarity of the Saivite development in modern Hinduism as over against the Vaishnuvite development. Frequently both movements are found in the same religion, as is probably the case in both Egypt and Babylonia, where the histories of Osiris and Marduk seem to represent the former and the relations of Horus to Ra and of Nebo to Marduk the latter.

Can we detect either of these movements in the half-obliterated traces of early Hebrew syncretism? Gen. 1. 26 and 3. 22 might suggest a tendency to the absorption of different deities into the same personality, but it is doubtful if these passages are best explained in this way. Much more clear are traces of subordination. Gen. 6. 1-6; Psa. 29. 1; 86. 8

may be explained by this idea. This tendency of syncretism early disappeared under the jealous isolation of Jahveh as the one God of Israel. The references from Psalms given above are the lingering echoes of a former faith, used to express a present belief in the absolute supremacy of Jahveh. Mosaism had no room even for divine servants of Jahveh, much less for a son. The gods of other nations are recognized, but are not placed in any organic relation to Jahveh (Judg. 11. 24; Exod. 15. 11). It seems possible, however, that in the transition from the older polytheism, which we are compelled to posit as the Semitic background of the Hebrew religion, to the new henotheistic position of Jahvism there may have been a stage when the subordination of the divine beings to Jahveh played a more important part than the literary period of the Hebrew religion reveals. If so, it will help account for the somewhat strange phenomenon of a religion with strong tendencies toward monotheism, yet using with perfect freedom the idea of a Spirit of God, or even of a spirit from God, figured as in 1 Kings 22. 21, f., as a distinct personality which Jahveh might send on his behests. It will help account for the semi-hypostasis of the Spirit, which always introduces an element of vagueness into its use in this period of Hebrew thought. On this supposition the phrase, together with some fringes of polydemonistic meaning, comes from a period when a multitude of divine beings were somewhat more distinctly conceived

than even in the earliest period of Hebrew literature—conceived, however, not as independent, but as subordinate in personality and power to Jahveh.

But if this aids us to understand the notion of the Spirit of God or the spirit from God, of Spirit as the medium of activity in distinction from God as the actor, it still leaves the notion of Spirit itself to be explained.

Here etymology will assist us. The Spirit, used for the active power of God, is the breath[1] of God. The divine psychology of the term, if we may use such a phrase, rests, as all scholars see, upon its human psychology. The breath was the manifestation of the active life. In excitement it came more quickly. With vigorous activity, running, severe exertion of any kind, it became fuller, stronger, more rapid. In sleep it was slower, and in death it disappeared altogether. It offered itself as the most obvious measure of vital activity. In this it contrasted with the blood. "The blood is the life" is perhaps as old a generalization as that the breath is the life. But blood differs from breath in two important ways: First, it is always material, and does not suggest an invisible power connected with life; second, it is not possible to think of it as something which may be sent out, and so it is more appropriate as a symbol of the static than of the

[1] Wendt (*Fleisch und Geist*) carries it back a step farther, to the wind (p. 41). It seems doubtful whether the living breath is not more close to the basal idea than the invisible, immaterial wind. Early religious ideas more often start with a conception of a living power than with a lifeless force.

dynamic life. Thus we find it in the Old Testament. It is never used of the divine life at all, though there is no inherent reason why it should not be, as well as the hands or the feet or the heart. When used of man it is never in the sense of psychical activity. The nearest approach to such use is in Gen. 4. 10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground," where the very strength of the figure lies in the powerlessness of the passive life, represented by the blood, to accomplish its own vengeance.

As we have already seen in the case of the Spirit of God, the use of the term "spirit of man" as applied to man soon broadens out from one sense into others, and we have the spirit as meaning the essential life of man. Still it differs from the use of blood in being his essential life as a conscious soul rather than as a physical being.

It is now easy to pass to the use of the term "spirit" as descriptive of the divine life. 1. Direct anthropomorphism would lead to the use of the same term to describe the divine life as was used to describe the human life. God is like man. But, since God is an immaterial and invisible being, the term connoting the relatively immaterial and invisible elements of human life would naturally be used of him. 2. Since early man was everywhere interested in the activity of God rather than in his passive life, that term would be chosen which was most closely connected with man's activity of life. Thus the direct anthropomorphism found in all

early religion led to the use of the term "spirit" for the activity of God.

Can we now build the different results of our investigation into an explanation of the particular central idea of the early Hebrew usage—that of the Spirit as the cause of prophecy and of other like inexplicable phenomena? It would seem to be possible to do this. These phenomena were regarded as manifestations of a direct contact between God and man. They came and went independently of visible or audible cause. They constituted a vivid experience to those who were their subjects. Sometimes they were even almost unwelcome. Compare the "calls" of the great prophets, every one of which implies almost a dread of the divine afflatus. At all times these experiences had, even to the subjects of them, a certain fearsome quality. They were inexplicable and uncanny, but very intense, very real. Their explanation could only be in a connection with God as intense and real as was the experience. The term which denoted active divine energy, vital but invisible, was peculiarly appropriate for the explanation of these phenomena. The most immaterial term that the language possessed was the most fitting for such mysterious movings of divinity. It was never even forgotten that back of the term stood the figure of the breath, the same element as the wind, whose mysterious changes and invisible motion but served to add power to the figure. Even as late as the gospel of John we have still the memory of these two ele-

ments of the figure: "Jesus breathed on them and said, Receive ye the Holy Spirit;" "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth: so is everyone that is born of the Spirit."

At the same time this psychical conception, with its roots in anthropomorphism, was strengthened by a religious conception, with its roots in polydemonism. Subordinate divine beings were messengers of God, and might be sent hither and yon on his bidding. As Jahveh's personality becomes more clear theirs become more shadowy, until finally they almost disappear from view, and all their functions become absorbed by this expression for the active God. And so two forces working independently unite to lay the foundations for a semi-hypostasis of the activity of God. It is not surprising if this double origin causes certain elements of vagueness in the later structure of Hebrew thought.

Thus we account for the conception of the Spirit as God active in those extraordinary phenomena of human life which constituted early prophetic experience. This was doubtless the earliest phase of the idea. But there is another element which seems to have lain in Hebrew thought in the pre-literary period. It is that of the Spirit as the basis of the entire rational life. What were the steps which led to this stage of thought? They were examples of early philosophizing. Men soon found that the ex-

traordinary was not the only range of life which needed explanation. Life itself, as well as the strange ecstasy of prophecy, needed a cause. The same course of thought was in progress in all growing civilizations. The best example outside of Hebrew thought is that of India. The Hindu and the Hebrew alike were led to the conclusion that the life of man, with all its phenomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, was due to the activity of God. The Hebrew had what the Hindu had not—a term which expressed the active God, and which was already closely connected with that activity as shown in the psychic life of man. It was easy for him, by the use of this term, to affirm that God was the cause of the life of man, even that the life of man was itself the breath of God, thus making the closest possible connection between God and man that could be made without the assumption of identity, and yet not to affirm that God was man or that man was God. The temptation to pantheism was thus avoided, even had the Hebrew been more inclined to philosophize than he was. The Hindu had no such convenient distinction. He was feeling after the same truth of a close relation of God to man. He could only say, however, that the life of man was the life of God; which, after all, is exactly what the Hebrew said, but in different language. That difference of language makes much difference in the history of thought. The Hindu could logically reach by his expression nothing but pantheism, with its inevitable outcome of

Vedanta and Maya. The Hebrew, without conscious philosophy and yet with perfect logic, could reach the conception of a transcendent God at the same time immanent in the world of human consciousness, and therefore in the world of external nature as well.

The origins of the idea of the Spirit lie in the common ground of early religious concepts. The growth of it may be explained by laws which we find working in all early religions. Its peculiarity is that it started very early along a line of development which is, as far as we can see, the only line that could have prepared it to receive the rich religious content with which Judaism and Christianity later filled it. If there is ever a providence in the history of human thought, surely here is a place where it may be seen.

CHAPTER III

The Canonical Writings after the Exile

THE post-exilic literature presents a much more complicated field of study in our subject than does the pre-exilic literature. This is partly due to the wider range of thought expressed in it, partly to the difficulty of dating certain portions of it, but mainly to the fact that the term "the Spirit of God" had lost its former simplicity of meaning, and was used of a wider variety of phenomena, but had not yet acquired the somewhat clear definition that it did at a later period. Such a time of more or less confusion of meaning is not uncommon at the period when a term passes from the unreflective use to the beginning of a more philosophic use.

To make a satisfactory classification of Hebrew and Jewish literature after the exile is not easy. For our purpose, however, it will divide fairly well into three sections: Post-exilic literature to the Greek period; Palestinian-Judaistic literature after the beginning of the Greek period; and Alexandrian-Judaistic literature. This chapter will be devoted to the first period, the writings of which will be designated simply as post-exilic Hebrew literature.

In this literature we find the following uses of the "Spirit of God" or the "Spirit of Jahveh:"[1]

[1] The following classification follows, as far as possible, the form of that of the pre-exilic writings, given on p. 5, ff.

A. Spirit used of God acting in the sphere of individual rational life:

1. For endowment of individuals with charismatic gifts:

(*a*) Prophecy: Num. 11. 29 (P); Ezek. 2. 2; 3. 12, 14, 24; 8. 3; 11. 1, 5, 24;[1] 37. 1; 43. 5; Neh. 9. 30; 1 Chron. 12. 18; 2 Chron. 15. 1; 20. 14; 24. 20; Isa. 48. 16 (perhaps); 61. 1 (if referring to a prophet).

(*b*) Skill in ruling: Num. 11. 17; 27. 18 (P).

(*c*) Skill in artisan work: Exod. 28. 3; 31. 3; 35. 31 (P) (all refer to one person, Bezaleel).

(*d*) Prowess in war: Judg. 11. 29.

(*e*) Wisdom: Deut. 34. 9 (P); Job 32. 8; 33. 4 (?).

2. As the basis of human life. This list is made to include both the rational and the physical life. In many cases it is impossible to distinguish between them. The Hebrew writers of this period often treated man as a unit, and conceived of the Spirit as the basis of his life quite without reference to the distinction of physical and mental: Isa. 42. 5; Job 27. 3; 33. 4; 34. 14; Zech. 12. 1; Mal. 2. 15 (?);[2] Num. 16. 22; 27. 16; Eccles. 3. 21 (comp. 12. 7).[3]

B. Spirit used for God acting in the physical world and in the development of human history:

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[1] Cornill regards as a gloss.

[2] For text of this obscure passage see Smith, *Book of Twelve Prophets*, p. 364, note; Wendt, *Fleisch und Geist*, p. 36; Nowack, *Kleine Propheten*.

[3] Ecclesiastes is treated in this period because, even if written slightly later, its general attitude of thought is conservative, as, for example, its skepticism regarding the new doctrine of the resurrection.

1. Acting on external nature apart from man: Job 26. 13; Gen. 1. 2 (P); Psa. 33. 6;[1] 104. 30.

2. Guiding or influencing in the field of human actions. In these books it always has to do with the past or the future of Israel. It shades off into the distinctly Messianic use:

(*a*) Of Israel's past history: Isa. 63. 10, 11, 14; Neh. 9. 20; Psa. 106. 33.

(*b*) Of the Messiah: Isa. 11. 2, 4.

(*c*) Of the "Servant of Jahveh," in whom the Spirit is a present possession: Isa. 42. 1; 59. 21; 61. 1 (if of the Servant) (comp. Psa. 51. 13 [Eng. 12]; 143. 10. If these psalms are national, the use is still the same).

(*d*) Of the future of Israel (that is, a Messianic promise): Psa. 143. 10; Ezek. 11. 19; 36. 26, 27; 37. 14; 39. 29; Isa. 4. 4; 32. 15; 34. 16; 44. 3; Zech. 4. 6; 12. 10; Joel 3. 1, 2 (Eng. 2. 28, 29) (comp. Psa. 51. 11; 143. 10).

C. Spirit used in a general way of the plan or purpose of God in relation to man: Isa. 40. 13.

D. Spirit used in the sphere of the religious life: Psa. 51. 11, 12 (Eng. 10, 11); 143. 10; 139. 7.

On page 7 attention was directed to certain conclusions from the pre-exilic use of Spirit. Comparing the passages noted above with the treatment there, we find:

1. In pre-exilic literature Spirit was never used of God *ab intra*. Here there is an approach to such

[1] This passage denotes the power of God under the figure of the breath, the double meaning of רוח allowing this use.

a use, though only once. In Psa. 139. 7 the Spirit of God is parallel with the "presence" (פני). Both are figurative expressions, used pleonastically for God, considered not dynamically but statically. Not activity but omniscience is here posited of the divine Spirit. During this period the spirit came to be used statically of man, to indicate his personality (Eccles. 3. 21; comp. Num. 16. 22). An extension of the same psychological use is here made to the divine Spirit.

2. There Spirit was always used of God acting, directly or indirectly, in relation to man. Here it is not. God's action in creation and in the ordinary processes of external nature is here assigned to the Spirit, quite apart from any bearing which these may have on human life (see Job 26. 13; Psa. 104. 29; 33. 6).

3. There the dominant idea is the charismatic. Here the charismatic no longer holds such prominence. The change in the main emphasis may be traced in the literature of the period itself. In Ezekiel the Spirit of prophetic inspiration is still prominent. The usage occurs ten times (nine if 11. 24 is discarded as a gloss). As prophecy disappears, this phase of experience passes into historic memory, and the conception of the Spirit as the source or medium of individual gifts tends to decline with it. The dominant thought then becomes more difficult to name. Instead of one idea overshadowing all others, we discover two quite different concepts of approximately equal prominence in the literature,

and both of great value for the future history of religion: One is the Spirit as the first cause and controlling power in the external world; the other, the Spirit as the guide of Israel's past history and the force that will shape its future destiny. In the last phase it becomes the name for God's activity in the Messianic time.

4. The concept of the Spirit as the basis of human life, without separation between the rational and the physical, now rises into importance. The thought had already appeared in the earlier writings (Gen. 6. 3). Two things tended to develop the idea in later literature: One was the tendency to expand an idea from a narrow to a wider range, which we have already noted as at work in this field; the other was the growing attention to the question of origins, a part of the philosophizing development of the human race which even Hebrew thought did not wholly escape.

In the study of the earlier literature emphasis was laid on the close connection of the Spirit with the extraordinary in life. The Spirit was there seldom used except as the source of unusual phenomena, while, conversely, unusual phenomena, when considered in their religious aspect, might almost always be explained as caused by the Spirit. We found also that the predominant use of the Spirit was in connection with individual endowment. Its significance was grounded ultimately in experience. It was the interpretation of the feeling of uplift and inspiration, perhaps even simply of mystery, accompanying

certain experiences and emotions that strongly affected those who were subject to them. In post-exilic literature the idea of individual endowment was, as we have seen above, not so prominent. The cruder conceptions tended to disappear. No case of bodily strength was assigned to the Spirit, as in the stories of Samson. The instance apparently most nearly parallel to this is the ascription of the skill of Bezaleel to the Spirit (Exod. 28. 3 *et al*), but this, as will be seen later, represented a national rather than an individual relation to the Spirit. The same is true of Joshua's skill in ruling (Num. 27. 18). There is left only wisdom and prophecy. Wisdom is an endowment of the Spirit only in the Wisdom literature, and in connection with the conception of wisdom as divine in essence. The only clear passage on this subject is Prov. 1. 23: "I will pour out my Spirit upon you." It means, as the parallel, "I will make known my words unto you," shows, "I will utter myself to you" (Toy *in loco*). The phrase and the idea are both directly borrowed from prophecy. While the endowment is clearly wisdom, the method of endowment is expressed in a way entirely analogous to prophetic usage.

The peculiar physical accompaniments of prophetic inspiration had disappeared from the work of at least the more valued prophets of Israel, but the tradition of the presence and power of the Spirit had remained. It is certain that even in the pre-exilic time the prophets whose writings were pre-

served were conscious of a mental experience which was to them not less supernatural than were the physical, dervish-like manifestations of the earliest Hebrew prophecy. The feeling of the imperativeness of his message which Amos expresses in 3. 3-8 can thus best be explained. This also gives a hint of what the experience was through which God revealed "his secret unto his servants the prophets." They had a perception which constituted for them a message. The clearness of this perception was the proof to them that it came from the Spirit of Jehovah. Its character, as a perception of truths lying mainly in the field of the intellectual, made the phrase "God spake" most natural. But doubtless we should not do justice to this experience if we merely regarded it as an intellectual perception with a moral content. That it had a content of emotion as well, we must believe. The vividness and compelling power of the conviction can be explained in no other way. The prophetic writings are also full of expressions which are strongly emotional.

This powerful conviction with its accompaniment of a strong emotion was not resolved by the prophet into elements of patriotism, reflection, logic, and religious feeling, but taken entire, just as he experienced it, for a divine gift. It was not for him the labored working of a human mind, but the direct inbreathing of God himself. In the early post-exilic times this experience was still felt, and so long as it was, the Spirit was regarded as

its origin. It is worthy of note that the Spirit was still confined to experiences of strongly emotional content, expressed in traditional terms of bodily meaning. The Spirit "falls upon" the prophet (Ezek. 11. 5), "enters into" him (2. 2), "takes" him "up" (3. 12), "carries" him "away" (3. 14), but never speaks. God speaks. In the New Testament this distinction is lost, and the Spirit is regarded as speaking through the prophet (for example, Acts 1. 16). It will be noted that all the passages above are drawn from Ezekiel. He is the last prophet who expressed his emotional experience in this form, and in this respect he belongs to the period of pre-exilic rather than of post-exilic religious thought.

With the exile began the period of reflection upon the nation's past. Now the older historic writings were reedited in the spirit of a reflective moral criticism. The traditional thought that God had guided the nation now came with new force. It is not surprising that the Spirit was used of that guidance. It was the strongest term the Hebrew possessed for the activity of God. Another element tending to this use is that the reflection on the past national history was all passed through the filter of prophetic thought. Even the editors of the priestly codes were indebted to the pre-exilic prophets for their general ideas of God's relation to Israel in the past. Even the most priestly writers were therefore in a measure the disciples of the prophets. Now, to all disciples of the prophets God's

guidance of the nation seemed to come largely through the prophets, that is, according to traditional conceptions, through the Spirit of Jahveh (comp. Neh. 9. 30). From the guidance of God by his Spirit in the prophets it is a short and easy step which is taken by the authors of Psa. 106. 33; Isa. 63. 10-14; and Neh. 9. 20, when they speak of the Spirit of God as in Moses for the direction of Israel. In fact, this is hardly an advance at all, for already Deut. 18. 18 assumes that Moses was a prophet. There seems, however, to be in these passages the reflection of a thought somewhat wider than merely that of the prophetic inspiration of Moses. The thought seems to center about God's general attitude toward Israel rather than about Moses as the special medium of God's action. In Neh. 9. 20 the Spirit for instruction is coupled with manna and water. In Psa. 106. 33, so far from making prominent the divine inspiration of Moses, the writer has in mind the human frailty of Moses's rash speech. In Isa. 63. 10-14 the thought is still more distinctly of the general providential guidance of Israel.

If we question what is the significance of the fact that, with the possible exception of Isa. 63. 10,[1] all references to the past guidance of Israel by the Spirit relate to the period of the wilderness wanderings, we shall find the answer lying in the conception of Hebrew history quite as much as in the

[1] If this passage also refers to the wilderness wanderings, there is no exception.

doctrine of the Spirit. The Mosaic period was that to which Hebrew thought always turned most readily when it considered the care of God in the nation's history, as in Mic. 6. 4, 5; Psa. 135. 8-14. To this period it was easy to assign special workings of the Spirit. All religions are prone to find the activity of God specially manifest in those periods of the distant past which are glorified by heroic legends. This also furnishes the explanation of P's use of the Spirit for artisan inspiration. It was no derogation of divine dignity that an artisan of the distant past, when Jahveh so manifestly led his people, should be considered under the control of the Spirit when engaged in work connected with Jahveh's worship. This is plainly traditional development, not grounded in the facts of experience. The like is assumed in no other case in the Old Testament, nor in any other Jewish literature. There is no evidence that any Hebrew artisan ever regarded himself, or that his contemporaries ever regarded him, as under the control of the Spirit. It is not correct to imply that the Hebrew artisan's labor might be regarded as the fitting subject of the Spirit's inspiration. That an artisan in a time of special divine guidance of the nation, concerned in a special religious work, is regarded in a late priestly writing as having been directed by the Spirit, by no means justifies such a statement. There is nothing in the experience of ordinary artisan labor that would suggest a belief in its inspiration, and living ideas of inspiration have always

been determined by the interpretation of actual experience. The same principles will apply to the representation of the Spirit as imparting skill in ruling which P gives in Num. 27. 18.

The charismatic Spirit is more clearly confined to endowments for direct religious purposes here than in pre-exilic literature. What has just been said shows that the cases of artisan labor and of skill in ruling cannot be regarded as secular. The literature presents us with no other charismatic endowments except prophecy and wisdom, both of which were strongly religious.

Of greater importance than all other changes is the rise of a new use of Spirit which connects it with the personal character, the ethical-religious use as distinguished from the emotional-religious and the ceremonial-religious. It is true that the cases of Spirit used in this sense are few, but they indicate with sufficient clearness the existence of this factor in Hebrew thought. It is true also that the only clear passages, Psa. 51. 11, 12; 143. 10,[1] are in psalms whose interpretation is in question. If they refer to national rather than to individual experiences, it would seem at first sight that they do not belong in this classification, and that we cannot be sure that Hebrew thought had even yet taken this important step. But if the author of Psa. 51 "spoke in the name of the church" (Cheyne, *Bampton Lectures,* page 161), it still remains true

[1] If the date of Cheyne be accepted, Psa. 143 would fall in the next period (Post-Persian, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 66), but Psa. 51 would still fall in this period (Restoration, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 162).

that he, as also the author of Psa. 143, uses the figures of individual life in which to clothe his thought. The subject of the poems is conscious of sin, his spirit faints, his soul longs for God as a weary land, he flees to God, he rejoices in forgiveness. Nothing in these psalms stands opposed to a personal interpretation, whether literal or figurative. The Psalms lie within the range of personal experience, and can only be explained as national under the supposition of a personal experience transferred to the nation. Whether the Psalms are national or not, then, does not affect the interpretation of the meaning of the Spirit. That interpretation remains personal.

In a general way the transition to this ethical-religious conception is clear. It follows inevitably from the exilic consciousness, such as Ezek. 18 and 33 reveal, of a personal relation to God. It is the logical outcome, in minds strongly imbued with religious thought, of the newly perceived idea of personal worth. But such a general statement does not satisfy the demand for genetic analysis. When we examine more closely, four ways by which the idea may have taken shape suggest themselves:

1. The Spirit may have been used of the origin of physical life; then, as religious consciousness grew, it may have been transferred from the origin of physical life to the origin of religious life. This would be growth by analogy.

2. There may have been a growing tendency to use the Spirit of God only for phenomena of clearly

religious value. Then the idea of the Spirit of God working in man may have become in a kindred way limited specially to the religious consciousness. This would be growth by limitation.

3. At the same time that the religious consciousness of the Hebrew grew, the physical phenomena which had formerly been referred to the Spirit decreased. The term formerly used of the origin of these physical phenomena may have been transferred to the ethical-religious, as being now the dominant element in the thought of divine activity. This would be growth by transference between phases of personal experience. This differs from the change noted under 1 in connecting the origin of this use with the charismatic rather than with the cosmical idea.

4. National religious life had come to be conceived as under the guidance of the Spirit of God. As personal religious consciousness grew, the personal religious life, like the national, may have come to be considered as under the same guidance of the Spirit. This would be growth by transference of idea from national to individual life.

All of these may have been factors of development. Our knowledge of the steps of progress in Hebrew thought is so slight that it would be rash to exclude any of them. We can, however, say as much as this: that the transition of the idea of the Spirit from national to individual life was very probably a large factor in this development. Certainly in the minds of some the working of the

Spirit in the nation's life had come to be predominantly ethical-religious. Such was largely Ezekiel's idea, even with all his priestly tendencies (see, for example, 36. 16-38). Nor was it a prophetic novelty. Its germs go back to the eighth century prophets. Then, when the holiness of the nation as a result of the Spirit's work was a dominant thought, the holiness of the individual as the result of endowment by that same Spirit follows naturally.

Why, then, did it not arise earlier? While it is true that the great emphasis on the future of Israel as a holy nation belongs to the exilic prophets, the idea was not so foreign to earlier prophets but that it might have led to the corresponding idea of ethical holiness in the individual. Why had it not done so? Because national holiness was only one element in the idea. The other element, no less necessary, was the clear recognition of the concept of personality. This is always assumed in modern thought. It was not assumed in ancient thought. A concept of personality so clear that it could stand apart and be made the subject of definite consideration is not found in Hebrew literature earlier than the exilic time. Ezekiel is the first writer who clearly perceived it. Only after it had gained recognition could the concept of personal ethical-religious life as the work of the Spirit come into being.

It is probable that the change of experience in the growth of religious thought which is summarized above under 3 may also have had its bearing on the

development of this new idea. We have seen that the physical phenomena of early prophecy had largely passed away. We have seen also that as long as the peculiar mental and emotional experiences that made up later prophecy lasted the prophet considered himself, and was doubtless considered by others, as inspired. When, however, prophecy declined there was no longer any experience except that of simple religious consciousness which could be ascribed to the Spirit. It would perhaps be more correct to say that Hebrew thought had now reached the stage where simple religious consciousness could take the place of the older and more intense experiences which were interpreted to indicate union with God. It was a natural sequence that the loftiest term Israel had for the expression of this union should not be laid aside, but lifted to a still loftier meaning and applied to what was now the highest and purest religious experience that devout hearts in Israel knew. Thus always at a certain stage in advancing religious thought the external has yielded to the internal, the ritualistic to the ethical and spiritual. Thus, for example, prayer ceased to be a mere appendage of sacrifice and rose to an independent expression of communion with God. This change in the experience which was ascribed to the Spirit is but part of the working of a law which the history of religions abundantly exemplifies elsewhere.

No period of profound reflection on God and his work could long confine the active power of God to

the field of individual consciousness or of national life. Already in the earlier period it had begun to reach beyond that into the realm of nature, but as yet only for the sake of man. In the time of the exile, when new national experiences were yielding so many new religious ideas, this idea of God in nature also passed through a period of very rapid expansion. Then for the first time cosmogony interested Hebrew thought.[1] Here, too, God was conceived of as active. What more natural than to say that the agent of this activity was the Spirit of God? If Jahveh was the God of all the world, not of Israel and Palestine only, then all the operations of nature were the working of the Spirit of God. The very growth and decay of the transient grass and flower proceeded from the Spirit (Isa. 40. 7). No operation of nature was too insignificant to be under the guidance of the Spirit of God. Man's connection with natural operations now disappeared as a reason for the interest of God's Spirit in them. To God the Creator nature is an end in itself, not merely a means. In this period Hebrew thought passed from the anthropocentric to the cosmocentric phase, and the change in the usage of the Spirit is one mark of that transition.

[1] Gen. 1; Psa. 8, 104; Job 26, the chief cosmological passages of the Hebrew Scriptures, are all exilic or later. בָּרָא (create) is used of the creation in pre-exilic writings only in Amos 4. 13; Deut. 4. 22 (exilic?). In P it is used 9 times, allowing Gen. 6. 7 to stand apart as R, in Second Isaiah 17 times, in Psalms 3 times. The title of God as Creator (בּוֹרֵא) is wholly post-exilic (Isa. 40. 28; 43. 15; Eccles. 12. 1). עָשָׂה (make) is used of creation in pre-exilic writings only in J, Gen. 2, ff. (Exod. 20. 11 is R, dependent upon P); Amos 4. 13; 5. 8; Isa. 27. 11; 29. 16, f.; 37. 16; Jer. 10. 12, f.; 14. 22; 27. 5; 32. 17; 51. 15, f. It is thus used in Second Isaiah 12 times, in Job 6 times, in Psalms 17 times (all plainly post-exilic, from Psa. 86 to end of the book), and in Ecclesiastes 7 times.

In the literature of this period what is the relation of the Spirit to the created universe? To material nature the Spirit stands in the relation of a transcendent cause. It caused the change from chaos to the ordered cosmos (Gen. 1. 2), made the heavens (Psa. 33. 6), "garnished" them (Job 26. 13), withers the grass and the flower (Isa. 40. 7), controls the floods of waters (Psa. 18. 15), endows the beasts with life (Psa. 104. 30). Nowhere do we have the assertion of any except the transcendental relation toward nature apart from man. It is interesting to note that the author of Psa. 104. 30 avoids saying that the Spirit of God which is sent out from him becomes the spirit of the beasts. The idea is plainly that of external causation, as determined by the preceding parallels, "Thou openest thy hand, they are satisfied with good; thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, they die." In all these, as also in the verse following, "Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created," there is an elliptical omission of the connective in the sense of result.

In certain passages where the Spirit is used of man a transcendental interpretation is possible. Such are Isa. 42. 5, God giveth the spirit to man; Job 33. 4, "The Spirit of God hath made me;" Eccles. 12. 7, "The spirit shall return to God who gave it." Note that this last does not speak of the human spirit as the Spirit of God, but the spirit which God gave. Compare, for the idea of the return of the Spirit of God, Psa. 104. 29, f.; Zech.

12. 1, God forms the spirit of man within him; Num. 16. 22; 27, 16, "Lord of the spirits of all flesh;" Mal. 2. 15. Other passages demand for explanation the idea of the Spirit as immanent cause: Job 27. 3, The breath of God is in my nostrils; Job 34. 14, "If he gather unto himself his spirit and his soul" (if "his" refers to God).

The predominant use is here still the transcendental. The narrow range of literature in which the immanent idea is found is noticeable. In character this literature is that which most closely approaches the philosophical. The statement so often made that in common Hebrew thought the spirit of man was the Spirit of God is not entirely correct. That certain Hebrew writers held such an idea must be admitted. That it was a common Hebrew notion does not seem to be the fact.

In the charismatic use some passages admit of a transcendental interpretation. Such are Ezek. 3. 12, 14; 8. 3; 11. 1, 24; 43. 5; Zech. 4. 6. In these the Spirit acts upon the prophet from without.

The Spirit used in the sense of immanent causation is, however, more usual. Of individuals: Ezek. 2. 2; 3. 24; 11. 5; Isa. 61. 1 (?); Num. 27. 18; Exod. 31. 3; 35. 31; Job 32. 8; Prov. 1. 23 (?); Neh. 9. 20. Of the nation: Isa. 42. 1; 59. 21; 61. 1 (if of the Servant); Joel 3. 1; Ezek. 11. 19; 36. 26, f.; 37. 14; 39. 29; Zech. 12. 10. Here the Spirit "enters into" the prophet or the nation, and the action is from within. The idea seems also usually to be that of a permanent force residing

in the person or nation, rather than a gift for a particular time and purpose. Where the ancient prophetic use is followed, as in Ezekiel, the use of the immanent idea is easily enough accounted for by ancient notions of the Spirit as immanent in the prophets; so perhaps also in the wisdom passages Job 32. 8; Prov. 1. 23. In the cases of the use of the Spirit as the possession of the Servant in the present or of all Israel in the future simple tradition no longer serves to account for the immanence. The old idea of prophetic inspiration doubtless furnished the foundation, but the superstructure belonged to living thought.

Now, to gather up the facts: The Spirit is used as a transcendent cause for all nature outside man. It is sometimes used as a transcendent and sometimes, but less often, as an immanent cause for the life of man. It is used sometimes as a transcendent, but much more often as an immanent, cause for individual and national endowments. That is, the Spirit of God operates *upon* nature, but operates both *in* and *upon* man. This last clause expresses not two ideas, but one and the same idea stated in two different ways. We find both used in the same writer, as in Ezekiel. We must not complain that the Hebrew writers did not see a discrepancy in these different ways of looking at God's activity; nor must we complain that they coupled the physical and rational life of man together as over against the physical external world.

This leads to the question, What is the distinc-

tion between God and the Spirit? It is still what it was in the earlier literature, that the Spirit is God active in the world. The Hebrew now differentiates between God and the world more sharply and philosophically than in the earlier period. There is a clearer sense of the transcendence of God. He is above the world, acting upon it from without. This is God considered as the philosophizing tendency demanded. With the further growth of reflection still more emphasis was laid on the transcendental character of God. It is the same tendency that culminated in the refusal to pronounce the name of the Deity. Had religion been only philosophy, the Spirit of God would have become only a transcendental power acting on the world and human life from without, not differing from God himself. The term would have lost special meaning and would perhaps have finally disappeared, as in the next period of the literature it actually does cease to be used in this meaning.

But religious feeling has ever made a different demand. It has felt the sense of union with the Deity, has striven to make that union as close as possible, and has earnestly sought means for its expression.

Theology and ritual in early Judaism were putting God away from man, until in the second century before Christ the author of Daniel gave as a commonplace the opinion that "the gods dwell not with man." But Hebrew religion had another side, that of religious feeling, and that side took refuge

in the use of the ancient conception of the Spirit of God. Sophistication had robbed religion of the old and crude ways of expressing union with God through the Spirit. Enthusiasm and exuberant prophetic ecstasy no longer satisfied it. But that only drove religion to a new ground. Deprived of frenzy and emotional excitement as evidences of the possession of the Spirit, it sought these evidences in the calm and rational religious experiences. As said above, the Spirit is, as in the earlier literature, God acting; but here it tends to become God acting *in* the human experience, and *upon,* not *in,* the external world. The tendency was toward the position that the Spirit is God immanent in man, as distinguished from God transcendent over the world, including man. When this tendency had become fully developed theological thought was ready to enter upon the New Testament stage of the subject.

It would be interesting to compare the search for union with God in early Judaism with that in other religions in periods of increasing theological and ritual activity. Essentially the same elements would be found in all. The feeling of union with God will not down. If crushed in one form, it finds refuge in another. Neither philosophy nor ritual are able to rob religion of this, its basal conception. Great activity in the field of thought or of ceremonial usually produces great activity in the field of religious feeling as its complement. So it came about that in the Christian church the age

of the triumph of scholasticism was the age of a great outburst of mysticism. The period of great activity in the purely deistic Mohammedan theology saw the rise of Sufism. In India a remarkably mechanical, ritualistic theology developed, and also the strongest mystical quietism that the world has seen; and while we know so little of dates in Indian history that we must speak with caution on all matters involving them, yet everything that can be discovered favors the view that the two developed in direct relation to each other.

The comparisons here suggested show us that the course which the conception of the Spirit took in early Judaism was in no way an isolated or inexplicable phenomenon, but was subject to the common laws of religious history. The only thing about it which is peculiar is that the Hebrew had an expression which allowed for the full development of the idea of man's union with God, yet without in any way violating the conception of the transcendental character of God.

CHAPTER IV

The Palestinian-Jewish Writings

It will be best for our purpose to discuss the later Judaic writings of the pre-Christian period in two sections, the Palestinian and the Alexandrian. Both the conception of the Spirit and the experience which it represents differ somewhat in the two literatures. In the Palestinian writings we include those Jewish productions dating from about B. C. 200 to the end of the first century of the Christian era which represent Palestinian as distinct from Alexandrian Judaism.

Classifying the uses of the Spirit in this literature as nearly as possible as in previous sections, we have the following arrangement:

A. Spirit used of God acting in the individual rational life:

1. For endowment of individuals with charismatic gifts:

(*a*) Prophecy: Sir. 48. 24, "Isaiah saw by a great spirit the last things." Test. XII, Levi 2, "A spirit of discernment of the Lord came over me." This spirit of vision seems to be essentially the same as the spirit of prophecy.[1]

(*b*) Skill in judgment: Sus. 45, Theod., "God raised up the holy spirit of a young lad, whose name

[1] Add Mart., Isa. 5. 14. During the martyrdom "Isaiah cried not nor wept, but his mouth discoursed" "mit heiligen Geist" (so Beer, in Kautsch, *Apoc. u. Pseudepigraphen*).

was Daniel." 42 LXX, "The angel, as he had been commanded, gave a sagacious spirit to a young man, namely, to Daniel"[1] (comp. 64 LXX, "For young men are piously disposed, and there will be in them a spirit of knowledge and sagacity forever").

(*c*) Wisdom: Sir. 39. 6, "If the great Lord will, he shall be filled with the spirit of understanding" (comp. 4 Macc. 7. 14, where the Spirit which revives life after death is called *πνεῦμα τοῦ λογισμοῦ*, Spirit of reasoning).

(*d*) The interpretation of dreams: Dan. 4. 8, 9, 18; 5. 12, 14.

(*e*) An ethical use (see C).

2. As the basis of human life. As in the early post-exilic literature, this division includes the whole man, without sharp distinction between the physical and the rational. Man is considered as a unit over against the rest of creation. At the same time the passages given below emphasize the rational rather than the physical:

Jub. 5. 8: "My Spirit shall not remain forever upon men, for they are flesh" (borrowed directly from Gen. 6. 3).

Apoc. Baruch 23. 5: "My Spirit is the creator of life" (said in speaking of life after death. The book is comparatively late, coming from the last half of the first Christian century).

4 Macc. 7. 14, quoted above, 1, (*c*).

[1] Passages like this seem to be the meeting point of the idea of the Spirit of God and the conception of the human spirit. The spirit is thought of as being in some way connected with God, yet as being at the same time the spirit of a man.

Judith 16. 14:

"For all thy creatures serve thee
For thou spakest, and they came into being,
Thou didst send forth thy Spirit, and it fashioned them"

(this may include animal life as well; if so, it is probably a borrowing of the common older idea, perhaps from Psa. 104. 30).

The following passages belong here only by inference. They speak of the human spirit as created by God, though not explicitly mentioning the Spirit of God as the active agent of creation:

2 Macc. 7. 22, f.: "I [the mother] know not how you came into my womb, nor did I give you spirit and life, and did not arrange in order the constituent parts of each one. Accordingly the Creator of the world, who originated and formed man, and found out the origin of all things, will in mercy give you back both spirit and life again."

2 Macc. 14. 46: "Calling upon the Lord of life and spirit to restore him these again, he thus died" (comp. 4 Macc. 16. 25, "If God would make them life;" same idea, without use of spirit).

2 Macc. 3. 24:[1] "The Lord of spirits," or "of spirit."

Enoch 37. 2, 4, 5, etc.: "The Lord of spirits." Compare note in Charles's *Enoch, in loco:* "One hundred and four times, twenty-eight of these at least in interpolations." Its original meaning in Enoch seems to be the Lord of the spirits of angels

[1] Fritzsch reads *πατέρων*; Sweet, Kamphausen (Kautsch's edition), *πνευμάτων*.

and of the dead (see 40. 7-10), the principle of whose life is spiritual (comp. 15. 4, 6; 61. 12).

B. Spirit representing God acting in the physical world and in the development of history:

1. On external nature apart from man. While there are no passages extant representing the Spirit as acting on nature apart from man, it is not impossible that there may be a remote connection between that more ancient idea and the conception which occasionally appears that the phenomena of nature have spirits:

Jub. 2. 2: "Then on the first day he created the heaven and the earth and the water and all the spirits who serve before him, . . . the angel of the wind-spirit and the angel of the spirit of the clouds of darkness and of the hail and of the hoar-frost, . . . and the angel of the spirits of the cold and the heat and the winter and the spring and the autumn and the summer," etc. (so Enoch 60. 16, where much the same list of natural objects is given).

Charles (*Assumption of Moses,* page 106, ff.) suggests that the original form of the *Assumption* contained the claim of Satan to the lordship of the world, to which Michael rejoined, "The Lord rebuke thee, for it was God's Spirit that created the world and all mankind, so God is the Lord of the world." The passages on the basis of which Charles makes the above suggestion are the following: (*a*) *Acta Synodi Nicaen.,* II, 20, *ἀπὸ γάρ πνεύματος ἅγιον ἀυτοῦ παντός ἐκτίσθημεν.* (*b*) An anonymous writ-

ing from Cremer's *Catena in Epist. Cathol.*, page 160, Τουτέστι ὁ Κύριος τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκός.

The total lack elsewhere in the literature of any expression exactly equivalent to (*a*) and the very frequent use of "Lord of spirits" in the Similitudes of the book of Enoch would suggest the probability that (*b*) more nearly represents the original, and that Charles's reproduction should be revised accordingly.

2. For guidance or influence in the field of human actions. In these books always a possession of the personal Messiah, working redemption for Israel or judgment on her enemies. This becomes a charismatic use, and might be classed under A, 1:

Enoch 62. 2: "And the Lord of spirits seated him [that is, the Messiah] on the throne of his glory, and the spirit of righteousness was poured out upon him, and the word of his mouth slew all the sinners, and all the unrighteous were destroyed before his face."

Enoch 49. 3: "And in him dwells the spirit of wisdom and the spirit of him who gives knowledge and the spirit of understanding and of might and the spirit of those who have fallen asleep in righteousness."

Psa. Sol. 17. 42: "God shall cause him to be mighty through the spirit of holiness and wise through the counsel of understanding, with might and righteousness" (17. 37 in Kautsch's edition).

Psa. Sol. 18. 8: In the day of the Messiah the Lord will bring goodness to pass through him, "in

the spirit of wisdom and of righteousness and of might" (18. 7 in Kautsch's edition).

Test XII, Levi 18: "The spirit of understanding and of holiness will be upon him."

Judah 24: "The heavens will open over him to give him the blessing of the Spirit of the holy Father, and the spirit of grace will be poured out upon him."

All these passages seem to contain a reminiscence of Isa. 11. 2, a passage which evidently had a great influence on the Messianic thought of Judaism.

C. Of the ethical life:

Test. XII, Simon 4: "Joseph was a good man, and had the Spirit of God in him."

Benj. 4: "The good man . . . loves him who has the grace of a good spirit with his whole soul."

Benj. 8: "He is unspotted of heart, since the Spirit of God rests upon him" (this is charismatic in form).

D. Spirit used of God *ab intra:*

Enoch 67. 10: "Spirit of the Lord" (unique in Enoch and in this whole literature. Occurring in the Similitudes, which use "the Lord of the spirits" so often, the suggestion is obvious that it may be an error of text. So Beer in Kautsch [page 274], "viel. in 'Herrn d. Geister' zu verbessern").

Enoch 70. 2: "And he [Enoch] was carried aloft on the chariots of the Spirit, and the name vanished amongst men" (comp. 2 Kings 2. 11).

Comparing these passages with those from the earlier post-exilic period, we find:

1. The use of the Spirit for God *ab intra* gained no ground. Judaistic thought does not incline to identify God and the Spirit of God. The word "spirit" was coming into continually more frequent use as a name for the personality of man, but the analogy of this psychological usage was not carried over into the realm of theological thought.

2. In the earliest Hebrew period the term was only used in reference to God's action upon man or for the sake of man. In early post-exilic literature it was also used of God's action upon nature apart from man. Here there is a return to the older usage, but with a difference; for now all idea of the Spirit as God acting on nature, for the sake of man or otherwise, has disappeared, and the Spirit acts only on man.

3. In the earliest Hebrew period the dominant idea was charismatic and individual, based on the manifestations of prophecy. In the early post-exilic it was twofold, the Spirit in nature and the Spirit in national history and hope. Here once more it is charismatic, but with two elements: One is individual, the thought of the ethical value of the possession of the Spirit; the other is national, the gift of the Spirit to the Messiah. This connects itself, on the one hand, with the national hope so prominent in the last period, and, on the other, with the idea of the individual charismatic gift in its ethical value. (Note that the Spirit given to the

Messiah is a spirit of righteousness and justice, qualities which immediately link with the individual ethical idea.) One may draw these together, then, in the statement that the dominant idea is that of the ethical rather than the merely physical or psychical result of the possession of the Spirit of God.

4. The concept of the Spirit as the essential substance of human life is nowhere clearly stated. It would seem that God had become too far removed from the world of human error and frailty for this idea to be wholly acceptable. In its place we find a rather numerous group of passages that affirm that God is the creator of human spirits, without, however, making the Spirit of God the means of creation or in any way the point of contact. Where, as in Judith 16. 14, the Spirit of God is the means of creation it is still not identified with the spirit of man. This is doubtless due to a growing hesitancy to affirm union between the erring spirit of man and the holy Spirit of God.

The small part which the idea played in the thought of this period is indicated by the narrow range of literature in which the term occurs. In the books of the Apocrypha it is found only in Judith, Sirach, Susanna, Second Maccabees, and Fourth Maccabees. It is lacking also in the Assumption of Moses, as we now have it, Fourth Ezra, and the Life of Adam and Eve.

The uses of the Spirit here may be reclassified as follows: 1. The historical—the Spirit in the past. With this falls the haggadic use in A, 1, (*a*),

(*b*), (*c*). 2. The Messianic—the Spirit in the future. 3. The psychological and religious—the Spirit as the basis of rational and ethical life. 4. The theological—the Spirit as God *ab intra*. None of these uses are new with this period. The ethical use, however, is more fully developed than in the preceding period, but is used only of traditional figures in the distant past, except in Test. XII, Benj. 4.

The uses found in earlier periods, but lacking here, are (*a*) the charismatic Spirit as productive of physical and strongly emotional results, (*b*) the Spirit as an active force in the external world.

We have tried to translate the literature of each period into terms of actual experience. Let us see if we can discover what experience lay for these writers behind their use of the Spirit. In order to do this we must exclude from consideration certain groups of passages. On nearly all subjects the writings of Judaism represent three classes of material:

1. That borrowed directly from the sacred writings, and used without assimilation or much effort to find its exact meaning. This has little significance for the Jewish thought of this period.

2. That which, while not borrowed directly, is yet so controlled by the usages of the sacred writings that it is merely traditional and cannot be used to represent the real thought of the period.

3. That which grows out of living experience, and so forms an integral part of the body of thought.

Every religion with a history behind it has need to classify its present possessions under these rubrics. One might draw illustrations from modern Hinduism or Buddhism or Parseeism or Confucianism. Those familiar with the present forms of these faiths are continually reminding us that their books do not fairly represent their real character, because the traditions which the books contain are so different from the actual religion. Christianity furnishes no less illustrations. All historic churches have in their theological lumber rooms traditional elements not yet thrown away which do not represent existing views of truth.

Cases of direct borrowing of the Spirit in Judaistic literature are such as Jub. 5. 8, "My Spirit shall not always remain upon man," and, slightly less direct, Enoch 70. 2, "He was carried aloft on the chariots of the Spirit" (comp. 2 Kings 2. 11, where the Spirit is not used).

Cases of traditional use are Sir. 48. 24, the ascription of prophetic vision to "a great spirit." The term "Lord of spirits" in Enoch is also traditional, though its particular use as Lord of angelic spirits or spirits of the dead is not. Charles notes that the term occurs often in the interpolations without regard to its real significance in the genuine passages. In such cases we have pure traditional use, founded on Num. 16. 22, etc. Here belong also all cases of haggadic stories in which the Spirit is made to perform the offices that it does in ancient national literature, without regard to contemporary

experience (for example, Dan. 4. 8, f.; 5. 12, f.). These form part of traditional theological belief, but not of living experience. Excluding these two classes, the uses of the term which express actual experience reduce themselves to the following:

1. Wisdom, as Sir. 39. 6, "If the great Lord will, he shall be filled with the spirit of understanding."

2. The basis of the ethical life.

3. The Messianic hope.

To this period the words of Wendt apply when he says that in the sense of a certain bodily ecstasy Spirit is applied either to "the ideal state of an antiquity garnished with tradition" or to an ideal future (*Fleisch und Geist,* page 35). Wendt seems to err in making this apply "im Grossen und Ganzen" to the Old Testament. Gunkel in criticising the position (page 4) perhaps does not recognize sufficiently the great difference between the different periods of Hebrew thought, or how barren late Judaism is of this use of the Spirit as applied to any actual experience.

What are the reasons for this narrowed use of the term? Two related reasons suggest themselves: The first is the disappearance from experience, at least so far as the authors of this literature were concerned, in large measure, if not entirely, of those extraordinary phenomena which the early Hebrews assigned to the Spirit. Prophecy with its inspired afflatus had ceased (1 Macc. 4. 46; 9. 27; 14. 41). Dreams might still be treated in haggadic story as

the revelations of God, as in Daniel, but in actual life there was a psychological reason for them. They came from the multitude of business (Eccles. 5. 3). Even where the experience occurred it was no longer ascribed to God. The madman was not under the inspiration of a Spirit of God, but of a demon, or unclean spirit. It is notable that in all this literature there is not one claim made of the actual possession of the Spirit by or in behalf of any contemporary. The contrast with the early Christian literature in this respect is very striking.

Was, then, this Jewish period so totally lacking in experiences connected with deep religious emotion? We are accustomed to call it a period of ritualism, but did the ritualism produce a religion so cold and barren as this would seem to indicate? It would seem an irreparable loss to religion if with the disappearance or reinterpretation of old psychic phenomena there had occurred also the disappearance of the accompanying religious feeling which had caused these phenomena to be ascribed to the Spirit.

One cannot so read Jewish history. The magnificent heroism of the Maccabean time would forbid it, if there were nothing else. First and Second Maccabees and Daniel are each in a different way witnesses for a very profound religious feeling of exactly the sort that in other ages, either earlier or later, would have been ascribed to the Spirit. Fancy the deed of Mattathias told in the book of Acts without a reference to the Spirit! Nor is the Mac-

cabean period the only one in which we must suppose intense religious experiences. The writers of all apocalypses show that they possessed it. One sees no good reason, so far as the feeling they express is concerned, why their visions should not have been introduced by "The Spirit of the Lord came upon me, and I saw." The phrase would have been appropriate enough in the mouth of Daniel or Enoch or Baruch or the Twelve Patriarchs, but the authors never allow them to use it. The New Testament apocalyptist claims spiritual possession (1. 10), while Spirit, though not the Spirit, is a part of the regular machinery of Hermas (*Visions*, I, 1. 3; II, 1. 1). While, then, the ecstasy of prophecy had failed, yet experiences and feelings appropriate to be assigned to the Spirit had not failed. There must be some other cooperating reason for the meager use of the Spirit.

This reason is found in the growing tendency, already noted in the last period, to put God far away from the world and to avoid any phrase which had an anthropomorphic relation. The angel of Jahveh had disappeared, except as a figure borrowed from the Scriptures in pseudepigraphic writings like Test. XII. In place of it a hierarchy of angels had been developed. This accounts for the meager use of the Spirit as applied to human experience. It is also closely connected with the further development of the traditional theological idea of the Messiah as possessed by the Spirit. This became an element in setting the Messiah apart from other men, and

dignifying his age as unlike the present age in being more closely connected with God.

This tendency also accounts for the total disappearance of the cosmological use, which had developed so fully in the preceding period. In the Psalms there had been, as Professor Toy points out, "a certain warmth of coloring in the representation of God's relation to the world."[1] This died away with the decline of the poetic impulse in the later and less original psalmody, as the consciousness of God's presence had died away with the decline of prophecy, and nothing had risen to take its place. The Psalms of Solomon contain nothing of it, nor do the psalms which can with certainty be assigned to the Maccabean period.[2] God was no longer immanent in nature. That was beneath the dignity of the God of heaven. It is true that the logical outcome of God's overlordship of the world could be nothing less than the care of all his creatures. The germ of this always lay in the undeveloped possibilities of Jewish thought. When Christ used God's care for the sparrows to illustrate God's care for men we do not learn that he met with any objection as one who degraded God. In fact, one may believe that he would never have used this picture of the sparrow at all had it not met with a ready response in Jewish popular thought, for he was too

[1] *Judaism and Christianity*, p 80.

[2] Even Duhm, who perhaps assigns as large a proportion of the Psalter to Maccabean times as does any recent writer, excludes the nature poems, placing them in the Persian period.

wise a teacher to load his argument with minor points to which his auditors would take exception. Yet, after all, so far as literature represents the case, Paul was much nearer typical Judaistic thought when he said, "Is it for the oxen that God careth?"

That this possible inconsistency existed is not surprising. True religious thought has always, in some form, left open the door for the idea of contact between God and the world of nature. Since the essence of religion is the recognition of a real relation between God and man, and since man is so closely connected with the external world, sincere religion never completely loses sight of God's connection with the world. The Palestinian Jews did not philosophize about it. They hardly recognized that it was there, but it was, in germ, and in due time it could bear its proper fruit. Indeed, Judaism was fortunate in that it did not philosophize about it, whether under the name of the Spirit or under any other name. It was better in the end that, while Judaism was exalting the might and power of Jahveh from the circumscribed limits of a national God to the supreme Ruler of the universe, his relation to nature should for the present remain in obscurity. To have brought it into prominence would have necessitated one of two things: Either the idea of God would have been kept from any genuine advance, bound to conceptions that were not lofty by shackles of connection with the material world, remaining permanently to all intents a demi-

urge; or else some philosophic chain must have been devised with links enough to stretch from heaven to earth. The non-philosophic nature of the Hebrew mind allowed the Jews to escape both of these calamities. Alexandrian-Jewish thought took the second of these alternatives, though only in a half-hearted way. Neither the Logos nor the Spirit was ever fully hypostasized by the system. Gnosticism was much more logical and thoroughgoing. Its "æons" and "powers" formed a definite system of divine connection with the world. It raised the conception of God to a fitting dignity and satisfied the demands of reason much better than did the amorphous condition of Palestinian Judaism. But here, as so often in the history of religion, the more haste the less speed. The battle of thought is not always to the logical. The line of religious history does not lie through Gnosticism nor even through Alexandrian Judaism, in spite of the Christian Logos doctrine, but through Palestinian Judaism. The Spirit was lifted forever above connection with nature. No other conception took its place. But in time the religious thought could once more set God himself in relation to his creation of nature, for then God has advanced to a position where this relation could not degrade him, but only uplift nature. And so this whole range of thought passes outside the history of the idea of the Spirit, yet with no loss to its intrinsic religious value.

At the same time the idea of the Spirit gained by

this change. It became limited to the relation between God and man. This gave it a religious force and made it significant of an intimacy of relation such as never could have been attained had it still been used of God active in the wide range of all his creation. By becoming narrowed it became both intensified and elevated. The closer one studies the history of this idea the more clearly it is seen that the seemingly simple fact of dropping the relation to external nature from the idea of the Spirit forms the greatest single crisis in its history. It completed the foundation upon which the New Testament structure of thought on this subject was reared.

We shall understand better the significance of this historic process for the growth of religious thought if we note the course of the same idea in other religions. It was said above that a sincere religion never completely loses sight of God's connection with the world. The statement was made in the light of the history of religion. Everywhere one finds this to be true, in some form or other, and often the form is significant of the kind of progress which it is possible for the religion in question to make.

Early religions placed their gods in connection with nature in a direct and naïve way. There was for them no problem about it, any more than there was about man's connection with nature. But as a religion developed the problem always arose, consciously or unconsciously. It was met in one of the

two ways mentioned above: Either the idea of relation to nature checked and limited the complete growth of the conception of God, or the problem was solved by some philosophical device which allowed the elevation of God, and yet kept his relation to nature. Examples of the first class are found in most of the earlier religions which we might designate as non-philosophical, as, for example, the Canaanite. The Baals of Canaan remained to the end agricultural gods. Hebrew and Canaanite alike worshiped them in this phase. They were so closely connected with the operations of nature that they could never be removed from this relation. The spirits of China and Babylon were also originally nature gods, whose connection with nature remained unbroken. The result was that they did not grow, but, remaining a sort of dwarf gods, had value only for the lower phases of religion, magic and demonology. The second class is illustrated by the philosophical schemes of Gnosticism and of the Sankhya and Vedanta schools of India. These were carefully elaborated metaphysical devices by which the Supreme was kept unchanged and unchanging, not sullied by the impurities of the world, yet his connection with the world was made prominent and was carefully explained. The defect of such religions as mediums of the advance of history is that their metaphysical devices are only temporary and are outgrown by the progress of philosophic thought. Few religions have, like the Jewish, steered a middle course through the intricacies

of the problem, and adopted neither of the two solutions which most naturally offered themselves.

Amid the limitations of usage, however, there is one use which is quite as free as in former periods. This is the Messianic use. The actual number of passages in which it occurs does not increase so much, but the increase in the proportion of use seems to indicate that the idea was here more dominant than it had been in previous periods. With this occurs a notable increase in the use of the spirit in a purely psychological sense, meaning the person, both living and dead (for example, Enoch 22. 5; 49. 3; 67. 8; 71. 2, 6, etc.; 107. 17; 108. 11).

We again raise the question here, as in the last period, of the relation of the Spirit to the created universe. There we found that it always stood in the relation of a transcendental cause to nature, sometimes in that of a transcendental and sometimes in that of an immanent cause to man. When thought of as the cause of the life of man the predominant use was transcendental; when as the origin of his endowment the more usual usage was the immanent. As later Judaism never uses the Spirit in reference to external nature the first class of transcendental passages entirely disappears. The Spirit as God acting upon man as the cause of human life is in all cases transcendental. This is so whether it is used of the Spirit as the cause of life in general, as in Judith 16. 14; 2 Macc. 7. 22; or of the rational life which survives the event of death, as in 2 Macc. 14. 46; 7. 23. The life of

man is never the Spirit of God, not even in Judith 16. 14. It is either, as there, caused by the Spirit of God or, as is more usual, the spirit of man is given by God, and there is no mention of the Spirit of God. The separation between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God is now complete. Man is not considered to have the Spirit of God because his spirit is created by God. This absolute separation between the two is a necessary prerequisite in preparing the older Hebrew anthropology for its development into the New Testament anthropology.

In the charismatic use the following passages, including some of ethical import, are capable of a transcendental interpretation: Sus. 42, "The angel, as he had been commanded, gave a sagacious spirit to a young man, namely, to Daniel."[1] Test. XII, Levi 2, "A spirit of discernment of the Lord came over me." Enoch 62. 2, "The spirit of righteousness was poured out upon him." Test. XII, Judah 20, "The spirit of holiness will be upon him." In these passages the Spirit works from without upon the individuals.

The following are more naturally interpreted as immanent: Sir. 48. 24, "Isaiah saw by a great spirit the last things." 39. 6, "He shall be filled with the spirit of understanding." Test. XII, Simon 4, "Joseph was a good man, and had the Spirit of God in him." Benj. 4, "Him who has the grace of a good spirit." 8, "He is unspotted of heart, since the Spirit of God rests upon him." Mart.,

[1] See the footnote on this passage, p. 61.

Isa. 5. 14, Isaiah "discoursed with the Holy Spirit." Enoch 49. 3, "In him dwells the spirit of wisdom," etc. Psa. Sol. 17. 42, The Messiah will be "mighty through the spirit of holiness." 18. 8, The Lord will bring goodness to pass "in the spirit of wisdom and of righteousness and of might." Dan. 4. 8, 9, "In whom is the spirit of the holy gods," etc. In these passages the Spirit operates from within the individual. Here also the Spirit is usually an abiding possession rather than a temporary gift, though it is not always easy to draw the distinction between the two. Certainly where character is the result of the Spirit, as in Test. XII, Benj. 8, the possession must be regarded as permanent. A study of the passages as a whole shows a tendency to regard the charismatic Spirit as immanent, working within the man, rather than as an external force, acting from without upon him.

Jewish thought, then, is working to opposite results along the two lines of the development of the idea of the Spirit. In the act of creation the Spirit of God works from without. Indeed, it is becoming rare that the need of the intervention of the Spirit is felt at all. In the endowment of man with gifts the tendency is to regard the Spirit as working from within.

The tendency to retire the working of the Spirit from all connection with the merely physical or unusual and to limit it to the distinctly ethical and religious is stronger at this stage than in any of the previous periods, but—and this is important for

the future history of the conception—the Spirit working ethically was never ascribed to or claimed by a contemporary. It always belonged to the past or to the present as a mere generality. This shows a growing spiritual power and ethical sense which is much greater than is sometimes recognized by those who see in Judaism only a monstrous development of burdensome ceremonial. The abiding religious power of Judaism was less in the elaboration of a ritual which isolated the Jewish from the Gentile world than in the growth of a clear moral insight which made the lower ethics of other religions repugnant. Isolation by ritual alone is a mere shell which never in the history of religion constitutes the living germ of religious growth, however much it may serve to protect it from external forces of destruction. The outcome and the great importance of this course of moral growth in the concept of the Spirit we shall see when we come to study its Christian use.

Up to this stage of our study we have found that the idea of the Spirit of God was never the exact synonym of the idea of God. Here also this is true. The Spirit of God still meant for the Jew what it had from the very beginning of his religion, God active in the world. The only difference from stage to stage has been in the delimitation of the sphere within which the activity of God was assigned to the Spirit. This sphere had been broadened from man to the cosmos. Here it was narrowed again to man and to the higher side of his mental

activity, but still it is God acting. Everything which was assigned to the Spirit could be equally assigned to God. The question then naturally arises, Was there, then, any need to preserve the term "the Spirit of God"? The answer lies in that religious feeling which we have before found to be so important in connection with this subject, the feeling of union with God. This feeling is very persistent. Its manifestation always measures the high-water mark in the advance of any faith, for it is always found along the highest levels. The exilic sense of God's relation to man and the world was higher than that which at an earlier period found proofs of the relation only in the unusual and ecstatic. But the Judaistic sense of this relation was higher still and found its expression, so far as experience went, in the ethical life and the higher reason which it called wisdom; while it looked to the future for a still closer union to be manifested in the Messiah. Amid the externalism of the Jewish ritualism it kept and used this old expression of the Spirit, and yet preserved the transcendence of the mighty God, the Creator of heaven and earth, untarnished by implication of contact with the frailty and impurity of man. Thus the religious longing for the union with God was satisfied, and yet God was not brought down to the level of man.

We have before turned for comparison to India, and we are again impelled to notice the likeness and the contrast. In India there was also this long-

ing for union with God. Perhaps nowhere in the world has that longing been more strongly felt. There also it reached its highest culmination in a period of elaborate ritual development. The Hindu, like the Jew, came to see that the rational and the ethical were the highest realms of life. He also had in his religious history trance, ecstasy, and vision as manifestations of man's union with the divine; and he, like the Jew, had risen to the thought that all the world was linked, like man, in union with God. But he had no term by the use or disuse of which he could mark nice shades of distinction in the growth of his own religious experiences. They must all be lumped together as union with the Supreme. Then union and unity were confused, and so it came about that he worshiped himself, saying, "I am Brahm;" and all the world was likewise Brahm, and cause and result, maker and made, enjoyer and enjoyed, sunk into one inextricable confusion whose only possible logical outcome was the absolute identity of all reality. To this conclusion the Vedanta philosophy came. Its most terse expression is "This is that"—whatever you can call "this" is identical with "that." It is the religious feeling of union with God fructifying in philosophy.[1] Yet religion must have this feel-

[1] How attractive this religious philosophy of the East is to some minds of the highest order may be seen in the following quotation from the *Autobiography* of Max Müller (p. 42): "The 'know thyself,' ascribed to Chilon and other sages of ancient Greece, gains a deeper meaning with every year, till at last the I, which we looked upon as the most certain and undoubted fact, vanishes from our grasp to become the Self, free from the various accidents and limitations which make up the I, and therefore one with the Self that underlies all individual and therefore vanishing I's. What that common Self may be is a question to be reserved for later times, though I

ing, else it possesses no quickening power. The Jew, with his term, "the Spirit of God," could develop this feeling of union, and yet not lose himself or his world in the boundless abyss of an unconditioned Supreme.

The Hindu was compelled to retain the crudest efforts of his religion to reach union with God, side by side with the most lofty. No term distinguished between them, and they all stood together in one confused tangle of religious ceremonials. So it happened that the philosopher, who in India was often the man of strongest religious feeling, was bound to the physical *yoga* exercises, whose aim was to produce trance and ecstasy. Hindu religion could not leave behind its outgrown expressions of religious experience, but must mold the higher to fit the lower and carry all forward with it, as alike important, making for itself an intolerable burden of old and new, crude and lofty, enough to bear down any religious system. From all this the Hebrew development of the idea of the Spirit relieved the Jew. One does not see how any other usage could have so well fitted his religion for advance. This allowed him to pass through the same stages of religious experience as the Hindu, to grasp all the Hindu's religious truths, and yet to leave behind the shell of the seeds from which a better fruitage

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may say at once that the only true answer given to it seems to me to be that of the Upanishads and the Vedanta philosophy. Only we must take care not to mistake the moral Self, that finds fault with the active Self, for the Highest Self, that knows no longer of good or evil deeds." It is interesting to note that the Self as used here is the Atma, which, like the רוּחַ, = spirit, = breath.

had sprung. It made his religion adaptable to the needs of growth, and yet always kept it true to the essential fact of all religion, the union of man with God.

Men sometimes question why it is that modern critical scholarship, with its strong appreciation of ethnic faiths, still holds to the unique value of Hebrew thought for the history of religion. It is because the more carefully it is studied the more modern scholarship finds in this religion, together with its successor, Christianity, the possibility and the power of an infinite religious advance which no other system of thought presents. Few elements of the religion exhibit this more clearly than that we are now considering. The reverent scholar is impelled to believe that through this Hebrew and Jewish progress of thought there worked the divine power to which he still can give no better name than the Spirit of God.

CHAPTER V

The Alexandrian-Jewish Writings

Successful attempts to combine elements from two widely differing forms of religion into a single system are somewhat rare in history. Mohammedanism is the only one which can be regarded as having become a permanent force under its own name. Next in importance to it, perhaps, is that movement of Greco-Jewish syncretism usually known as Alexandrian Judaism, of which Philo is the best exponent and the Wisdom of Solomon the most valuable and best known single literary product. In tracing the growth of religious thought it is always possible to treat such a development from either one of its two sides. So Mohammedanism may be regarded as a development of Arabic religion, under the influence of Jewish and Christian ideas, or as a Christian sect corrupted to extreme heresy by Arabic paganism and Mohammed's belief in his own inspiration. In the study of Alexandrian Judaism the question is further complicated by the fact that the Greek element comes into it not in one pure strain, but mingled in varying proportions from at least three different forms of Hellenic thought: Platonic, Stoic, and Neo-Pythagorean. With these the student of Greek philosophy must deal in detail. For him Alexandrian Judaism is the development of a somewhat confused system of Greek thought under Hebrew influence. We

are to approach it as the development of Hebrew thought set in a framework of Greek philosophy. In this approach we are certainly at one with the authors themselves. Philo, for example, conceived of his own work as the legitimate outcome of Hebrew ideas. He always stood within the confines of the Hebrew religion, and his Greek forms of thought were only the platform from which he hoped to make himself heard by those outside. He called Plato "the great," but Moses was "the greatest and most perfect man that ever lived" (Vita Mosis, I, 1). The God to whom he offered the allegiance of his thought was always the Hebrew Jahveh. The problem before him was to make the Hebrew religion speak Greek; to show that the best Greek thought was essentially at one with the eternal verities of the revelation of God through Moses in the Hebrew law.

In this attempt he was seemingly hampered by an almost total disparity in content and purpose between the two. Greek thought was largely speculative. The Hebrew law, when not ceremonial, was entirely ethical. If he would link them together, he must either emphasize the ethical elements of Greek thought or find speculation in the Hebrew law. The practical demands of his purpose united with his own philosophical inclination to lead him to the latter choice. Yet, Hebrew-like, he continually referred to the divine demands for purity and righteousness and to the close relation between ethical goodness and the possibility of gaining wisdom.

Philo used two general methods for the discovery of speculation in the Hebrew law: first, allegory, an instrument which the Greek interpreters of Homer placed in his hand; and, second, the elevation of certain Old Testament terms to a prominence far greater than they occupied in Hebrew thought, at the same time modifying, though never totally transforming, their content. These terms he uses for the expression of the relation of God and the world. They are "Wisdom" and "Word." The former brought its speculative suggestion from the first nine chapters of Proverbs, where Wisdom is, on one hand, the creative expression of God (8. 22), and, on the other, the divine ideal of human life (8. 1-20). The latter was drawn from the numerous Old Testament expressions of God as uttering himself in his Word. Both were fused with Greek ideas that are only somewhat dimly shadowed in the Hebrew uses of the terms.

As we have found, Hebrew thought had already a native term which admirably expressed the Hebrew sense of the relation between God and the world. This was the term "the Spirit of God." It had a real content of thought, was venerable with age, and was found in every class of Hebrew literature. On the other hand, "Wisdom," in a philosophical sense, was late in origin and narrow in usage, being only found in one class of literature; while "Word" must borrow from Greek sources nearly all its speculative significance. Looking at the matter from the Hebrew standpoint, one would

expect to find "Spirit" the great term of Philonian philosophy. Two reasons may be suggested why it was not: first and most important, the close affinity of "Wisdom" (σοφία) and "Word" (λόγος) with Greek philosophy; second, the very fact that the term "Spirit" was so old and well fixed in Hebrew literature and had received so definite a content unfitted it for the use of Philo. The term was no longer flexible. Its affiliations were so closely linked with Hebrew ideas that it could not readily take new contents. Yet Philo and his followers did not wholly abandon the older term, though their use of it is comparatively slight. A study of the development of Hebrew thought on this subject would be incomplete without the consideration of the form it assumes here.

Using as nearly as possible the same classification as in former sections, we find the following uses of the Spirit of God:

A. Spirit used of God acting in the sphere of human life:

1. For endowment of individuals with charismatic gifts:

(*a*) Prophecy:

"It is not lawful for a wicked man to be an interpreter of God, as also no wicked man can be said to be inspired. . . . Accordingly, all those whom Moses describes as just persons he also represented as inspired and prophesying." He then instances Noah, Isaac, Jacob, Abraham, and Moses himself (Quis rer. div. her., 52).

In the prophetic trance "which proceeds from inspiration" "the mind that is in us is removed from its place at the arrival of the divine Spirit, but is again restored to its previous habitation when the Spirit departs, for it is contrary to holy law for what is mortal to dwell with what is immortal" (Quis rer. div. her., 53).

The beginning of Moses's "divine inspiration" was at the Red Sea, when the Egyptians pressed from behind upon the Hebrews. "When the prophet saw the whole nation now inclosed like a shoal of fish and in great consternation he no longer remained master of himself, but became inspired and prophesied" (Vita Mosis, Lib. III, 33).

Conjectures—that is, inferences—are "akin to prophecy, for the mind could never make such correct and felicitous conjectures, unless it were a divine Spirit which guided their feet into the way of truth" (Vita Mosis, Lib. III, 36).

(*b*) Skill in artisan work. This is not properly a separate division here, but is retained from former classifications for the sake of uniformity. In the cases cited the Spirit is obviously used only because it is so used in the Old Testament text. The instances are used to illustrate (*c*), below:

"God summoned Bezaleel, and filled him with his Holy Spirit, and with wisdom and understanding and knowledge to be able to devise every good work" (De Gigant., 5).

"For the divine Spirit is not a motion of the air, but intellect and wisdom; just as it also flows over

the man who with great skill constructed the tabernacle of the Lord, namely, upon Bezaleel, when the Scripture says, And he filled him with the divine Spirit of wisdom and understanding" (Quaest., I, 90).

(*c*) Wisdom (see also (*b*), above):

"The Spirit which is upon [Moses, or any other subject of inspiration] is the wise, the divine, the indivisible, the undistributable, the good Spirit, the Spirit which is everywhere entirely filled up,[1] which, while it benefits others, is not injured by having a participation in it given to another" (De Gigant., 6).

"The holy spirit of discipline will flee deceit, and remove from thoughts that are without understanding" (Wis. Sol. 1. 5). "I prayed, and understanding was given me: I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came to me" (7. 7). "For in her [wisdom] is an understanding spirit" (7. 22). "Thy counsel who hath known, except as thou gavest wisdom, and didst send thy Holy Spirit from above?" (9. 17).

4 Macc. 7. 14: "The spirit of wisdom" (text doubtful; Lin. reads τῷ πνεύματι διὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ).

2. As the substrate of rational life. A use not specifically found in the Old Testament:

In commenting on the passage, "God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life:" "The formation of the individual man perceptible by the external senses is a composition of earthy substance and

[1] On the text see Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, II. 216, f.

divine Spirit. For that the body was created by the Creator taking a lump of clay and fashioning the human form out of it; but that the soul proceeds from no created thing at all, but from the Father and Ruler of all things. For when he uses the expression 'he breathed into,' etc., he means nothing else than the divine Spirit proceeding from that happy and blessed nature, sent to take up its habitation here on earth, for the advantage of our race, in order that, even if man is mortal according to that portion of him which is visible, he may at all events be immortal according to that portion which is invisible. . . . He is born at the same time both mortal and immortal; mortal as to his body, but immortal as to his intellect" (De Opif. Mundi, 46).

"Man was not formed of the dust alone, but also of the divine Spirit" (Fragment from John of Damascus).[1]

"The divine Spirit is the essence of the rational part [of the soul], . . . for it is said, 'God breathed into his face the breath of life'" (Fragment from John the Monk, Concerning the Soul and Mind).

"The essence of the soul is truly and beyond all question Spirit, . . . but has no independent place, but is mingled with blood" (Quaest., II, 59).

"I ordered my wisdom to make man from seven substances, . . . his spirit from my Spirit and from wind" (Secrets of Enoch 30. 5).

[1] References to Fragments are to the Tauchnitz edition.

B. Spirit used of God acting in the physical world:

1. As the basis of physical life. This has no separate representation here. It must be combined with God acting on external nature apart from man. Both together make

2. Spirit used of God in his relation of cosmical immanence:

"The mind, which is intrinsically light," can "be raised up by the nature of the divine Spirit, which is able to do everything and to subdue all things below," as material things may be raised by the wind (De Plant. Noe, 6). Though the direct reference is to the mind, yet the words "to subdue all things" seem to go beyond mental action, and to have a cosmical significance. Yet perhaps the fact that this is the only case of such a significance in Philo should make us careful not to insist too strongly upon this interpretation.

"Because the Spirit of the Lord hath filled the earth, and that which sustaineth the universe [τὰ πάντα, the all] hath knowledge of the voice" (Wis. Sol. 1. 7).

"For in her [wisdom] is an understanding spirit, . . . having all power, overseeing all things, and permeating all intelligent, pure, and most subtile spirits" (Wis. Sol. 7. 22, 23).

"For thy incorruptible Spirit is in all things [ἐν πᾶσιν]" (Wis. Sol. 12. 1).

Gförrer has pointed out that the Spirit is used in Philo only where it is brought over from the Old

Testament, but certain differences in usage are immediately obvious. The first is the great emphasis on the connection of the Spirit with wisdom. The second is the lack of the national sentiment in connection with the Spirit. This arises from its close relation to wisdom, which, following out the suggestions of the Wisdom literature, is not conceived of as national, but as cosmic. Philo's purpose, also, does not lead him to deal with the national hope. A consequence of these things is the total disappearance of the Messianic hope, and so of the Spirit as a force in the Messianic time. This takes away from the Alexandrian thought the hope, which always remained a living power amid all the Palestinian dogma, of a time in the future when the Spirit should again be a potent fact in actual life, once more entering into experience in new forms and with a more powerful energy than ever before.[1]

The peculiarities of Philo's idea of the Spirit as related to God depend primarily upon his cosmic conceptions. In Palestinian Judaism there was, as we have seen, a growth of the term "Spirit" to mean God himself, God's being apart from God conceived as acting, God *ab intra*. Philo does not

[1] In order to complete the uses of spirit the following are added:
C. Used of angels:
"The essence of angels is spiritual, but they are very often made to resemble the appearance of men" (Fragment from John of Damascus; comp. Quaest., I, 92).
D. Used of human beings, equivalent to souls:
"All intelligent, pure, and most subtile spirits" (Wis. Sol. 7. 23). It would be possible to interpret πνεύματα here of angels or other non-human beings, but there seems to be no real demand for it.
"A man indeed killeth in his wickedness; but the spirit, when it hath gone forth, he bringeth not back" (Wis. Sol. 16. 14).

use it in this sense, for the reason that his conception of God did not allow it. The essence of God remains unknown. That he exists is evident, but what is the noumenal content of that existence must remain hidden. He is without qualities. The Spirit which is the expression of God cannot then be identical with God *ab intra,* since he in his real nature is inexpressible.

But if the Spirit is not used as the equivalent of God himself in his eternal nature, is it equivalent to the powers of God? That it stands in close connection with the two most prominent of these powers, Wisdom and the Logos, is plain. Is it identical with them, thus forming a triad of biblical expressions for the relation of God to the world, or is there such a difference between them that the relation becomes other than that of mere parallelism?

Certainly some passages seem to imply an actual identity with Wisdom. It is directly defined, in the passage based on Bezaleel's possession of the Spirit for work in the tabernacle, as "wisdom and understanding and knowledge to be able to devise any work." Once again, returning to the same incident of Bezaleel, Philo says, "The divine Spirit is not a motion of the air, but intellect and wisdom." Here is an obvious reference to the literal meaning of πνεῦμα as air. Philo means that he is not using the word in this sense. As Wisdom the Spirit cannot dwell with man forever, since the "disposition of the flesh is inconsistent with wisdom" (De Gigant., 5; Quaest., I, 90; in both the above cases

he is commenting on Gen. 6. 8, "My Spirit shall not always dwell with man"). Spirit is then in one of its uses an equivalent of Wisdom, as one of the powers of God. This identity is approached in Wis. Sol. 7. 22, "An understanding spirit is in wisdom" (some texts, "is wisdom," omitting ἐν). Still, perhaps by reason of its traditional Hebrew use, it is only identified with Wisdom when in relation to the mind of man. The distinction becomes more sharp as we study the uses of Wisdom itself. Wisdom has certain cosmical relations. It stands as the highest of the divine powers. It is the medium of creation. The Spirit is not given such cosmical relations. Indeed, it is never used at all in this sense by Philo, although it is by the writer of the Wisdom of Solomon. The fact that Philo only uses it where it is carried over from the Old Testament, and that in the Old Testament passages which fall under his consideration the use is always the charismatic, would seem to explain his lack of the cosmical usage in connection with Wisdom. The definition of this form of the idea may be stated as follows: The Spirit is Wisdom considered as an endowment of man's soul for special ends and at special times.

The relation of the Spirit to the Logos depends on the relation between the Logos and Wisdom, for the Spirit is never set in direct connection with the Logos. The question of the relation of the Logos and Wisdom is not one belonging properly to this study, and comprises such curious equalities and

subordinations and seeming contradictions that it would demand more space than we could afford it. The matter is fully investigated in Drummond, *Philo Judaeus,* II, 201-213. The general conclusion is that the Logos and Wisdom are ultimately identical. Our interest in this is that the Spirit is thus made ultimately identical in its essence with the Logos.

What now shall we say of the relation of the Spirit to the created world? We have seen that the Hebrew conception of the Spirit had its origin in an explanation of the relation of God to man, and that only in post-exilic times was it used with a cosmic significance. In Alexandrian Judaism it is also used in a cosmic sense, but only in the most general way and in rare passages. The reason for the rarity of its use is plain. The Logos and Wisdom have taken its place. The emphasis of it is once more, as in ancient Hebrew thought, thrown upon the inspiration of man. In Philo the Spirit is said to "subdue all things." Here, though the context is of the mind, the Spirit as a cosmic force would seem to be meant. The Wisdom of Solomon gives a few more passages, though almost as vague and general. Here it is said that the Spirit in wisdom "oversees all things" (7. 22), "filleth the earth" (1. 7), and is "an incorruptible Spirit in all things" (12. 1). That here is a side glance at the Platonic soul of the universe may very likely be true. Plato's word for it is *νοῦς*. He never uses *πνεῦμα* in the cosmic sense. When the Alex-

andrian writers thus use it probably one must always see the reflection of Hebrew terminology. As already noted, Philo never uses πνεῦμα except when led to do so by the use of the biblical passage upon which he is commenting. The author of Wisdom combines a Hebrew term with Greek thought.

The fullest passage is that whose concluding clause is quoted above (Wis. Sol. 11. 24 to 12. 1): "For thou lovest all the things that are, and abhorrest nothing that thou didst make; for if thou hadst hated anything, thou wouldest not have made it. And how could anything have persisted if it had not been thy will, or been preserved if not called into existence by thee? But thou sparest all because they are thine, O Lord, thou lover of souls. For thine incorruptible [deathless, ἄφθαρτον] Spirit is in all things." The loving care of God over his creation is due to the fact that it embodies his Spirit. This is quite plainly a statement of the doctrine of immanence. The cosmos is God's own; it contains his own expression; his Spirit not only created it, but is in it. This is the philosophical side of that conception of relationship which has its ethical expression in the Hebrew notion of holiness. There it was the relation of ownership based on creation; here it is the relation of ownership based on consubstantiality; but in both the emphasis is on the relation, not on its ground. The principle of the permanence of the cosmos is based upon the idea of the indwelling Spirit. That Spirit is deathless (ἄφθαρτον). Therefore, since it is in the

universe, the universe abides. Thus the ground of the uniformity of law, or, in other words, of the permanence of phenomena, is laid for this author in the permanence of God. Compare 7. 22-27, where the permanence of wisdom is due to a Spirit in her.

It is to be remembered that the author of Wisdom is not dealing with the eternity of the cosmos or with its independent existence, but only with its permanence in the realm of experience. Philo, however, deals with the problem of the eternity of the cosmos. The treatise on the Incorruptibility of the World rests under suspicion. Zeller supposes it to be the production of a Peripatetic, revised by a Jew of the Alexandrian school. Schürer says that its genuineness has been "generally given up" (*Jewish People,* II, 3, page 359). It deals with the relation of God to the universe only in the fashion of a dialectic on the perfection of God. If the universe is destroyed, it must be either in order that no other may be produced or that a new one may be created. Both are impossible, for both would imply less than perfection in the work of God; the first in his work in the future, the second in his work in the present. Here there is obviously no kinship to the idea that the permanence of the cosmos is because of the immanence of the Spirit of God in it.

But aside from this more than doubtful treatise the subject is touched, though briefly, elsewhere. The world is imperishable, but because it is in a

state of constant flux, not because of its stability; for it is not stable. The creations of God differ from those of man because the "ends of things God creates are the beginnings of other things" (Leg. Alleg., I, 3). For example, the end of day is the beginning of night. So transformation, not destruction, is the order of the universe. "It is by proportion [of its elements] that the whole world is compounded together and united and endowed with consistency so as to remain firm forever, proportion having distributed equality to all its parts" (Quis rer. div. her., 30). Compare De Opif. Mundi, 27, where man and heaven are placed in comparison, each as the best of its kind: the heaven, the best of incorruptible things; man, the best of perishable things.

It is tempting to say that the preeminence of the things of God's creation over those of man's as presented in the first passage may be due to the fact that the Spirit of God was conceived of as in them, but the second passage seems to put it on quite a different ground, namely, the constitution of the cosmos itself. Indeed, if Philo held to the eternity of matter and made the creation its organization, not its origination, as Drummond suggests (I, 299, ff.), there is little chance for this attractive speculation to be true.

One expects to find Philo's treatment of the Spirit as a cosmic principle more fully expressed in his comments on Gen. 1. 2, "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters," than anywhere else.

But instead of that he treats πνεῦμα here simply in its literal meaning of air, which forms a third element with water and earth, and no cosmic significance is given to the passage (see De Gigant., 5). In the treatise De Opif. Mundi it is treated in the same way. There is no quotation of the passage itself, but the following sentences seem to be based on it: "In the first place, therefore, from the model of the world perceptible only by intellect, the Creator made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth, and the form of air and of empty spaces: the former of which he called darkness, because the air is black by nature; and the other he called the abyss, for empty space is very deep and yawning with immense width. Then he created the incorporeal substance of water and of air, and above all he spread light. . . . And air and light he considered worthy of preeminence. For the one he called the breath of God, because it is air, which is the most life-giving of things, and of life the cause is God; and the other he called light, because it is surpassingly beautiful" (7. 8).

To conclude: In Philo the Spirit is used only once of the power of God active in the world. In the Wisdom of Solomon it is used in the same meaning, with the added idea of the Spirit as inherent in the cosmos, thus forming the ground of confidence in its permanence and its place in the power of God. The conception of the Spirit as the direct cause of particular phenomena in nature, a use so frequent in Hebrew literature when the Spirit first

began to be thought of as applied to nature, is here, as in Palestinian Judaism, totally lacking.

In the relation of the Spirit to man Hebrew thought brought to Alexandrian Judaism two elements: the Spirit as a permanent basis of rational life, and the charismatic Spirit as the ground of special gifts. But Greek philosophy brought to it what early Hebrew thought never possessed, the philosophic theory of a soul. We are not here concerned with the origin and constituent elements of this theory, but with its form as found in Philo.

The soul is used by Philo in two senses: (*a*) The soul in its sensorium, the sum total of living personality apart from the body; and (*b*) the rational soul, the human spirit, which constitutes the essential personality. The first is shown, among other passages, in the comments on "Thou shalt not eat the flesh with the blood:" "For there are three divisions of the soul: the one part nutritious, a second endowed with the outward senses, and the third endowed with reason." It is the second part of which "the divine πνεῦμα is the essence," for it is said, "God breathed into his face the breath of life." Drummond (I, page 320, f.) maintains that the meaning of πνεῦμα here is air, and that the continuance of the fragment in Armenian proves it. It is certainly in favor of this interpretation that we have πνεῦμα used in the sense of air in a cosmic relation; but compare De Special. Legibus, Concerning the Life of Man, I: "For the essence of the soul of man is the breath of God. . . . That which

was thus breathed into his face was manifestly the breath of the air, or whatever else there may be which is even more excellent than the breath of the air, as being a ray emitted from the blessed and thrice-happy nature of God." This seems to suggest that the principle of even the more irrational part of the soul may be some substance of which air is only a coarser and cruder representation. On such matters it is not impossible that we may be obliged to allow a certain vagueness in the expressions of Philo.

Of the rational soul, however, it is said that the divine Spirit is its essence: "The divine Spirit is the essence of the rational part, . . . for he says, 'God breathed into his face the breath of life.'" Nay, the soul is an immigrant into this sphere of human life. It originally came down from above and goes back to the place whence it came (Quaest., III, 10). "Souls are sent down from heaven to earth as to a colony" (De Conf. Ling., 17). This accounts for the longing they have to return to their original country. Souls, demons, and angels are really one and the same thing (De Incor. Mundi), but souls have, for some unexplained reason, taken up their abode in mortal bodies, as the others have not. They are spiritual existences made in the likeness, not of the Most High, for that would not be fitting, but of the Logos (Fragment from Eus., Prep. of the Gospel). Before the fall the divine Spirit was more evident than now (Fragment from John of Damascus). The

Wisdom of Solomon has also the same idea of the soul as an immigrant from a region outside, though not saying in express terms that the soul is a spiritual essence. "Being good, I came into a body undefiled" (Wis. Sol. 8. 20).

The difference between Philo and the Old Testament thought is interesting. In the Old Testament the Spirit is the transcendental part of man, and of beast as well. It is not in itself personal, and could never be called a soul. It is not a separate entity. It is the power of God expressing itself in life. Without this power of God there is no life. When that is withdrawn life disappears. In Philo the Spirit is not an impersonal power of God, dependent for its operation upon the divine will, but a distinct entity. It is spiritual in its nature—that is, it belongs to a class of beings whose essential quality is that they partake of the characteristics of the divine Logos or Wisdom. Quite in accord with the general trend of Alexandrian thought, the emphasis is no longer laid on the direct communion of God with men, but on the series of gradations from God to men.

To represent it graphically, Hebrew thought makes the steps of relation thus: God (= Spirit) — men. Alexandrian thought, thus: God — Logos (= Spirit) — souls — men.

In the later portions of the Old Testament the Spirit plays a vital part as the expression of God in creation. Here that function is performed by the Logos, and the Spirit in the cosmic sense is a

supernumerary, only used of the creation of the rational soul, and yet the Spirit is not differentiated from the Logos in any essential manner. The same cannot be said of the cosmic relation in the Wisdom of Solomon, where the Spirit fulfills a real purpose in relating the universe to God.

The charismatic Spirit has a much narrower range than in Hebrew literature of either the earlier or the later periods. It concerns itself with two fields only: the gift of wisdom and the gift of prophecy. The connection of the Spirit with wisdom has been already touched upon. In Philo it is a common thought, and in the Wisdom of Solomon is not infrequent (see 1. 5; 7. 7, 22; 9. 17). There it is considered as being sent from God (9. 17) in answer to prayer (7. 7).

In Philo the typical instance, twice used, is that of Bezaleel. It is, as shown in this case, "wisdom and understanding and knowledge to be able to devise any work" (De Gigant., 5). "The divine Spirit is not a motion of the air, but intellect and wisdom; just as it flows over . . . Bezaleel" (Quaest., I, 90). This Spirit is a single force. It is not separated by being divided, as when it is taken from Moses and put in the seventy elders. Like fire, it can light others, yet not be diminished itself (De Gigant., 5, 6). This last passage is interesting as a reminiscence of the Old Testament conception of the Spirit of God as the single basis of a variety of phenomena. We have seen that separate souls take the place of the single divine Spirit as the

ground of rational life, but as the ground of charismatic gifts Philo still keeps the old Hebrew idea of the single and indivisible Spirit.

Philo distinctly regards the charismatic Spirit as temporary. "The Spirit comes upon men, but does not continue or abide in them, . . . because they are flesh" (Quaest., I, 90). A passage already quoted, on page 90, would seem to suggest that Philo may have regarded the charismatic Spirit as a temporary substitute for the permanent possession of the Spirit, which would have been man's privilege had he continued without sin. It is temporary because of the impossibility of the permanent connection between the Spirit and the flesh. Possibly the experience of a temporary "frenzy" in prophecy may have combined with the Philonian philosophical positions in producing this idea.

Philo's doctrine of the Spirit has been, up to this point, a matter of tradition and dogma rather than of experience. In the charismatic Spirit of prophecy one approaches the field of his own experience. He himself had been a subject of visions which he could explain by no natural means. There had been moments when he had seemed lifted out of himself, possessed by a power that was not himself. This could be none other than a work of the Spirit of God. The passage in which these experiences is described is worthy of being quoted in full:

"I am not ashamed to relate what has happened to me myself, which I know from having experienced it ten thousand times. Sometimes, when I

have desired to come to my usual employment of writing on the doctrines of philosophy, though I have known accurately what it was proper to set down, I have found my mind barren and unproductive, and have been completely unsuccessful in my object, being indignant at my mind for the uncertainty and vanity of its then existing opinions, and filled with amazement at the power of the living God,[1] by whom the womb of the soul is at times opened and at times closed up. And sometimes when I have come to my work empty I have suddenly become full, ideas being, in an invisible manner, showered upon me and implanted in me from on high; so that, through the influence of divine inspiration, I was filled with enthusiasm, and have known neither the place in which I was, nor those who were present, nor myself, nor what I was saying, nor what I was writing; for then I have been conscious of a stream of interpretation, an enjoyment of light, a most penetrating sight, a most manifest energy[2] in all that was to be done, having such an effect on my mind as the clearest ocular demonstration would have on the eyes" (De Migration. Abraham, 7).

Few passages in the literature of this subject are more important than this. Here is a philosopher, a careful thinker, capable of introspection, speaking frankly of his own experience as the illustration of his conception of the contact of God with man. It

[1] Him who is (Drummond, I, 14).
[2] Rather read *ἐνάργειαν*, "distinct view of the subjects treated" (see Drummond, I, 15).

marks the intensity and vividness of this experience that he drops his philosophy of "powers" and "energies" and speaks of the contact with God as simply and directly as any old Hebrew prophet. It is not Wisdom or the Logos that came upon him, but God himself, "the all-accomplishing Father," "He who is." This is not dogma, but life.

It is possible to make a psychological analysis of this experience. It has several elements of origin. The first is intellectual. The experience came at moments when the mind was extremely active and closely attentive to the subjects of its thought, so absorbed in them that it became oblivious to all about. The second element is one of feeling. Accompanying the stress of attention was an emotion which he recognized under the name of enthusiasm (*κορυβαντιᾶν*),[1] while the subjective result was also an emotion which he seems to distinguish, very properly, from the "enthusiasm" of the process itself. The third element is the sense of the worth of the results, considered not as objective thought-products, but as subjective feelings which have their place in the highest ranges of personal life. The fourth element is the sense of the remoteness of this experience from the normal life. It is not the usual mental processes that are the ground of this experience. They offer no analogy to it or explanation of it. One hesitates at first as to whether this should not be called rather an infer-

[1] The use of this word, with its connotation of wild and uncontrolled excitement, is significant.

ence from the experience, but it seems to be so interwoven into its emotional content that one is compelled to regard it as a primary factor of the experience and itself a ground for the further intensity of the ecstasy. Philo's conclusion was that the moments of ecstasy into which these factors entered were only to be accounted for as the direct inspiration of God.

In the light of this experience must be interpreted all that Philo says of Hebrew prophecy. His fullest treatment of it is given in connection with Moses. When Moses saw the people entrapped at the Red Sea "he no longer remained master of himself, but became inspired, and prophesied" (Vita Mosis, III, 34). This was the beginning of his divine inspiration. In the speech that follows Moses is represented as seeing the Egyptians overwhelmed in the Red Sea. So in the destruction of Korah he saw what immediately afterward happened. He also gave oracles about manna, the Sabbath, the destruction of Korah, and his own death. A frenzy which left no consciousness is supposed. The soul abdicated its seat, and the Spirit of God took its place, using the body as the medium of its supernatural manifestations.

What are the antecedents of Philo's theory of inspiration? First, his own experience. However mechanical the above theory may have become when held in modern dogmatic theology, historical theology must never forget that with Philo it was simply the application to the Old Testament prophets of what

he believed to be his own experience. The strong ethical element in prophecy was marked in his experience by the emphasis on the religious and moral worth of the results. It was marked, in his conception of the Old Testament prophecy, by the demand for righteousness in the prophet. "No wicked man can properly be said to be inspired;" "for a prophet says nothing of his own, but everything which he says is strange and prompted by some one else," and it is not lawful for a wicked man to be the interpreter of God (Quis rer. div. her., 52). Here speaks the Hebrew, with the ethical conception of God, and so of a prophet in connection with God. A curious contradiction, which perhaps marks the Greek element, is found in Flaccus, 21: "For every man's soul is very prophetic, especially of such as are in misfortune." Not only is every man, especially those in misfortune, given this gift, but the passage is about Flaccus, whom Philo especially hated as a monster of iniquity. With this may be compared De Somniis, II, 1, where the third class of dreams are those in which the mind is set in motion by itself, and filled with "frenzy and inspiration, so as to predict future events with a certain prophetic power." In both cases a closer examination shows that the "prophecy" is wholly lacking in the elements of moral and religious emotion, which are so strong in the narrative of Philo's experience. God is not even mentioned. In fact, the last passage quoted makes the power of prophecy a quality of the soul itself. It is simply fore-

telling (comp. *Sibylline Oracles,* III, 816, f., 297, ff., 163, 491). It finds its appropriate representative in the widespread belief in "second sight." This idea of prophecy also was founded on experience, but experience of quite a different nature from Philo's lofty joy in conscious communion with God. Philo, then, like Hebrew history, has two kinds of prophecy, a higher and a lower, and the two sets of terms used in describing it show that he meant quite different things by the two kinds of use.

It is usually held that this theory of inspiration rested upon Greek sources. Beyond doubt Greek ideas were factors in it. The inspiration of the oracle is like the inspiration of Moses. A frenzy is the accompaniment of inspiration. A state of trance is natural to it. There can be no doubt that the phenomena of prophecy as Philo considered it take much of their coloring from Greek conceptions. The same idea appears in the *Sibylline Oracles* (III, 812-816):

> "Others say
> I am a sibyl and of Circe born
> And father Gnostos, raving mad and false.
> But at the time when all things come to pass
> Ye will make mention of me; no one more
> Will call me mad, but God's great prophetess."

Less obvious are the Hebrew sources of Philo's idea. Certainly such descriptions of the prophetic method as are given in connection with the life of Moses are entirely aside from the Hebrew narratives of the same events. They are not compatible

with the facts of higher prophecy. They are, however, closely akin to the conceptions of the lower, cruder Hebrew prophecy of the earlier period. Saul among the prophets, Elisha under the spell of music, Balaam compelled to speak the thing he would not, are best explained by some belief kindred to Philo's. We have seen that without doubt this was the early Hebrew conception of the source of prophecy, a conception based upon an experience comparable in its fundamental factors to that of Philo. But still it does not follow that Philo drew his conceptions from these sources. One can hardly, however, use the fact that he never cites these cases to prove that he did not draw from them, for he does not deal in his extant writing with these portions of Scripture.

The fact is that the Greek oracle represented the same stage of religious thought as the early Hebrew prophet. In Greece prophecy remained permanently crystallized in its lower and cruder form. The Hebrew records have nothing to add to that form which could not be gathered from the fuller and clearer experience of Greek life. It is not necessary, then, to posit the early Old Testament form of prophecy as one of Philo's sources, especially as we have no evidence that he ever gave conscious attention to the particular cases which might have served as ground for his concept.

Philo's idea of the action of the Spirit in prophecy forms a backward movement in the history of the idea of the connection of God with man. It be-

comes important, however, in the study of the interpretation which the writers of the early church put upon certain events in the history of the first Christian century. It was an essential factor in the preparation of conditions out of which the later Christian theological conception of the Spirit arose. Many of the modern theories of the Spirit's activity, notably certain post-reformation theories of biblical inspiration, allow of explanation only on the basis of the conception of the Spirit in Alexandrian Judaism.

PART II

THE SPIRIT OF GOD IN NEW TESTAMENT THOUGHT

CHAPTER I

Introduction

THERE are only four possible factors in the origin of New Testament theological conceptions. They are (1) the Hebrew tradition, in which is included both Palestinian Judaism and the Old Testament system of thought; (2) Greek influences; (3) the teaching of Christ; (4) the experiences of the early Christians, in which are included the experiences of the writers of the New Testament. Alexandrian Judaism comes in some things under the Hebrew tradition, and in others under the Greek influence, according to the affiliation of the particular elements with Hebrew or Greek thought. In some cases the Christian thought is not the representative of anything existing in contemporary Hebrew conceptions, but reflects by a sort of intellectual atavism the ideas of ancient Hebrew thought. Such leaps in the heredity of religious thought are not uncommon where there are sacred books to furnish links of connection. Some phase of experience or of thought may produce a revival of an idea obscured by time and half forgotten. This is sometimes only a passing phase, where a conception out of harmony with the present is merely galvanized into an artificial semblance of life, but often it is the application to present conditions of an old idea which has actual vital content. In such cases the

once antiquated idea becomes a new force, and enters on a new career of transformations and historic influences.

Such a movement, however, has its real cause in some contemporary development of religious life. A partial illustration of this is the attempted revival of Mosaism, resulting in the real revival of Scribism, in the Puritan movement, when there was an attempt, under the influence of a very genuine religious impulse, to mold the state and certain social and religious customs after the supposed demands of the Old Testament. Outside of Christianity the present Vedantism and the Arya Somaj of India furnish illustrations. They are attempts to revive Hindu philosophy as the basis of modern religious movements. Theosophy is in like manner based less on present Buddhism or Yogaism than on an attempt to interpret the classic books of these religions. Whether any of these will prove to be more than the attempted galvanism of dead ideas remains yet to be seen. Something of this harking back to earlier thought one finds in certain New Testament ideas, perhaps nowhere more than in the conception of the Spirit. There is a life, a vividness and force, about the New Testament teaching regarding the Spirit that one does not find elsewhere this side of the ancient Hebrew prophetic literature. The likeness of idea was caused by the likeness of experience. In both periods belief in the possession of the Spirit was a factor in actual life. Thus the Hebrew tradition and the experience of the Chris-

tian church combine in the shaping of this idea. For the rest the idea depends largely on contemporary Palestinian-Jewish ideas.

The chief points of the Palestinian-Jewish conception of the Spirit were, as we have seen, the withdrawal of the activity of the Spirit from physical nature, the limitation of its operation to the range of human activities, the use of it to explain the ancient national history and literature, the denial of its activity in contemporary life, and the expectation that it would once more operate in the future Messianic kingdom. All these assumptions lie in the background of the earliest New Testament thought on the subject. Here, too, it is used only of man, never of nature. Its application to the history and writings of ancient Israel is one of the most frequent New Testament usages, while the idea of the working of the Spirit as a part of the Messianic program is the main taproot from which springs the entire growth of the peculiar New Testament doctrine of the Spirit. Two elements of Jewish conception which may seem at first sight contradictory to the New Testament doctrine are the moral and religious work of the Spirit and the denial of the Spirit's operation in present life. The last, however, is only a seeming discrepancy, for the Christian belief that the Messianic age had come carried with it, on the presupposition of Judaism, the idea of the present operation of the Spirit. The Spirit as working in the purely ethical and religious realm was not a thought that was particularly dom-

inant in later Judaism. The course of development which was begun in Psa. 51 and 139 never reached in Judaism its full fruition. There is no evidence that in the first Christian century it formed any appreciable element of Judaic thought. We shall not be surprised, then, to find that early Christianity ignores it. It is taken up and developed by Paul, but under influences so new that when we come to its consideration we shall need to raise the question whether there is in it any element of old Hebrew thought.

The portions of the conception which are due to the other three elements vary much in quantity and importance. Greek thought coming through the medium of Alexandrian Judaism contributed very slightly if at all. It influenced later philosophy in the mechanical dictation-theory of the inspiration of Scripture, but few distinct traces of this appear in the writings of the New Testament. The teaching of Jesus emphasizes certain elements, but, strangely enough, adds nothing that is essentially new, and is far less important for the genetic study of the doctrine than one would naturally expect in the case of an element of Christian theology which has held so important a position in the structure of the Christian system. The element of experience was much more significant. Without the widespread and firmly fixed belief in the early church that certain phenomena of their religious life were produced by the Spirit of God the doctrine of the Spirit would have taken an entirely

different form and would have had a very different history. This was the warp into which the woof of traditional concepts, from whatever source they came, was woven. This experience is worthy of the most careful study. The neglect of this study of actual life has been one reason for so much interpretation of this doctrine which has been mechanical and unpsychological and which has refused to lend itself to the demands of progressive theological thought.

The term for the Spirit which has become almost the peculiar characteristic of the Christian literature, namely, "Holy Spirit" (*ἅγιον πνεῦμα*), is a direct borrowing from Judaism. The contribution of Christianity to the thought of God is not his holiness, but his Fatherhood. The peculiarly Christion addition to terminology is "the Spirit of Christ." "Holy" as the qualifying adjective of "Spirit" belongs to the cycle of Hebrew thought. Its origin preceded the Christian period, and yet its development is not wholly easy to trace. The term appears first in the later Old Testament literature (Psa. 51. 11; Isa. 42. 1). In the Jewish literature it became more common.

Two reasons for the growth of the term may be found. One is the Jewish hesitancy to use the name of God. As "Heaven" and "the Most High" and sometimes "the Holiness" came to be used for Elohim and Jahveh, so "the Holy Spirit" came to be used for the Spirit of Elohim and the Spirit of Jahveh. The substitution was not universal in the

one case more than in the other, but in both it was so general as to make a distinct usage which conforms to a well-marked type.[1] That "Holy" was chosen as the qualifying adjective is in accord with the Jewish exaltation of holiness as the chief characteristic of God. It is a part of the large unconscious tribute of Judaism to the work and influence of the prophets. The second reason for the growth of the term "Holy Spirit" is the development of the idea of the spirits which are not of God. The Jewish mythology of angels and demons had made the old term "the Spirit" vague and ambiguous. That we find this term used later in Christian literature is due to the fact that, while there was in early Christian thought no decrease of belief in the existence of evil spirits, there was at the same time a great emphasis on the work of the Spirit of God; so that "the Spirit" came to be used commonly of "the Holy Spirit" *par excellence*. How different this familiar Christian usage is from the Jewish, and how the demon mythology assisted in the development of the term "Holy Spirit," is shown by Dalman: "The Targums have conjoined רוּחַ [Spirit], wherever in the Old Testament it is not expressly called the Spirit of God, either with קֻדְשָׁא [Holy] or נְבוּאָה, to make it clear what spirit was contemplated. . . . In Jewish literature it

[1] "רוּחַ קֻדְשָׁא, not רוּחַ אֱלָהָא, is the common Jewish expression; and when Jesus uses ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ (Matt. 12. 28), the original would be the Aramaic בְּרוּחַ קֻדְשָׁא, unless the preference were given to the fuller form suggested by Matt. 10. 20, 'by the Spirit of my Father in heaven'" (Dalman, *Words of Jesus*, p. 203).

is so unheard of to speak of 'the Spirit,' הָרוּחַ, when the Spirit of God is meant that the single word 'Spirit' would much rather be taken to mean a demon or the wind" (*Words of Jesus,* page 203, Eng. tr.). In Christian literature the use or omission of the adjective "Holy" is quite incidental. The meaning is not thereby affected.

CHAPTER II

The Synoptic Gospels

I. The Teaching of Jesus

It is necessary to distinguish in the synoptic gospels between the teaching of Jesus and the conceptions of the writers of the gospels or of the sources which they used. Even in subjects regarding which the teaching of Jesus was entirely, or even largely, original this problem of distinction is not always easy. In those regarding which early Christian thought contained a large infusion of inherited Jewish ideas the problem becomes very important and sometimes very difficult. Nor can this distinction always be the same as that drawn between the words of Jesus and the narration of the evangelist. It is always possible that in the transmission of the words of Jesus some infusion of Christian interpretation or of Jewish inheritance may color the impression which the words leave upon the reader, even if it has not modified in some measure the record of the words themselves.

The words of Jesus recorded in the synoptists give the following uses of the term "the Spirit" (*τὸ πνεῦμα*), in the sense of the Spirit of God:

Matt. 10. 20: "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you" (parallels, Mark 13. 11; Luke 12. 12).

Matt. 12. 31, 32: "Every sin and blasphemy

shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven; and whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him" (parallels, Luke 12. 10; Mark 3. 29).

Luke 4. 18, in the quotation from Isa. 61. 1 describing the "Servant:" "I will put my Spirit upon him."

Matt. 12. 28: "If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then is the kingdom of God come upon you" (parallel, Luke 11. 20, "by the finger of God," instead of "by the Spirit of God").

Luke 11. 13: "How much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him" (parallel, Matt. 7. 11, "good things," instead of "the Spirit").

Matt. 22. 43: "How then doth David in the Spirit call him Lord, saying" (parallel, Mark 12. 36, "David himself saith in the Holy Spirit").

Matt. 28. 19, the baptismal formula: "Into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."

Attention is immediately drawn to the two passages where mention is not made of the Spirit in the parallels: Matt. 12. 28 and Luke 11. 13. Matt. 12. 28 ascribes the power to cast out demons to "the Spirit of God;" Luke 11. 20, to "the finger of God." There are no other cases in which Christ ascribes the miraculous elements in his ministry to the Spirit. The Spirit as the divine guiding power

in the Messianic career is, however, expressed in the quotation from Isa. 61. 1 (Luke 4. 18). It is, then, quite possible that such an expression as is used in Matt. 12. 28 may have come from Christ. The question comes to be one of probabilities rather than one in which we can expect to find absolute proof. On the principle that the more difficult reading is probably original Luke's phrase, "the finger of God," would be preferred. It is also true that it is easier to suppose the change of this more unusual phrase to the very common Christian term "the Spirit" than to suppose the opposite change, particularly in Luke, who uses "the Spirit" with such frequency. Especially is this change probable in a passage which a moment later implies the Spirit's power in healing demoniacs. At the same time there is a certain liking for Old Testament phraseology shown by the Lucan editor, and this phrase has its prototype in Exod. 8. 19.[1] The question is, then, one which does not admit of absolute decision. The probability remains against the phrase "the Spirit of God." That Christ does not elsewhere lay stress upon the Spirit as the source of the power of his miraculous works makes the probability yet stronger.

The second text in which the parallel passage does not sustain the use of the Spirit is Luke 11. 13, the promise that the Father will "give the Holy

[1] Holtzmann notes the Lucan fondness "for certain plastic expressions like the arm and hand of God" (Luke 1. 51, 66, 71. 74). He is still more fond, however, of the expression "the Spirit," as its frequent use in Acts shows. That he has not used it here is a somewhat strong argument for the originality of the form he does use.

Spirit to those that ask him." The parallel passage, Matt. 7. 11, promises instead the gift of "good things." This case seems to be less doubtful than the one just considered. It is a promise of the Holy Spirit to the disciples; yet not to the disciples in any time of great future need or for the advance of the Messianic kingdom, but at any time and for the behoof of the personal relation between the believer and God—a use not made of the conception of the Spirit elsewhere in the teaching of Christ and hardly in the literature representing the primitive Christian idea of the Spirit. Besides, the gift of the Spirit in response to the prayers of the disciples is more akin to later Christian ideas than to the teaching of Christ. In that teaching the expression has no parallel. In John 14. 16, which is most nearly akin, the Spirit is promised in response to the prayer of Christ. We conclude, then, that the insertion of the common Christian term of "the Spirit" in the synoptic source or by the Lucan editor, with whom it is a favorite, is more probable than is the opposite change.[1]

Having, then, excluded those two passages on the basis of the parallel texts, let us gather up the uses in the remaining passages:

1. The Spirit is used only in respect to the Messianic kingdom, and in respect to the inspiration of the Old Testament writers.

[1] D and Codd it, Orig. read *ἀγαθὸν δόμα*, but doubtless influenced by the text of Matthew. Lucan forms of text are also seen in *ὑπάρχειν* (Luke uses thirty-three times) and in the attraction of *ὁ* (if *ὀ* is to be read) in the phrase *ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ δώσει*.

2. It is used by implication of the Messiah's activity in the quotation from Isa. 61. 1 (Luke 4. 18), and, somewhat more directly, in Matt. 12. 31, 32.

3. It is used of the divine power which will hereafter help the disciples in their labor and in their witness for the Messianic kingdom (Mark 13. 11).

So far the representation is entirely Palestinian Jewish. The Spirit is not regarded as the origin of the external world. It is limited entirely to the divine influence upon human activity. It is a temporary gift for special needs, not a permanent possession. It is not the basis of a moral or mystical "new life." All these are marks of the Palestinian-Jewish phase of thought. Christ neither introduced original interpretations into this conception nor did he go back to those Old Testament elements which had dropped out of the Jewish usage. His expression was quite that of contemporaneous thought. It is notable, however, that if we lay aside Matt. 12. 28, his teaching never ascribes the unusual, the mere "wonders," to the Spirit. Standing between the Jewish conception of the wonder-working Spirit and the later emphasis in the church upon the "gifts of the Spirit," the moderation of Christ in this respect is notable.[1] It forms the link between the Jewish conceptions and the later development of an

[1] Wendt (*Gospel of John*, p. 8) calls attention to what he regards a mark of the subapostolic origin of the editor's framework of John as distinguished from the apostolic "source," in that the framework emphasizes the value of Christ's "signs," while the source keeps to the ethical evidence of the divinity of Christ's mission. Whether Wendt's analysis of the gospel be correct or not the dependence upon the ethical evidence is in greater harmony with the synoptic teaching of Jesus than is an emphasis upon external signs.

ethical doctrine of the Spirit under Paul. Whether or not the teaching of Christ contained elements more closely in harmony with the later Pauline doctrine is a question which arises more distinctly in the consideration of that teaching as presented in the fourth gospel. If there were such teachings, it is certainly singular, but yet not wholly impossible, that they should not appear in the synoptic gospels.

The obscure saying about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12. 31, 32; Luke 12. 10; Mark 3. 29) is connected in both Matthew and Mark with the charge that Jesus cast out demons "by Beelzebub, the prince of the demons." It is seemingly an assertion of the Spirit as the source of the miracles of Christ. From it one might even gather a somewhat strong implication that the healing of the demonized was the one great proof that Christ's work proceeded from the Spirit. Yet he who could say of the exorcism of demons, "If I by Beelzebub cast out demons, by whom do your sons cast them out? Therefore shall they be your judges," could hardly have given such a unique and transcendent importance to this particular miraculous work as the limitation of this saying to that work alone would imply. Nor do we find that elsewhere Christ places his miraculous works upon so high a plane. It is likely, then, that Christ in this saying had in mind not merely the phenomenon which formed the occasion of the saying, but that he included in his meaning rather the sum total of the evidence for his Messianic mission.

The saying is of further significance as marking Christ's conception of the transcendent importance of the Spirit's work. That conception finds its best explanation in the idea that Christ here speaks in the language of Palestinian-Jewish notions of the Spirit. For long generations the Spirit had been withdrawn from the world. From the close of prophetic times it had been reserved for the Messianic period. When it was now once more operative in Israel, when it was present in the fulfillment of the long-desired Messianic hope, for Jewish leaders to deny its manifestations was a sin of peculiar heinousness. The saying gets its sting not from its comparison of blasphemy against the Spirit and against Jesus, but from the Judaistic background of the connection of the Spirit with the national Messianic hope.

For Christ's conception of the work of the Spirit the most central synoptic teaching is Mark 13. 11; Luke 12. 12; Matt. 10. 20.[1]

The Spirit here is the Old Testament Spirit of inspiration. Compare, for example, the idea in the Balaam fragment, where Balaam waits upon the word of Jahveh (Num. 22. 8; 23. 3; and especially 24. 13). True, it is here promised by Jesus not for prophecy, but for testimony; but Christian testimony is the correlative of the Old Testament proph-

[1] Gilbert (*The Revelation of Jesus*, p. 297) supposes the teaching to have been given on two occasions, but Matt. 10. 17-22 and Luke 12. 12 seem to be parallel with Mark 13. 9-13 and to be a doublet of Matt. 24. 9-14 (see Holtzmann *in loco*). Only the occasion suggested in the latter passage furnishes a proper historical basis for the teaching in general. The promise of the Spirit also points to a time when the Messianic nature of Christ's mission was well understood by the apostles.

ecy. The apocalyptic writer was but following the lead of this teaching of Christ when he wrote, "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy" (Rev. 19. 10).

The work of the Spirit is connected with the development of the Messianic kingdom, not with the safety of the individual disciple. The purpose of the speaking is "for a testimony to" those before whom the disciples will be brought. (Luke's thought in 21. 13 is, as Wendt suggests,[1] a change not in strict accord with the teaching of Christ; see also Holtzmann *in loco.*) But the testimony of the disciples in the New Testament has for its purpose the advance of the Messianic knowledge and belief (1 Cor. 1. 6; 2. 1). Mark 13. 12 shows that the result of the guidance of the Spirit is not personal safety.

The guidance of the Spirit is for special needs. The promise is not for general assistance, nor for a continual control, but only for guidance on particular occasions. It is the particular charismatic use.

The promise of the Spirit is a promise of divine help when human resources fail. The simple disciples might well be alarmed at the prospect of facing the religious and civil power of their own nation and of the Roman empire; for thus they must have understood Jesus's words. His promise was obviously that of help where their own resources of wisdom and eloquence were too feeble to avail.

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, Eng. tr., I, p. 238, note.

The promise was not of the Spirit as grounding the ethical life, but of the Spirit as inspiring for utterance which will further the purposes of God, as in the Old Testament prophecy. In fact, the closest affinities of this thought are with the ideas of Old Testament prophetic inspiration.

The intimate association of the Spirit with the activity of the disciples is marked by as strong an emphasis as the most anthropomorphic Old Testament writer could use. "It is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit." It is a most absolute expression of the doctrine of the individual as the instrument of the Spirit. In Luke 21. 15 the same guidance is assigned not to the Spirit, but to Christ himself. This unification of the two is quite in line with the early Christian thought which spoke of the Spirit as "the Spirit of Christ." This passage may be summarized as follows: The Spirit so inspires the disciple of Christ that his natural powers are supplemented whenever the needs of the Messianic kingdom demand it. This is, then, the conception of a supernatural inspiration, akin in psychological character to the Old Testament prophetic inspiration, a temporary gift for special occasions.

In Luke 4. 18 Jesus applies to his mission the description of the Servant in Second Isaiah (61. 1). He uses it as a Messianic passage, in which the entire Messianic mission is ascribed to the Spirit. This was one of those indirect and tentative claims to the Messiahship which were frequent in the early middle period of Jesus's ministry. It is possible

that some inkling of his high claim penetrated the minds of the men of Nazareth on that occasion, for Jesus's refusal to repeat "the things done in Capernaum" here in "his own country" could not have been thrown cavalierly upon a friendly audience. It is not improbable that the outbreak of wrath which followed his address may have proceeded in part from his claim of the Spirit's guidance, which could have meant to a Palestinian audience nothing but an assumption of the Messianic mission. Even John, the prophet of the wilderness, had been careful not to arrogate to himself the possession of the Spirit. Who was this fellow, that he should claim that which only belonged to the Messiah or to the Messianic era? The Messiah was not yet come. Did he himself claim to be that person? "And they were filled with wrath."

There remains the formula of baptism in Matt. 28. 19: "Into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." Does this proceed from Jesus?[1] The fact that the full formula is not elsewhere given in the New Testament creates a probability against it, but by no means makes, as is often assumed, a conclusive objection to it. Elsewhere in the New Testament we have no occasion for a full formula. The incidental references to baptism do not demand the formula. At the same

[1] The investigations of Conybeare, published in the *Zeitschrift fur die N. T. Wissenschaft* and in the *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. I, and summarized by Professor Lake in his inaugural lecture at the University of Leyden, January 27, 1904, throw grave critical doubt upon the trinitarian formula as a part of the original text. There seems reason to believe that the early church fathers knew the text without the formula. Should the position be proved, the problem of the use of the Spirit in this text disappears for biblical theology.

time the slight reference to baptism in the activity of Christ (baptism seems to disappear totally from Christ's work after the beginning of the Judean ministry), the fact that Christ so filled the content of the religion of the early church, coupled with the use of Christ's name only in all references to baptism, make it probable that the trinitarian formula does not come from Christ.

The study of the use of the Spirit furnishes a more sure ground of conclusion on this subject than does historical criticism. What could baptism "into the name of the Spirit" have meant in the mouth of Jesus, judging by his use of the same term elsewhere in the synoptists? What but baptism into the occasional possession of a divine power in times of great need, when ordinary human abilities did not suffice to advance the Messianic purposes of God? One may well question whether Christ would have put a term with this meaning by the side of God and the Messiah in a solemn formula of baptism. If, on the other hand, we could suppose it to have been in some sort a synonym for the power or "name" of God—a meaning sanctioned by neither the teaching of Jesus nor the remains of contemporary Jewish literature—it would still be difficult to account for the use of synonyms in this way. We can explain this formula neither from the use of the term "the Spirit" in the words of Jesus nor from its use in Palestinian-Jewish writings. It is, however, not difficult to explain it from the point of view of the early church. No sooner did Chris-

tianity pass from the Jewish into the Gentile world than the belief in God "the Father" became an article of Christian faith in a much more important sense than among monotheistic Jehovah-worshiping Jews. The Spirit, too, as the basis of the new life, as both the essence and the evidence of the connection of the Christian with the supreme God, as the divine guiding power of the Christian community in all its ecclesiastical organism and its missionary activity, came to be an essential element of Christian belief. It meant a rich heritage, a precious experience, a high vocation. It meant a form of divinity, not less divine than God the Father or than Christ. It is not surprising that the church embodied its consciousness of the value of this relationship to the divine in the formula of baptism. To find its value, however, we need to go not to the teaching of Christ, but to the thought and life of the early church. For these reasons, as well as for those which historical criticism more often presents, one is compelled to withdraw the formula in Matt. 28. 19 from the genuine words of Jesus.

There remain, then, as probably genuine words of Jesus regarding the Spirit: 1. Mark 12. 36 (parallel, Matt. 22. 43), a reference to the Old Testament writers as speaking "in the Spirit." 2. Matt. 12. 31, 32 (parallels, Luke 12. 11; Mark 3. 29), the sin against the Holy Spirit. 3. Luke 4. 18, the Messianic Spirit, quoted from Isa. 61. 1, connecting the Spirit with the mission of the Messiah. 4. Matt. 10. 20 (parallels, Mark 13. 11; Luke 12. 12),

the promise of the aid of the Spirit to the disciples in future times of need.

Summarizing the teaching of Christ in the synoptists: The Spirit is a manifest revelation of God, present in the work of the Messiah and guiding his action. It will also furnish needed divine power to the members of the Messianic kingdom when Christ is absent and their own powers no longer suffice. It is not a new life or the basis of a new life, but a special gift, superadded to the ordinary life.

This is thoroughly Palestinian Jewish. There is here no hint of the peculiar Pauline development. The whole conception is in line with that of the early Jewish apostolic church. There is elsewhere in the synoptic teaching of Jesus the equivalent of Paul's idea of the new life in the Spirit. It is expressed as coming into the kingdom; as a life with new aims and purposes; as the life of faith, its ethical aim, righteousness, its inspiration, trust; as the gift of God, its connection being with God directly, not with the Spirit of God.

The small part which the Spirit plays in the teaching of Christ needs explanation. It certainly cannot be taken as indicating that Christ placed little value on the idea which that term represented. The intimate relation between God and man which this term had indicated in the Hebrew literature was exactly that which Jesus was most concerned to bring about. It may very possibly be his clear realization of this relation that led to the rare use of the term "Spirit of God" to express it. Christ

taught a perfect harmony with God. He himself stood in such a relation. He desired it for his followers. He would have his disciples brought into direct and immediate connection with God himself. Even so thin a veil as the idea of the Holy Spirit might tend to obscure the relation. Of the classes of instances which can be traced undeniably to his use one is of the past, when the Spirit spoke through Hebrew inspiration (Mark 12. 36), one is of the future, after his departure (Mark 13. 11), and the third is such a statement as could by no possibility obscure the fact of an immediate relation between God and men (Matt. 12. 31, f.; Luke 4. 18 and parallels).

It is significant that in no case does Christ speak of the Spirit as acting upon his followers while he is present with them. He would keep the thought of the disciples fixed upon himself as the revelation of the Father. It is only when his thoughts recur to the gloomy future that he appeals, in either the Johannean or the synoptic tradition, to the Jewish thought of the Spirit as an element of comfort to the "orphaned" disciples. Even this use of it is in the nature of a concession to Jewish usage. Really his disciples had what was better than the Spirit; they had Christ himself. Even after his departure the presence of the Spirit would still be his own presence, so that he could say, if we may trust the Johannean tradition, "I will not leave you orphaned. I will come unto you." It is in line with this that Luke substitutes, for the promise of the

Holy Spirit to the disciples when brought before kings and rulers on account of the gospel, the words, "*I* will give you a mouth and wisdom which none of your adversaries shall be able to withstand." Certainly Christ's teaching resulted in the consciousness of the presence not only of the Spirit, but of Christ himself, active and energizing in the Christian church. One queries if this may not be due, at least in part, to Christ's sparing use of the Spirit and his great emphasis on the direct and immediate relation of the believer to himself and to the Father.

II. The Synoptic Narrative

There is one section of the gospel narrative which represents entirely Jewish thought, except as it may have been colored by the Christian medium through which it has passed. This is the preaching of John the Baptist. The Jewish element is seen in all the concepts of John's teaching. The Messiah as the purifier of his people (Mark 1. 8); the need of repentance as the preparation for his coming (Matt. 3. 8); the Messiah as being present, but hidden in obscurity until the time of his manifestation (John 1. 26) are all common Jewish ideas. The one reference to the Spirit which the tradition of John's preaching has preserved in the gospels is also wholly Jewish: "I baptize you with water: he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire" (Matt. 3. 11; Mark 1. 8; Luke 3. 16; comp. Acts 1. 5).

It is worthy of note also that the idea of the Spirit

is Jewish rather than Hebrew, even though one finds in other elements of John's teaching a revival of Hebrew concepts. For example, his sense of his own prophetic mission is Hebrew, not Jewish. Judaism, as we have seen, did not thus interpret its religious experiences. John feels that he is "a voice" through whom God speaks. He is now ready to say, "I say unto you" (Luke 3. 8), quite in the manner of the ancient prophet. One can only think of him as recognizing within himself that divine guidance which made the prophetic consciousness. Yet with all his claims for himself he did not claim to possess the Spirit. That he keeps, with characteristic Jewish reverence for the idea, exclusively for the operation of God in the fully developed Messianic kingdom. So thoroughly was he imbued with the Jewish idea of the Spirit as being the peculiar property of the Messianic kingdom in the future that the old prophetic language which called the prophet the man upon whom the Spirit of God had come was no longer the natural language to use. He is a prophet, but the Messiah will have the Spirit.

While this conception of the Spirit is Jewish, still its interpretation is based on Hebrew prophecy. The Messiah is regarded as mediating the Spirit to his followers. "I baptize you with water: but he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." The figure of baptism in the Spirit (*ἐν πνεύματι*) is not to be carried too far, as though the Spirit were an element by means of which the

Messiah would accomplish his purpose, as water is the element of baptism. The use of fire in the same phrase shows that the whole double figure must be taken in the broad sense of its inner figurative meaning. It is as though John said, "I am placing you in relation to God by a symbol which expresses your desire for purification from sin. The Messiah will place you in a relation to God which shall exceed what I can offer as much as purification by fire exceeds washing by water." Not only will it be different in power, but in content. "Your baptism expresses your own purpose. The Messiah will offer you a baptism in which God's power shall meet with your purpose. The purification shall be God's work, not yours only."

Nor was the idea of purification the only, or perhaps the most important, idea of the Baptist in his use of the Spirit. The promise of the Spirit constituted a claim for the fulfillment of the old prophetic promise of the return of the Spirit to the people. It was the affirmation in another form that the Messianic age was at hand.

Closely akin to this Messianic teaching is the incident of the vision at Jesus's baptism. Mark, our first source for this tradition, makes this a vision of Jesus (1. 9, 10), without, however, implying that John did not also see it. Matthew follows Mark in part. In Luke the rhetorical figure of the Spirit descending "like a dove" is transformed into literal fact, "in bodily form as a dove." John 1. 33, "I saw the Spirit descending as a dove out of

heaven," contains a reminiscence of the same figure. One would not press the phrase "as a dove" here or elsewhere as necessarily from the Baptist; but it seems not impossible that the vision may have been to the Baptist,[1] and that the fourth gospel may have at the basis of its account the most correct form of tradition when it puts the story of the vision of the Spirit in the mouth of the Baptist. It would, at least, be in perfect accord with his Jewish conception of the Spirit as a peculiar possession of the Messiah.

When we pass in the earliest gospel source from the tradition of the Baptist to the narratives of the ministry of Christ we are struck by the meagerness of reference to the Spirit. We might expect that in the light both of the Jewish Messianic idea and of the later Christian experience there would be an abundant use of the Spirit to explain the life and works of Christ.[2] On the contrary, the narrative portions of the oldest tradition present only one passage, aside from the story of the baptism mentioned above, in which this explanation is offered for an event in Christ's life. That is the temptation (Mark 1. 12), an event not a part of the expected Messianic activity. So far, then, as our

[1] There is little use in trying to rationalize this account or to discuss various vision hypotheses in connection with it. He who recognizes how easily the periods of religious enthusiasm evolve psychological experiences which take the form of visions, and also how easily events become thrown into vision form in the telling, will be but little inclined to dogmatize about this dove. The important thing is the conception of the Spirit. The figure of the dove may have come into the narrative in any one of several ways.

[2] The few references in Acts must be from a later date. They occur in later documents, which use the Spirit very freely as an explanation of all Christian phenomena. The same would, of course, apply to the Johannean literature (for example, John 3. 34).

literature allows us to judge, the earliest Christian thought did not explain the Messianic work as being due to the possession of the Spirit by Christ. This paucity of use may be due to two influences: the very meager use which Christ himself made of the conception in explaining his work, and the feeling that Christ stood so close to God that there was no need for the intervention of the Spirit. This would have been quite in accord with the Jewish notion of the Spirit. The Spirit was God's medium for the inspiration of the prophets and other men through whom he wrought his will upon earth. So long as the Messiah had been thought of, as he was by Hebrew prophet and Judaistic scribe, as a prince-prophet, a man whose official position determined the relation in which he stood to God, so long he had, like other prophets and national leaders, been regarded as holding this official position by the gift of the Spirit. There is abundant evidence, however, that with the disciples, who had known Jesus, the personal element dominated the official. He was the Messiah to them, having all the Messianic offices; but as he had seldom if ever spoken to them of the Spirit as the source of his revelation of God, but rather of his relation as being immediately with the Father himself, so the disciples found no need of supplying, in their thought of him, a medium of connection with God through the Spirit. Another element seems to have assisted in this change from Jewish ideas: that the teaching of Christ himself took up the Jewish conception

of the Spirit in the Messianic time, but applied it especially to the time following the earthly presence of the Messiah. In that time the disciples would need the Spirit to assist them in the midst of enemies (Mark 13. 11). Here also belongs, as will be shown more fully later, the conception of the Spirit which is found in the last discourses of John, the account of Jesus's breathing upon his disciples, and saying, "Receive ye the Holy Spirit" (John 20. 22); and the instructions to the disciples given at the ascension, as told in Acts 1; all of which are in harmony with the teachings of Christ about the Spirit, and doubtless rest upon genuine tradition.

The reference to the Spirit as driving Christ into the wilderness to be tempted seems to have been made under the impulse of the desire to account for such an unexpected circumstance as a temptation of the Messiah. Even this temptation, the author of the narrative wishes to affirm, was not apart from the divine plan of his work.[1]

The Matthean account of the nativity unites with the Lucan account in ascribing the divine agency in the birth of Christ to the action of the Holy Spirit (Matt. 1. 18, 20; comp. Luke 1. 35). The whole critical question of the stories of the nativity

[1] Since the account of the temptation must, if it has any historical basis at all, have come in some form from Christ himself, there is a possibility that this reference to the Spirit is also to be ascribed to him. All the probabilities, however, are otherwise. The paucity of the references of his own activity to the Spirit unites with the great improbability that he would assign this event to the Spirit, when he does not so assign his great works of grace and teachings of mercy. On the other hand, nothing would be more probable than that early Christian tradition should attribute this event, so strange, so unexpected in the career of the Messiah, to the direct action of the Spirit of God, under the feeling that it stood in peculiar need of an element of defense.

is involved in any discussion of this matter. Without entering here into an extended treatment of the subject one may assume that they do not represent in their present form the earliest period of the apostolic church. They are attempts to account for the unique personality of Christ. They must have taken literary form after the personality of Christ had become in some measure a problem for the church. The idea often advanced, that these narratives in their present form belong to the earliest stage of Christian tradition,[1] seems hardly borne out by a close study. It is true that the Messianic mission of Jesus appears prominently in both narratives. This would, however, hardly need a birth by the Spirit of God. Nothing in Jewish thought would demand that. Nowhere in Judaism is the Messiah a person of supernatural birth, though sometimes he is regarded as a supernatural person, come down from heaven. The Spirit, however, is nowhere connected with his personal appearance. On the other hand, a vivid realization of the wonderful character of Jesus demanded an explanation of his person. It is this explanation rather than the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah which would give occasion for the publication of the narrative of the miraculous birth.[2]

[1] For example, in Hastings's *Bible Dictionary*, article "Holy Spirit," p. 405.

[2] Dr. Hoben ("The Virgin Birth," in *The American Journal of Theology*, July, 1002) suggests three possible conceptions as finding explanation in the miraculous birth: the moral purity of Christ, his Messianic mission, and his moral likeness to God. He excludes the explanation of the divine nature of Christ from the purpose of the gospel writer. What is said above would serve to exclude the Messianic mission also from the lists, and would leave the explanation of the unique personal elements of Christ's character, his moral purity and moral likeness to God, as the reason for the narrative of the story of the miraculous birth.

The conception of the Spirit presented in the gospel of the infancy is unique, different from any that preceded it. In the broad sense it is charismatic and connected with the element of character. At the same time the Spirit seems to be regarded as the origin of the physical body of Christ, and so it connects with the middle Hebrew idea of the Spirit of God active in the physical world. There, however, it was God moving upon the physical world directly and for the sake of an end within that world. Here it is for the sake of the religious rather than of the physical,[1] an idea more in the line of later Judaic thought. One may perhaps call this the earliest attempt to explain the person of Christ. The explanation is in accord with the Judaistic Christian ideas of the Spirit.

Nor, despite the unique character of the conception, is it difficult to see why the Spirit is used as the active agency of God in the birth of Christ. It lay so closely related in Jewish thought to the Messianic office that it offered an easy and natural term to use for the explanation of his person. In this

[1] There seems to be no doubt that the creation of Christ's physical body is included in the action of the Spirit. Walker (*The Spirit and the Incarnation*, p. 302) says of the ordinary understanding of the passage that it seems "an irruption of the spiritual and the divine into the physical and natural sphere so entirely out of harmony with the idea of evolution as an orderly process by means of resident forces as to be incredible." Perhaps that is true, but the story seems, nevertheless, to mean just that. Walker calls it "a narrative in the naïve biblical style," expressing 'in semi-poetical form the great fact that underlay the second creation in Christ." He would find its significance in the entrance into the world "of a distinctly new and higher kind of being –man wholly after the Spirit, man as the Son of God, nay, the Divine Life realizing itself as man." To make this a naïve poetical account of so profound a truth is to deal with the New Testament in a way out of all accord with the type of literature it represents. It is not easy to believe that the early church either had such an elaborate theory of the person of Christ or that, if they had, they would have taken this enigmatic way to express it. It looks too much like Philonizing rationalism.

way, too, the Christian church avoided the offensive physical conceptions of the Fatherhood of God which would otherwise have lain so near the surface and which Professor Curtiss[1] shows to be within the actual range of the Syrian peoples. Without the idea of the Spirit the thought of the divine Sonship of Christ, had it ever been carried into the physical realm at all, would almost certainly have become a conception of mythical nature not essentially unlike Greek and Hindu myths of divine-human beings.

Even as it is, the enemies of Christianity actually charged this mythical belief against the church. It was possible to avoid this physical mythology, and yet to express the profound truth of Christ's unique personal relation to God, by the use of that conception of the Spirit which the Hebrew religion had developed. Without the use of this inherited term and the idea which it represented the Christian conception of the person of Christ would have been either much lower or vastly poorer and more barren than it has been. With it the early church could think of its Messiah as coming body and soul from God, yet perfectly human, and could so conceive his nature as neither to lower his character nor make an idea impossible to picture from their Jewish point of view. It was only when Greek metaphysical notions entered Christian thought, and the simple Hebrew conception of the Spirit as the divine power dropped away before a metaphysical ideal-

[1] *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day.*

ism, that the person of Christ became a mystery. To the theologians who discussed the person of Christ in the terms of *homoousios* and *homoiousios* the Spirit of God was a term of hidden meaning. The explanation which had met the first needs of the Jewish Christian church played absolutely no part in the great classic theological debates regarding the divinity of Christ. Doubtless the scholarship of the world can never retreat from complex and philosophical to naïve answers to its riddles, but meantime the great mass of the church will continue to find if not a complete, yet a satisfactory, provisional answer to its questions of the person of Christ in the earliest Jewish Christian explanation, "conceived by the Holy Ghost," even if it is not able to comprehend speculations of scholastic theology. As one follows the attempts of other religions to express kindred ideas of their leaders and divine heroes one is thankful that the providence of God furnished the Christian church with this old Hebrew term for the divine activity operating in the world.

In spite of their great differences there seems to be some relation between the Matthean and Lucan accounts of the infancy. The resemblances are too great to permit the view that the accounts have an entirely disconnected origin. Whether that connection be in a form of an original Jerusalem-Bethlehem saga, as Wernle[1] suggests, or in some other way, is a problem which would lead us far afield.

[1] *Die Synoptische Frage*, 1899.

Certainly the original form contained the reference to the Spirit which is common to the two accounts (Matt. 1. 18, 20; Luke 1. 35). The Lucan account has been largely expanded. The annunciation of the birth of Jesus has been balanced by an annunciation of the birth of John the Baptist, and a different cycle of stories of the infancy of Jesus has been employed. The history of these changes is, at least in the present state of the study, a hopeless problem. There is, however, a series of phrases in the Lucan narrative whose affinities reveal their origin with sufficient plainness: Luke 1. 15, (John) "shall be filled with the Holy Spirit." 1. 41, (Elisabeth) "was filled with the Holy Spirit." 2. 25 (of Simeon), "The Holy Spirit was upon him." 2. 26, "It had been revealed unto him by the Holy Spirit." 2. 27, "He came in the Spirit into the temple."

These are all the references to the Spirit in the infancy passages aside from the one common to the two accounts. To these may be added the Lucan phrases inserted in the Christian tradition: 4. 1, Jesus, "full of the Holy Spirit." 4. 14, "Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee." 10. 21, Jesus "rejoiced in the Holy Spirit."

Whether in the infancy narratives the insertion of the references which we call Lucan was made by the editor of the writings is a question which belongs to criticism rather than to biblical theology. It may be that the Lucan story of the infancy was a part of the document which furnished the material for the first part of Acts. If so, the likeness of

phrases in the two sections is thereby accounted for as the mark of the source common to both. "Filled with the Holy Spirit" (Ἐπλήσθη πνεύματος ἁγίου) occurs in Luke 1. 15, 41, 67; Acts 2. 4 (in pl.); 4. 31. "Full of the Spirit" (πλησθείς or πλήρης πνεύματος) occurs in Luke 4. 1; Acts 4. 8; 6. 3; 7. 55; 9. 17; 11. 24; 13. 9. Some of these, however, as Acts 13. 9, cannot belong to the source common to Luke and Acts, if, indeed, such a source is to be assumed, but must be the work of the Lucan editor. References to the Spirit are far more abundant in the earlier portion of Acts than in the later, and they are akin in character to those in the infancy accounts. They are mostly statements that individuals were possessed of the power of the Spirit, or acted, either habitually or on occasion, under the Spirit's impulse. Of the same sort are all the references in the infancy accounts which are peculiar to Luke. These give no new material for the history of the concept in general. They simply add further instances of the common Christian idea of the charismatic Spirit, which we have already seen sparingly expressed by Jesus and which we shall find abundantly used in the literature reflecting the thought of the early church. The only peculiarity is that they ascribe the prophetic Spirit to individuals in the pre-Christian period; but this is limited to those who had to do with the fulfillment of God's plans for the Messiah—John, Elisabeth, Simeon. The passages could not have originated in Judaism, for in Jewish literature, as our study

of it has shown, the Spirit is never ascribed to contemporaries. They represent the reflection of Christian Messianic thought upon the period of the beginning of the Messiah's life.

CHAPTER III

The Primitive Christian Conception

The study of our subject in the New Testament literature presents a wholly new phenomenon. There is a mass of conceptions, perfectly explicable historically, covering the entire period of the early church and appearing in all its literature. In the midst of it appears, like the little horn of the apocalyptic vision, a new conception, speaking things that for the history of religion are truly great. It is not easy to trace the history of its growth. It belongs to genius, and genius is never amenable to the common laws of evolution. But beside it, in the same composite life, nay, even in the same mind, the old ideas still stand and pass on to the next age with no one, not even he who originated the new, perceiving that they are merely relics of the past, doomed to be silently pushed aside without even a chance to arm themselves for the battle of self-preservation.

Such a phenomenon is not uncommon in the history of religion. The growth of high religious ideas has always been due to personal religious insight, whether one calls that insight genius or inspiration. A course of religious growth will often proceed naturally and explicably for a certain distance. The student almost feels that he can calculate its orbit and project its future course,

when suddenly and unexpectedly he finds that the idea has come into the grasp of some new personality and has shot off from its former course at a most inexplicable tangent. For the psychologist here lies the spontaneity of personality. Religion has always explained such events as showing the inspiration of the divine. It is at least noteworthy, let us repeat, that every lofty religious idea which has passed into the world's possession has been thus struck out at a flash from the religious insight of some lofty soul. It would be possible to divide, not religions indeed, for they are always complexes of the lower and the higher, but religious conceptions, into lower and higher according as they were the gradual developments of religious thought influenced by environment or the sudden transformation of old ideas in the mind of some religious genius. Such a division would be the modern correlative of the old distinction between natural and supernatural religion. The former might be called racial religious concepts; the latter, personal religious concepts.

The new ideas of the Spirit were the Pauline; the old, those which we may, for want of a better name, call primitive Christian. We shall attempt first to trace the connection and growth of these older ideas. They are found in all parts of the early Christian literature. It so chances that Acts furnishes the best examples, but no portion of the literature, not even the Pauline epistles, is wholly without its additions to this phase of thought.

The following classifications may be made:[1]

A. The Spirit used of God acting in the individual life:

1. In the endowment of individuals with charismatic gifts:

(*a*) Prophecy: Acts 11. 28; 20. 23; 21. 4, 11 (comp. Rev. 2. 7 and parallels, 14. 13; 22. 17).

(*b*) Tongues: Acts 2. 4, 38; 10. 44, ff.; 11. 15, f.; 15. 8; 19. 2, ff.

(*c*) Wisdom: Acts 6. 10.

(*d*) Power to perform miracles: Acts 13. 9.

(*e*) Vision: Acts 7. 55; Rev. 1. 10; 4. 2; 17. 3; 21. 10.

(*f*) Power in Christian testimony on specific occasions: Acts 4. 8, 31.

(*g*) Specific or general direction in the progress of Christian activities: Acts 8. 29, 39; 10. 19; 11. 12; 13. 2, 4; 16. 6, 7; 20. 28; Jude 20.

(*h*) Charismata, without more specific definition: Acts 5. 32; 8. 15, f.

2. In the more continuous and permanent control of individuals. "Full of the Spirit," used only by Luke, of the individual as a mark of character, but not resulting in any specified charismatic power. An approach to the ethical meaning, possibly influenced by the Pauline use: Acts 6. 3, 5; 9. 17; 11. 24 (comp. Heb. 6. 4; see also corresponding Lucan usage in Luke 1. 15, 41; 4. 1).

B. The Spirit used of God active in the church

[1] This list of passages is from the extra-Pauline portions of the New Testament, outside the gospels. For the corresponding Pauline usage see p. 202.

as a whole, especially for the development of its Messianic testimony: Acts 1. 8; 2. 33; 5. 3, 9, 32; 9. 31; 13. 52; 15. 28; Heb. 2. 4; 10. 29; 1 Pet. 1. 12; 4. 14; Jude 19.

C. The Spirit as present in Christ, guiding his Messianic activity: Acts 1. 2; 10. 38; Heb. 9. 14.

D. The Spirit used as the medium of revelation in the Old Testament: Acts 1. 16; 4. 25; 7. 51; 28. 25; Heb. 3. 7; 9. 8; 10. 15; 1 Pet. 1. 11; 2 Pet. 1. 21.

E. The seven Spirits of God, used symbolically for the complete self-revelation of God. A use peculiar to apocalyptic symbolism: Rev. 1. 4; 3. 1; 4. 5; 5. 6.

If we compare the use of the Spirit here with that in earlier periods of Hebrew history, we find that the growth has been intensive rather than extensive. No new use has appeared. On the other hand, there has been a very full development of certain of the older uses. The Spirit now means not something different from what it did formerly, but means, in the large, the same things, not now as matters of memory or of hope, but of a vital, vivid experience in actual life.

1. The use of Spirit for God *ab intra* has entirely disappeared, yet the identification of God and the Spirit of God is more close than in Palestinian Judaism. God as manifesting himself in the new Messianic movement, as active in the Christian community, had very largely taken the place of the dis-

tant, abstract Deity whom the Jew worshiped. The result was a new sense of relation to God, a closer drawing together of God and man, and, because of this, a greater unification of God in his essence and God in his active and intimate connection with man—that is, of God and the Spirit.

2. Here, as in Palestinian Judaism, the Spirit acts only upon man, never, as in earlier periods, upon nature. Here, however, there is a still further narrowing. The Spirit is no longer conceived as acting on any man or for any divine purpose, but only on Christ, the believer in Christ, and the writers of the Old Testament who prophesied of Christ. The human use has become narrowed to the Messianic.

3. The Judaistic Messianic conception was national. The Spirit was an expression for the future guidance of God over the whole people, which corresponded to the past guidance of God, in, for example, the Mosaic period. In the earliest Christian conception it is still national, for the Messiah is "the hope of Israel," but the possession of the Spirit belongs only to Christians. They are now the part of the nation through which God works. Other Jews are urged to become believers in the Messiahship of Jesus in order that they too may share in the possession of the Spirit (Acts 2. 38). Not only is the trend of the entire conception of the Spirit national, but the individual conception, properly so called, is entirely absent. The Spirit never comes upon any man for any individual purpose,

but only for the development of the purpose of God in connection with the Messianic kingdom.

4. The conception of the Spirit as the basis of human life entirely drops out of view in this literature. It had already disappeared in the period of Palestinian Judaism. Its disappearance was probably due, at least in part, to the influence of the growing hesitancy to affirm union between the erring spirit of man and the holy Spirit of God. Such hesitancy belongs to the deistic thought of Judaism rather than to the rich experience of the life of early Christianity. The usage is lacking in the latter rather because the early church had no need for it. The whole field in which it stood had disappeared. God's relation to the spirit of man was now thought of under the category of direct creation. Occasion for the former phase of thought has dropped out of existence, and with it the usage has disappeared.

We have seen that the early Christian conception of the Spirit took its point of departure from Palestinian Judaism, but even this statement is too broad to express the facts. The Jewish element in the new thought of the Spirit came exclusively through its Messianic side. We have seen in former chapters how the Spirit came to be to the Jew only the memory of God's activity in the past periods of his history and a hope for his activity in the Messianic future. To the Jewish believer in Christ this future had become present, and all the promises and hopes of the Messianic Spirit he claimed for himself. All else suddenly drops out of sight. This situation

shows the overpowering effect of the belief that Jesus was the Messiah. All thought, all life, all personal experience, all past history, all idea of God's activity, was interpreted by the early Christian in the light of that belief. God himself was transformed from the God of Israel into the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." All his activity—that is, his Spirit—was reckoned as having to do with the Messiah. This simply means that the Christian looked not backward, but forward, and stood in a light of truth so intense that all the rest of the world became for the moment darkness; and when later Christian thought was again attracted to the world-wide activity of God it bore this light with it as an explanation for God's work in the world.

But Palestinian Judaism, even though on the basis of infrequent Old Testament prophecy it had emphasized here and there the idea of the Spirit in Messianic times, can never in itself account for the superabundant use of the Holy Spirit in the literature of early Christianity. If that literature represents with any adequacy the life of the early church, that life was full of the thought that the Spirit was an actual possession of the Christian. The Spirit manifested itself in every church and was a part of the common experience of many Christians. Its gifts were so frequent that they served as the main test for the approval of the churches and individual Christians by God (Gal. 3. 2; Acts 11. 15-18). No inherited belief will ac-

count for such a state of things. That can rest only on experience.

Next to the conceptions borrowed from Palestinian Judaism the experience of the early church is the most important factor in the study of the growth of the Christian idea of the Spirit. The experience which connects itself most closely with that of the former periods of history is prophecy. The mere use of the word in the New Testament, however, does not of itself give the key to its description. We have found in Hebrew thought two distinct kinds of prophecy: one, earlier, cruder, with less ethical import and more ecstatic impulse; the other, that which produced our prophetic literature, where the element of ecstasy was reduced to the vanishing point and a deep religious and ethical conviction took its place. We have, then, seen what was essentially the first element reappearing, partly under the influence of the Greek oracle, in Alexandrian Judaism. Meantime Palestinian Judaism—partly because it had little experience of a lofty and intense religious emotion; partly, perhaps, because of its reverence for the Most High—forbade the prophetic explanation of whatever profound religious experience still persisted. These hindrances must have been great, for it is plain that the nation at large longed for prophecy. Suddenly and, it would seem, almost unexpectedly the barriers were broken down in the Christian community. It could have been nothing less than a great flood that swept away the obstacles which had so long hindered the flow

of the sense of prophetic inspiration. Two things, both elements of experience, seem to have caused this flood: One was the feeling that in Christ God had once more come close to the race of men; the Judaistic Most High had become the Father. The other was based upon this fact and grew out of it; it was the intensity of the newborn experiences, the strong emotion which could only find its explanation in the belief that its origin was not human, but divine. When an experience becomes so emotionally intense that one can say of it as Paul did, that it took place "whether in the body or out of the body I cannot tell," it has reached a pitch where some explanation aside from the ordinary is imperatively demanded. In a period when life is dominated by religious thought the religious explanation is sure to be the one applied.

All this has to do with much else besides prophecy, but it applies with peculiar force to prophecy, the traditional Hebrew means of divine communication with man. The question arises as to the kind of prophecy we find in the New Testament. Where shall we classify it? Does it fall under either of the older categories, or must we make a new place for it? The New Testament offers no full description of its prophecy, but it gives us several instances of it and such touches of description as allow us to draw inferences with considerable fullness. We must start with the common New Testament interpretation of Old Testament prophecy. Here we find representations which suggest the mechanical

ideas of prophecy characteristic of Philo. There is in the New Testament, however, no passage so extreme as many in Philo, who teaches that the prophet becomes simply the unconscious mouthpiece of the Spirit. The writers conceive of the Spirit as speaking, through the Old Testament prophet, of future times (1 Pet. 1. 10), with especial reference to the work of the Messiah. We cannot minimize the idea underlying the frequently recurring "that it might be fulfilled." Beyond doubt the writers of the New Testament considered Old Testament prophecy as having been given under such a guidance of the Spirit that its words, without regard to their immediate historical reference, had reference to the Messianic future of Israel. The method of interpretation was rabbinical. The main idea of prophecy was drawn from orthodox Judaism, but the details of interpretation were determined by the Christian Messianic consciousness. The early Christian understanding of prophetic inspiration as represented in the Old Testament, then, was that it was God's absolute control of the prophetic utterance for Messianic purposes.

When we pass over to the Christian life what kind of experience shall we expect to find receiving the interpretation of prophecy? Obviously it must be utterance controlled by the Spirit for God's Messianic purposes; or, what was for the Christian the same thing, for the purposes of the Christian church. This defines prophecy in two directions: One is that of experience; it must seem to the subject of it and

to others to be superhuman. The other is that of purpose; it must be for the good of the church. It is possible to lay down other limits. 1 Cor. 14 suggests that prophecy is not only "for edification"—that is, for the good of the church—but also "with understanding" and subject to the conscious control of the prophet. "The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets," so that the coming of a revelation into the mind of a prophet does not involve unseemly interruption of other teachers in the Christian congregation (1 Cor. 14. 29-33). This presents a picture far different from that of the irresponsible frenzy of the early Hebrew prophetic companies or of the rapt experience which Philo relates. The New Testament nowhere considers prophecy to be uncontrollable rhapsody. In this respect early Christian prophecy is not to be classed with the early Hebrew prophecy. On the other hand, there is a certain external and mechanical element in the early Christian conception of the content of the message. It sometimes deals with the future, and is to a certain extent "history related beforehand" (for examples, see Acts 21. 10, 11; 11. 27-30). Nay, the oracle may be one whose significance is not perceived by the prophet himself if he is not in accord with the will of God (John 11. 47-52). It is neither wholly the older, cruder Hebrew ecstasy nor wholly the later, higher prophecy. It is much nearer the last than the first, with mechanical elements which come from the rabbinical interpretation of Old Testament prophecy, and

all fused in a fire of actual experience and fervent zeal which transformed inherited dogmas of inspiration into vital facts of personal religious life. There was no wholly novel element either of belief or of experience, but there was such a new combination of old factors that one must make a new category for Christian prophecy. It will not fall under any that earlier Hebrew history provides.

Closely connected with prophecy stands the experience which New Testament writers call "speaking with tongues" (*λαλεῖν γλώσσαις* or *γλώσσῃ*). If one may judge from the frequency of references to it in the literature, it was common in the Christian communities and was much desired not only by the ambitious and factious, but by the most sincere and devout as well. Paul thanks God that he speaks with tongues more than all the Corinthians. It was used as a common test of the believers' acceptance by God (Acts 10. 45-47; 19. 6). Probably this is also the correct interpretation of the gifts of the Spirit in Acts 8. 18 and Gal. 3. 2 (comp. Acts 11. 15; 15. 8). It was the spiritual gift *par excellence,* so that those who had it were called "the spiritual," as in mediæval Christianity, with its idea of monasticism as the religious life *par excellence,* monks and nuns were "the religious." That such a usage should arise indicates that the experience was not only much desired, but very common.

The nearest approach to a description of it is in 1 Cor. 14. The most evident thing about it is the lack of reason in its utterances. It is "without

significance," like a trumpet which gives a blast that is no recognized call (verse 8). It is a sort of prayer, a natural utterance of the spirit of man guided by the Spirit of God, but is not edifying to the hearers (verse 14). To one not accustomed to the phenomenon it might as well be a word in a foreign language. If he is inclined to be hostile to the Christian community, he may charge those who speak with tongues with insanity or drunkenness (Acts 2. 15). It arises under influences of strong religious emotion—the pentecostal fellowship of the early Christian church (Acts 2), the enthusiasm of newly awakened faith in Jesus as the Christ (Acts 8. 17; 10. 44; 19. 6), or the excitement of a religious assembly (1 Cor. 14). In at least the first and last cases (Acts 2 and 1 Cor. 14) we perhaps see the influence of the power of suggestion. On the basis of the New Testament description, and leaving out of account now some elements of the pentecostal phenomena in Acts 2, one may define the glossolalia as the emotional expression of religious feeling uncontrolled by the reason.[1] In the lack of the control of reason lies the difference between speaking with tongues and New Testament prophecy. The last was always for edification; it appealed to the reason; it conveyed a message that could be understood.

[1] Bruce (*St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 244): "The gift consisted in ecstatic utterance, not necessarily in any recognized language, and not usually intelligible to hearers. . . ." "The speaker was not master of himself; he was carried headlong, as if driven by a mighty wind; he was subject to strong emotions which must find vent somehow, but which could not be made to run in any accustomed channel" (see also *Encyclopedia Biblica*, article "Spiritual Gifts").

Having arrived at this definition, a host of analogies in religious history immediately offer themselves. We find that instead of being, as has been so often assumed, a thing unique in the history of religion, it is quite identical with very widespread elements of religious life which are found in all periods of religious history, and that it has analogies in many religions in all parts of the world. One finds it connected with ancient Hebrew prophecy itself. The worship of the schools of the prophets was much more analogous to the phenomenon of tongues than to that of later prophecy. One recalls, too, that to prophesy was to play the madman (comp. 1 Cor. 14. 23). So of the Greek oracles (*πυθώ*, called *μάντις* by the later Greeks), whose meaningless sounds must be interpreted, as Paul advises that the utterances of the tongues should always be. In the Christian church prophecy has often been the name applied to what was essentially this phenomenon. Weinel[1] has very properly recognized this, and has gathered instances of the use of incoherent and meaningless expressions from the Gnostics of the early church, from the Camisards of southern France, and the Irvingites of England. John Wesley recounts thus an interview with "one of those commonly called French Prophets:" "Presently after she leaned back in her chair, and seemed to have strong workings in her breast, with deep sighings intermixed. Her head and hands, and, by turns, every part of her body,

[1] *Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister*, p. 73, ff.

seemed also to be in a kind of convulsive motion. This continued about ten minutes, till, at six, she began to speak (though the workings, sighings, and contortions of her body were so intermixed with her words that she seldom spoke half a sentence together) with a clear, strong voice, 'Father, thy will, thy will be done.' . . . She spoke much (all as in the person of God and mostly in Scripture words) of the fulfilling of the prophecies, the coming of Christ now at hand, and the spreading of the gospel over all the earth" (*Journals,* January 1, 1739).

Although Wesley doubts the divine source of these manifestations, he has no doubts when kindred experiences come in connection with his own preaching. In the midst of a theological controversy "one who sat at a distance felt, as it were, the piercing of a sword, and before she could be brought to another house, whither I was going, could not avoid crying out aloud, even in the street" (*Journals,* March 8, 1739). A few months later (October 28) certain persons "fell into a strange agony." "The violent convulsions all over their bodies were such as words cannot describe. Their cries and groans were horrid to be borne." The whole *Journal* furnishes a museum of religious emotions, working in all degrees of intensity and producing a wide variety of physical and mental results. It is not strange that Wesley regarded the experiences as manifestations of the Spirit kindred to those of the New Testament time. On the

side at least of psychological phenomena he was correct in his opinion that they were alike.

The use of "prophecy" for such experiences began very early. Weinel notes (page 75) that Irenæus, speaking of Acts, already uses "prophesying" (προφητεύοντες) for "speaking with tongues" (λαλούντων γλώσσαις),[1] but he does not raise the question of the cause for this change. It lies in the fact that the Christian church inherited the Alexandrian-Jewish idea of prophecy as being a possession of the body by the divine Spirit to the exclusion of the human consciousness. Probably, however, this came into the church not from the direct influence of Alexandrian Judaism, but through the Gnostic sects with their large infusion of ideas from Greek conceptions of the oracles. The first generations of Christians understood the relations of prophecy to human consciousness better, for they drew more largely from Hebrew sources of thought. This inheritance of semi-Greek conceptions has greatly obscured the study both of prophecy and of the glossolalia in the Christian church.

Christianity, however, has frequently had the same phenomenon without designating it prophecy. The excitement connected with the worship of the madmen of Münster in the Reformation, and the strange hysterical sounds called "the holy laugh" in the revivals of Kentucky in the early part of the

[1] Iren. Adv. Haer, III, 12, 15. In III, 12, 1 Irenæus uses the expression "speak with tongues," referring to the day of Pentecost.

nineteenth century, belong to the same category. When in the excitement of revivals in the early and middle part of the last century the people rose up and gave expression to the intensity of their religious emotion in incoherent shouts or detached exclamations of praise or prayer, neither the feeling nor its expression seems to be essentially different from those which issued in the early Christian speaking with tongues. Here, again, one also finds the frequent temptation on the part both of the subject of the experience and of the believing observers to regard this peculiar gift as the supreme test of spirituality. The very name most commonly used for it in America among the classes which have emphasized this experience points in the same direction. It is "the power," as though this was the manifestation of the Spirit *par excellence.*

There are few religions making much of the facts of emotion where one does not find emotion expressed in some form of sounds uncontrolled by reason. The groans and cries of a Siberian shaman or an Indian medicine man, the shouts of a Hindu saniyasin as he follows the car of a god at some great temple feast, the indescribable noises which mingle with the cries of "Allah" in the worship of Mohammedan dervishes, and the meaningless shrieks and yells of religious orgies over whose end all civilization gladly draws a veil, are all to be put in the same psychological category with the speaking with tongues. But because the dragnet brings in such a heterogeneous collection of good

and bad alike its contents are not all to be treated as of the same moral value. The ethical worth of religious phenomena depends on the ethical worth of the religion rather than on the psychological nature of the phenomena. And yet it is true that the emotion ungoverned by the reason is a dangerous force. The higher exponents of religion have always been, like Paul, distrustful of an emotion whose expression to others breaks away from the bounds of reason. It places too strong a force in the hands of a single one of the factors of the human soul. Montanist prophecy and Gnostic ravings may have played a more important part in personal religious development than the history of Christianity has sometimes been willing to admit, but the line of growth in religion has, after all, not lain through them.

It is possible that this comparative study may help us to some further knowledge about the early Christian glossolalia. We find everywhere that this emotional expression ranges itself under two categories; first, disconnected words and phrases more or less exclamatory in form; and, second, sounds which in themselves are meaningless. The less extreme forms of the phenomenon, particularly where it appears under the criticism of modern civilization with its exaltation of reason, are apt to take the first form. Certain modern revivals, with their shouts of "Amen," "Glory to God," "Come, Lord Jesus"—the last descended from the ancient "Maranatha," which was itself, perhaps, an

expression of the glossolalia—are examples. So are the "Allah, Allah," "Hassan, Hosein, Hosein, Hassan," "Siva, Siva," "Ram, Ram," "Hara, Hari," of the Mohammedan and Hindu devotees. The more extreme forms produce, naturally, meaningless expressions, where the intense emotion completely banishes the desire and sometimes even the possibility of reasoned utterance. The "holy laugh" and the unintelligible cries and moans, like those of wild beasts, which have accompanied certain religious gatherings among the lower classes of America, are illustrations. Schmidt (*Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache,* 1892) has gathered a list of such "senseless combinations of vowels and consonants" (quoted in Weinel, page 77, note): *ιεουα, ιεα, ωιεου, ιεου, ξωζηζαζ, . . . χώζωζ,* etc. As in this case, such words are usually vowel sounds, like "O," "Ah," or such repetitions of consonantal vocables as the organs most easily produce.[1]

There is every reason to suppose that, as indeed usually happens, the early Christian glossolalia combined both these elements. 1 Cor. 12. 3 suggests that "Jesus is Lord" (Κύριος Ἰησοῦς) was a common exclamation, and, under a perverse influence not unknown in other religious gatherings, but naturally ascribed by the Christians to a demon, "Jesus is anathema" (*ἀνάθεμα* Ἰησοῦς) was not wholly unknown. And yet the expressions could not all have been of this intelligible sort. Leaving

[1] Compare, however, the "languages" of the medium Helen Smith, in Flournoy's *From India to the Planet Mars*, and Henri's *Le Langage Martien.*

aside the presumptive judgment of insanity which Paul says the stranger might pass upon the phenomenon, the symbols which Paul uses would seem rather to indicate meaningless words. He speaks of them as like the meaningless blast of a trumpet, the speech of a barbarian, the pipe or harp sounded to no tune, and contrasts them with voices that have significance. Nay, the utterances of the tongues, unlike a series of exclamations which have acquired a sort of symbolic significance to the assembly accustomed to them, are here so meaningless that they cannot even elicit the response of "Amen." It is also easier to explain the origin of the story about other languages in Acts 2, if we assume the phenomenon to include meaningless sounds, than if we only assume significant exclamations. Such indications as we possess, then, lead to the same conclusion to which the analogies of comparative study point, namely, that both kinds of phenomena were found in the glossolalia.

There is one narrative of the New Testament that has long been recognized as containing factors impossible to harmonize with the uniform representation of speaking with tongues elsewhere. I refer to the account of the Pentecost in Acts 2. The comparative study which we have instituted leads to the same suspicions of the accuracy of the account which have long found expression in the works of New Testament critics. The implications of the narrative are perfectly obvious. The editor of the book or of the source used sees in this event

a speaking in other languages, so that those from different countries heard persons speaking in their own tongues. To assume a miracle of hearing rather than of speaking offers no help and is a flat contradiction of the meaning of the editor in saying that they spoke with "other" tongues (verse 4). Not only, however, is this a unique event in New Testament story and unprovided for in any promise of Christ, but the historical study of religion, which finds the glossolalia a quite common phenomenon, is able to bring nothing to compare with this. The glossolalia is psychologically explicable as the temporary dominance of the person by emotion. The account in Acts is totally inexplicable by psychology. No religion ever wrought thus anywhere else in the world. This story is not supernatural; it is unnatural.

The comparative study of religion which we have been using takes one step further along the road with the literary critical study of the New Testament. One deals somewhat cautiously with minute analysis of Acts, and yet it cannot but be observed that if "other" (ἑτέραις) in verse 4 is taken out, and also verses 6-11, we have a narrative which accords exactly not only with the experience of speaking with tongues elsewhere in the New Testament, but with all that the study of other religions can bring in comparison. Add to this the fact that Peter's speech (verses 14-36) knows nothing of a gift of languages, and the presumption of interpolation becomes very strong. One would not say that this

proves an interpolation into a fairly correct narrative rather than a legendary development of the narration as a whole, but if the textual critic can make a case for editorial additions, the student of the history of religion will certainly stand ready to furnish some aid to his claim. We can, at least, say with assurance that when the portions suggested above are omitted we have left a narrative of glossolalia, perfectly explicable and quite credible. The interpolations are often assumed to be proof that the editor lived in a day when these appearances were no longer known (so Weinel), but possibly that conclusion is not necessary. It may be that to him or to the author of his source the occasion seemed, as it has seemed to so many modern commentators, to be so great, so significant in the light of the past promise of Christ and the future growth of the church, that he could easily have inserted elements of a tradition already for the same reason taking shape in the church, which made the uniqueness of the manifestation correspond to the uniqueness of the occasion.

It is easy to see why the whole group of phenomena called glossolalia was assigned to the Spirit. The experience was the result of an emotion so strong that it seemed extra-human. It was intimately connected with the church, the realm of the Spirit's activity. It was a witnessing for Christ, for which purpose the Spirit was poured out upon the church. The very great dominance of the factor of emotion in the experience then soon led it

to be regarded as above all other experiences the manifestation of the Spirit.

It is at first sight rather surprising that the use of the term should have disappeared so early. After the earlier New Testament times it is never heard of again. A factor in this disappearance is doubtless the emphasis put by the church upon instruction as over against emotion, following the spirit of Paul's words to the Corinthians. But the emotional elements persisted in the Montanists, and yet the term disappeared. The significant thing, however, is that the experience did not disappear. It persisted in Montanism[1] and Gnosticism[2] under the name of prophecy. It was the Greek and Alexandrian-Jewish idea of prophecy entering the church which made unnecessary the continuance of this term, for that idea included within itself the earlier glossolalia. The use of prophecy in this sense was a kind of historical atavism, a looking backward to an earlier and more amorphous condition of religious experience. Christian prophecy and glossolalia actually belong to two quite different categories of religious expression. Greek influence, both directly and through Philo, was responsible for a long-continued use of ideas in Christian thought which Hebrew conceptions had already in the New Testament times outgrown. The result in religious life has been the occasional attempt to exalt under the properly revered name of prophecy a type of ex-

[1] See Eus. H. E., V. 16, and especially Tertullian, Adv. Marc., V, 8.
[2] See Iren. Adv. Haer., I, 13, 3.

pression which actually belongs to a very low grade of religion and experience. The result in theological thought has been that the crude conceptions of this lower grade of religious life have been applied to the higher biblical prophecy and extended from that to all the biblical writings, and a theory of biblical inspiration has been built up which is based on these emotional crudities. It has in it more of the Greek conception of the oracle than of the Hebrew conception of the Spirit of God.

Somewhat more vague is the expression of the connection of the Spirit with miraculous manifestations. In the inception of the Samaritan church there were wrought signs and great powers (Acts 8. 13), and yet the Holy Spirit is not connected by the writer immediately with them. More intimate is the relation manifested in the account of the blinding of Bar-jesus (Acts 13. 9, f.), but even there the Spirit is the origin of the prophetic word, while the miraculous act is ascribed to "the hand of God." The one miracle for which an explanation is given in Acts, the healing of the lame man at the gate, is ascribed by Peter not to the Spirit of God, but to "the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth" (4. 10). It accords with this that a distinction is drawn between the Spirit and "powers" (*δυνάμεις*)—that is, miracles—in Christ himself (Acts 10. 38). The "power" of Acts 1. 8 promised to the apostles "after the Holy Spirit has come upon them" is not the miraculous power, but the power for witness, as the next clause shows.

There is, then, a relation of somewhat peculiar complication here. The Spirit is the cause of visions, tongues, prophecy, but is not directly affirmed to be the cause of healing and other miraculous manifestations of divine power in the external world through the hands of the apostles. These are ascribed directly to "the hand of God" or "the name of Jesus." And yet the Spirit is so often mentioned in connection with them that there must have been in the mind of the early church some relation. The early church uses the Spirit for the manifestation of God in subjective experience, like visions, and in the immediate outcome of that manifestation in personal expression, like prophecy and tongues. The facts with regard to miracles would seem to show that when the results passed into the realm of life outside of the person the event was not thought of as due to the action of the Spirit, even though, as in the case of Paul's word to Bar-jesus, it took place as the result of an experience which was ascribed to the Spirit. This careful limitation of the Spirit to the personal experience is another mark of the freshness, power, and intensity of the early Christian religious life. The limitation did not last very long. The distinction is a fine one, and yet the New Testament writers seem to draw it somewhat clearly. The power to perform the miracle and the impulse to use that power were the working of the Spirit. The miracle itself, the actual external event, was the work not of the Spirit, but of God.

All the charismata which have been considered thus far are plainly those which would be classed by most students of this subject as gifts of new powers. We now come to a group which it would be possible to regard as augmentations of the natural powers, namely, wisdom and boldness in utterance (Acts 6. 3, 5, 10; 4. 8; 13. 9). Compare also the effect of the Spirit on the whole church in 4. 31 and the entire resultant impression of the events of chapter 2. This distinction, however, is not one of any great value. Perhaps Gunkel is right in assuming that all manifestations of the Spirit in the New Testament were supposed to be the gift of new powers, and yet it would be hard to prove that this position is correct. It is true that Paul speaks of a "wisdom not of this world," especially shown "among the perfect," but it is difficult to see in the desire of the apostles that the seven should be men "full of the Spirit and of wisdom," or in the irresistible "wisdom" with which Stephen met his disputants of the synagogue, any idea other than that of superlatively good judgment in the affairs concerned. It is not mere intellectual knowledge, to be sure, but rather the Hebrew idea of Hokhmah, as practical skill in meeting the actual needs of life. There is no reason to suppose this to be a new power inserted from without into the Spirit-filled man. Indeed, that would inject an unnatural meaning into the word which the exegesis of the narrative in no way demands.

The distinction between supernatural powers

directly given and natural powers augmented is artificial. The only form in which it could be defended, aside from an unreal supernaturalism, would be to show that from the point of view of the early church such a distinction could be made. Probably they made no such distinction. Doubtless in a rough way all spiritual phenomena seemed to them to be directly supernatural in origin, but it is certain that they did not draw fine lines of distinction upon the basis of introspective psychology. Certainly we can make, from the modern point of view, no absolute distinction. All the manifestations have alike a psychological basis. Even such phenomena as visions and the speaking with tongues are in reality as much the augmentation of natural powers as are wisdom and boldness of utterance.

The reason for the ascription of wisdom and boldness to the Spirit is easy to see. "Wisdom" and "boldness" are never ascribed to the Spirit except when they are a part of the means of development of the church. The "wisdom" is skill in making arguments for the Christian belief; the "boldness" is boldness in pleading the Christian cause in the face of popular hostility. We may well surmise, however, that in addition to this relation to Christian progress there must have been a relation to Christian experience. The "wisdom" and "boldness" must have been accompanied by an emotional element to have caused their assignment to the Spirit. The narratives themselves give some

indications which would lead us to judge that this is so, especially in the case of boldness. The instances cited above occur in connection with events which would be the natural causes of emotional excitement: a crisis in the life of the community (Acts 4. 5, ff.), a common prayer, with all the accompaniments of contagious enthusiasm, ending in an occurrence which seemed to them to be miraculous—"the place was shaken"—and as the result of this experience, which could not but have had a strongly emotional element, they "were all filled with the Spirit, and spake the word with boldness" (Acts 4. 31). The connection of the Spirit with "comfort" (Acts 9. 31) and "joy" (Acts 13. 52) also indicates emotional experience like that which is assigned to the Spirit.

When, therefore, we gather up all these gifts of the Spirit and ask ourselves the question, What were the experiences for which the early church gave this explanation? we find a certain common underlying ground: *The Spirit was used as the name for the divine cause which the early church assumed to lie beneath those experiences whose strong emotional element seemed to mark their extra-human origin, and whose providential end was the advancement of the Messianic kingdom.*[1]

The two essential elements of this definition are:

[1] Compare Gunkel's definition: "The workings of the Holy Spirit are certain mysterious powers operating in the range of the life of men, which stand in a certain definite relation to the life of the Christian congregation, which in no case work damage to men, which frequently take place under the naming of God or Christ, and in all cases belong only to such men as are not unworthy of a connection with God" (p. 43). This includes the two essential elements noted in the following paragraph, but seems to include certain nonessential accompaniments as well.

First, the fact of emotional experience. The proof of the possession of the Spirit lies within the life of the feeling. This was the case from the beginning of the Hebrew usage of the word. The earliest prophets believed that the Spirit of Jahveh had come upon them because of what they felt within their own consciousness. In this respect the primitive Christian conception is in the closest possible relation to the primitive Hebrew conception. It represents the same fundamental idea. The second essential element is the Messianic purpose of the experience. This is the direct outgrowth of the Hebrew Messianic hope, but to say it represented only that hope would be to put much too narrow an interpretation on it. We have seen that from the first, and especially at the first, the idea of the Spirit of Jahveh working in the mind of man was only applied to such experiences as could be interpreted to have in some way a bearing upon the development of the purposes of Jahveh. They must be religious or national, and we remember that those ideas were not two, but one. To the early church the religious and national purpose of God summed itself up in the development of his Messianic purpose through Christ. It is of interest to note that the Spirit thus really plays the same rôle in the early church that it does in the early Hebrew nation. It has already been noted that the Spirit had also in the early church returned once more to its ancient limitations. It now meant only the divine working in man, having lost the wider

meaning of God in nature that it had acquired in the middle Hebrew thought.

This spiral movement of thought is not without its reason. The early Hebrew idea arose because of profound emotional experiences for whose origin men felt that they must posit a power of God. Not less profound were the emotional experiences of the early church which they assigned to the Spirit of God, while the connection of these experiences with the plans and purposes of God was to them even plainer than it had been to the early Hebrews. Experiences of the same nature suggested religious thoughts of the same purport.[1] We are here only following once more a common movement in the history of religion. It has already been illustrated so fully that we hardly need again to return to it. A great emotion must have a great occasion. It must also have a great outcome in life. All men of strong religious feeling in all races have felt that their profounder emotions could have no occasion less than the working of a god, and no outcome in life less than the great purpose of fulfilling his designs. The man who interprets in this way the stirring in the depths of his soul cannot but feel himself to be inspired. Visions, as in the case of Mohammed and Buddha, not to mention many a saint of the Christian church, have often been the

[1] If the principle here expressed, of like results from like psychological causes, had always been adhered to, it would have saved a vast amount of fruitless labor in the field of religious history. The futile attempt to trace historic connections between widely scattered myths, like that of a flood, or of a first man, or of the divinity of the sun, or of rites like totemism or sacrifice, has been a work of supererogation. Like causes produce like results in the minds of prehistoric men as well as in those of later ages.

product or the accompaniment of the feeling, but back of the vision has lain the divine force of an emotion, without which the vision would never have been interpreted as containing a divine message.

Herein lies the justification for placing the modern experience of emotional conversion in this chapter of common religious history. It is essentially the same mighty emotional experience interpreted religiously as the presence and power of God in the soul. Traditional theology has made a correct use of the term, from the point of view of the earliest Christian terminology, when it has called this the work of the Spirit. We shall see later that Pauline theology contributes an element to this phraseology, but the Pauline element, except where it is a mere phrase of dogma, has come to be fused in the alembic of religious feeling; indeed, it had its origin with Paul in religious feeling. It matters little that in the early church the emotion and its accompaniments which were called the gifts of the Spirit usually came not at but after conversion. With the Jewish Christian the moments of strong religious feeling were usually experienced after conversion, as he came somewhat slowly to realize the bearing of his new-found faith in Jesus as the Messiah on the national hope and on his religious life. In the modern world the moment of strong religious emotion usually comes, if it comes at all, at the moment when a person realizes the conquest of egoistic impulses by the higher life of

an altruistic sympathy—that is, when he purposes that God rather than self shall rule his life. Doubtless the average Jew who became a believer in Christ had no such battle to fight between the fundamental forces of human nature. Not until somewhat later in the church did the question of self or not-self become the supreme test of Christianity. The Jew to whom Christianity made its appeal was already religious. The problem which it presented to him was not ethical, but intellectual, namely, Was Jesus the Messiah? If he were, then the Hope of Israel had drawn near, the last days were at hand, and the more the Christian, be he Jew or Gentile in origin, saw the full bearing of this, the more motive his religious faith presented not only for an urgent activity, but for a mighty emotion. So it comes about that the New Testament emphasizes the working of the Spirit, not so often at the moment of conversion as on later occasions under the impulse of Christian labor or in the sympathy of Christian fellowship.

There is a group of experiences referred to the Spirit the psychological nature of which is less easy to ascertain than that of those we have been considering. This is the group in which the author of the book of Acts assigns to the Spirit the guidance of the church in its progressive expansion. The purpose of Acts has been much debated, and this is not the place to enter upon any extended study of it. It is necessary for us, however, to note that at least a part of the evident design of the

writer is to show that the progress of Christianity from a Jewish sect to a universal religion was made under the direct guidance of God. It was not at all according to the plan of man, but of God. In his emphasis of this polemic purpose the author returns with constant reiteration to this point. Again and again at crucial periods of the history he marks how God led the church into some new field of expansive labor.

These marks of divine guidance fall under two categories: the providential control of circumstances, as when the persecution at Jerusalem drove the church into Judea and Samaria (chapter 8); and the guidance of direct divine suggestion, as where two visions and a message of the Spirit insure the preaching of the gospel to Cornelius and his friends. Such circumstances of guidance are usually assigned to the Spirit.

In Acts 2 the first expansion of the church is ascribed to the Spirit. Stephen was "full of the Spirit" (6. 5). When the disciples, driven from Jerusalem by the persecution which arose about Stephen's death, preached at Samaria the gift of the Holy Spirit marked God's approval (Acts 8. 17). The conversion of the eunuch by Philip was under the direction of the Spirit (8. 29, ff.). In verse 26 "an angel of the Lord" implies a vision. Peter's preaching to Cornelius and his friends was prepared for by a message of the Spirit and confirmed by the gift of tongues from the Spirit (10. 19, 44). The beginning of Paul's missionary journeys

was the result of a message from the Spirit (13. 2), and the passage into Europe was the result of hindrances of Paul's plan by the Spirit (16. 6, f.). These events include prophetic utterances of the Spirit and the phenomenon of the tongues, but most of the indications are so vaguely given that we can only surmise what experiences they represent. We may make such surmises on the ground of our study, for we have found the classes of experience fairly well defined. It may be regarded as probable that the gift of the Spirit to the Samaritans was the glossolalia, as Gunkel surmises. This would account for the desire of Simon Magus that he might possess the power to give the Holy Spirit. It is probable that the message of the Spirit to Philip and Peter is to be interpreted as of the nature of prophetic impulse. One can see its psychological origin in the suggestion of circumstances. When Philip is already in the presence of the eunuch the impulse comes to join him as a traveling companion.[1] As the story of Cornelius lies at present in the narrative the impression is conveyed that the message of the Spirit to Peter contained information supernaturally supplied: "Three men wait thee. Go with them, nothing doubting, for I have sent them." We certainly cannot say with any assurance, however, that this would be the interpretation of the facts if we had them as they

[1] Possibly the mention of the Spirit is an editorial insertion, in accord with the conception of the author of Acts that all progress of the church was under divine guidance. The element of emotion, which was usually the cause of a belief in spiritual suggestion, is not evident on the face of the narrative; still it may have been present, induced by some circumstance to us unknown.

occurred. The knowledge that three men had presented themselves in search of him lies so near the surface that one cannot claim its supernatural impartation to Peter as any part of the necessary interpretation of the story. What is essential in both these cases is an impulse so strong that it seemed to those who received it to possess a divine force. It came from God. It was a voice of the Spirit. Whether that interpretation would have been given to the experience had it not resulted in Christian progress is a question which we have no data to answer.

What shall we say of such an expression as "the Spirit caught away Philip"? What kind of an experience does this indicate? It is not necessary to suppose that it indicated any direct effect of the Spirit upon the material body. It contains a superficial resemblance to such uses as 2 Kings 2. 16, with its suggestion of the Spirit of Jahveh as a physical force, transporting human bodies at will. Possibly its form may have been suggested by that. But it belongs to a period which possessed an entirely different conception of the Spirit from that of the time of Elijah. To put this interpretation upon it would remove it from the analogy of New Testament usage, and that should only be done as a last resort. The same prophetic impulse which suggested to Philip that he should join the eunuch seems to have impelled his hastening away at the end of the interview. Ἥρπασεν ("caught away"), which implies a hasty or violent snatching away,

a supernatural physical action as well as a prophetic impulse, is probably due to the development of tradition. We have seen in the case of the Pentecost narrative that the editor of Acts is not always critical in his treatment of the phenomena of the Spirit, especially when they mark the divine guidance of the progress of Christianity.

Even more undefined is the experience which lies behind Acts 16. 6, f. Paul and his companions sought to preach the word in Asia and later in Bithynia, but the Spirit in each case hindered them. That it is called in one place the Holy Spirit and in the other the Spirit of Jesus cannot be supposed to indicate any difference in the experience represented. One may surmise a prophetic message or impulse to some member of the party, like the one which came to Paul on the voyage to Rome (27. 23), or a vision, like the one which soon after called them to Macedonia. The mere force of circumstances is hardly a sufficient explanation unless the references to the Spirit be assigned to the traditional development, for, wherever its meaning can be ascertained, a message of the Spirit is found to stand for some personal religious experience.

These indefinite references require no change in the definition of the charismatic Spirit given above. The charismatic gifts were not the common possession of all Christians. They did not flow directly from the fact of Christian faith, as the phrase "faith and the Spirit" shows. The Spirit was never regarded in the pre-Pauline church as an essential

part of the ordinary Christian life, but as a *donum superadditum*. In every instance which is recorded the charismata came in special circumstances, where strong emotional feelings were natural. The company of the disciples, the combat of strenuous controversy, prayer in a time of crisis, the suggested opportunity of Christian work—such as these are the occasions which produced the gifts of the Spirit. Nowhere in the book of Acts is there proof that the author regarded the Spirit as the basis of the ordinary religious life. In this respect the book is not Pauline. The only phrase which points in a Pauline direction is one which is used of the body of disciples in 2. 4; 4. 31; 13. 52; of Peter in 4. 8; of the seven in 6. 3; of Stephen in 6. 5; 7. 55; of Paul in 9. 17; of Barnabas in 11. 24. It occurs most frequently in the earlier part of Acts, but this is true also of all uses of the Spirit. It is connected in some places with particular charismatic gifts which were temporary in their nature; as the gift of tongues at Pentecost, Peter's speech on the same occasion, the vision of Stephen (7. 55), Paul's prophetic words to Bar-jesus (13. 9), boldness of preaching on the part of the disciples (4. 31). The "fullness" (πλήρωμα) of the Spirit seems sometimes to be only an emphatic way of expressing the action of the Spirit in various charismatic gifts. There is no reason to suppose that these particular gifts seemed to Christian tradition to be of more power or strangeness in themselves or of any greater importance in the development of the character than

gifts which are not so designated. There are, however, cases of the use of this phrase which seem to connect it with the description of character and to make the Spirit a permanent abiding element of the Christian life.

This would be the most natural interpretation of the phrases "full of faith and the Holy Spirit," "full of wisdom and the Spirit," "a good man and filled with the Spirit," where the Spirit is correlated with permanent elements of character. Such a use suggests Pauline affinities. It is probable that a Pauline element is to be recognized here. The comparison of the gospel of Luke with the gospel sources shows that the phrase, when used in the third gospel, belongs to the vocabulary of the author rather than to that of the original sources. When Acts was written the Pauline use of the term as the basis of Christian life and character must certainly have been common in the Christian church. This author seems to make use of it on occasion in a Pauline way, but without careful discrimination, and without holding in mind, in any clearly defined way, the Pauline use as a part of his conscious theological furnishing.[1] The use of the phrase in Acts, then, is not uniform; but the element of Pauline use is slight. The general thought of early Christianity as represented in the book is very clearly that of the Spirit as a temporary possession of particular men, the evidence of which consisted

[1] This would point toward an author who knew Pauline terms, but was not thoroughly imbued with Pauline thought.

in particular powers that came and went in ways which seemed to the early church to be unaccountable, and so supernatural.

The relation of the Spirit to Christ also takes its starting point from charismatic usage. We have found the Messianic significance to be one of the most frequent uses in Palestinian-Jewish literature. The hope for the presence of God in the future history of Israel was correlative with the memory of his presence in past history, in the work of the prophets, and the same term, "the Spirit," was used of both. In early Christian usage Christ was a person who had the Spirit of God. "God anointed him with the Holy Spirit, and with power" (Acts 10. 38). Acts 1. 2, "after he had given commandment through the Holy Spirit," indicates the same thing. The words of Christ are the words of the Spirit. Nor does 16. 7, "the Spirit of Jesus," need an interpretation essentially different. It is the Spirit of God in its Messianic activity, called the Spirit of Jesus because of its mission in developing the work which Jesus began. The use is akin to that in 2 Cor. 3. 17, 18, without being in any way a direct borrowing of the Pauline usage.

Is the Spirit used in primitive Christian thought for God *ab intra?* We found in the middle period of the Old Testament the beginning of the use of Spirit for God *ab intra.* This use did not grow later. It tended rather to disappear, inhibited by the growing transcendental idea of God in Judaism. Now that the belief in Christ as the Messiah and

the appearance of phenomena regarded as spiritual in human life had once more brought God near to man, one would naturally expect the use of the Spirit for God *ab intra* to be revived. There is evidence that such was the tendency, although the cases are not so clear as to make it more than a tendency. Passages where the words of Jahveh in the Old Testament are ascribed to the Spirit should not be used in this connection.[1] The conception of the Holy Spirit as the active originator of the Old Testament and the Hebrew institutions does not amount to identification of the Spirit with God. The idea of the Spirit as the source of the Old Testament writings had its rise in the most barren periods of Judaism, when all the tendencies of thought were against any identification of the Spirit and God. There is no evidence that its use in the New Testament will bear any different interpretation from that in the preceding Judaism. Occasionally the writers say "the Holy Spirit spake" (Acts 28. 26), and at other times assign authorship to Jahveh (13. 47); yet at still other times a writing is ascribed to David (2. 25) or a prophet (2. 16). All these are condensed expressions. When the writers become definite they specifically recognize the three elements of the Old Testament revelation: God, the Spirit of God as inspiring the writers, the writers themselves. Compare Acts

[1] Denio (*The Supreme Leader*, p. 48) so uses such cases as Heb. 9. 8: "The Holy Spirit is the author of the Old Testament regulations as to worship, the authorship of which is attributed in verse 20 to God. In Acts 28. 24–27 the utterance of Jehovah (Isa. 6. 6–10) is called that of the Holy Spirit."

4. 24, 25, "O Lord, thou who didst make the heaven and the earth and the sea, and all that in them is: who by the Holy Spirit, by the mouth of David our father, didst say" (Ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου στόματος Δανεὶδ παιδὸς σου εἰπών).[1] With this accords 2 Pet. 1. 21, "For no prophecy ever came by the will of man; but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit." This passage probably represents the conscious judgment of the early church more nearly than any other in the New Testament, and here God and the Spirit are as clearly distinguished as in any Hebrew or Jewish writing. We must be careful not to use popular condensed expressions as the scientific statements of complex ideas, especially where exact distinctions are at best drawn only with difficulty.

Not less erroneous is it to assume that because the Spirit does the work of God it is therefore equivalent to God *ab intra*. The case in Acts which comes nearest to the use of the Spirit for God *ab intra* is in the story of Ananias and Sapphira. Deceit is against the Spirit, for the Spirit is the controlling force in the Messianic movement (5. 3), but verse 5 affirms that this is also a sin against God. And yet it is easy to press even this case farther than the facts will allow. The starting point is not God *ab intra,* but God's active working through the Spirit as guiding the destinies of the church. It was this Spirit that Ananias attempted to deceive.

[1] The text presents variations, but it is still possible that *διὰ πν- ἁγ- στόματος* all belong to the original. See Westcott and Hort, note in Vol. II; Blass's *Acta Apostolorum, in loco*, also note in Stuttgart edition N. T.

But this Spirit was divine, and the most natural contrast between it and men would be in the terms used—"thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God." It hardly affirms so conscious a theology as is implied by the equation, the Holy Spirit = God *ab intra*. The thought is still moving in the realm of the Spirit as the Messianic activity of God, and does not go beyond it. The identity of the Spirit with God is not necessarily an identity of essence, but of operation and interest.

The introduction to the decision of the council in 15. 28, "it seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us," bears essentially the same significance. It is a recognition of the Spirit's active operation in the church. Its special interest lies not in the identification of the Spirit and God, but of the Spirit and the thought of the church, in the confidence with which they venture to interpret "the mind of the Spirit." One questions whether it does not imply the experience of some prophetic impulse or other manifested phenomenon in the assembly of the church, which authenticated to them their decision as that also of the Spirit. It is not certain that thus early in the church the mere unanimous decision of a Christian assembly without prophetic or other verification would be so pointedly identified with that of the Spirit.[1] The older commentators inter-

[1] If, as Weizsäcker and others suppose, the decision must be put at a later time (comp. 21. 25, where, it is said, the Jewish Christians seem to assume that Paul has not heard of the decree), this statement would still be true. It would need modification only if the text is the product of post-Pauline Christianity. Even then it would be an unusual form in which to state the belief that a mere decision of judgment was made under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Its parallel, if this be the meaning, is not known elsewhere.

preted, quite naturally, "the Spirit in us," but this is not what the passage says, nor would the analogy of usage elsewhere seem to warrant this. In fact, later scholars usually reject it. In some marked way the decision must have been approved by the Spirit. This interpretation places the passage in the class of charismatic uses.

Only one other passage needs attention here: 7. 51, "Ye always resist the Holy Spirit, as your fathers, so also ye." In this we have plainly the prophetic Messianic use, linking together the word of the Spirit through the prophets and the word through the Messianic activity of the church. In neither case is there an identification of the Spirit with God in any different sense than in all prophetic charism.

That the Spirit was divine goes without saying. The entire significance of all the experience we have been studying was that its subjects believed that they were directly moved upon by God himself. The experience was their closest personal relation to God. That their "gifts" were the direct result of the operation of God they no more doubted than they doubted the evidence of their senses. The immediate inference from the phenomena to its divine causation was to them perfectly evident. With simple naïvete they found no difficulty in supposing that the great God himself was stirring in them. And yet they were not so narrow and self-confident as might be made to appear. It was not, to use the phrase one sometimes hears, that God

was concerned with their affairs; they were concerned with God's affairs. The Spirit never came for their individual behoof or advantage. It was only when their labor was in behalf of the progress of the cause of the Lord that God moved upon them. That God should, under those circumstances, personally direct their lives to the fulfillment of his own great purposes of cosmic importance seemed to them to be no strange thing; nor, for that matter, did they find much skepticism in the life about them, so far as it influenced them. Jewish Sadduceeism and Greek Epicureanism probably had little weight in the classes from which Christianity drew its first converts. God acting upon men through their conscious experience was the Spirit. They drew no fine-spun distinctions between God acting and the activity of God. To use a Ritschlian phrase, the Spirit had for them the value of God even before that could be said of Jesus the Messiah. From the first God came nearer to them personally by the Spirit than he did by the Christ. This does not make the Spirit historically more important for the explanation of Christianity, because the Christ stood behind the Spirit. The ground for the explanation of these experiences through the Spirit lay in the fact that the Messiah had come, and God was therefore revealing himself more clearly to men than ever before. Certainly the Spirit was God. But quite as certainly the difference drawn in modern theology between the Spirit as God and the Spirit as the influence of

God would have been meaningless to the early church. The Spirit was both. They unified or separated the Spirit and God in a way that is very puzzling to a logical theology, but very reasonable when we take our stand on experience rather than on dogma.

We have found the beginning and the end of all our explanations here, as in the Old Testament, in the study of experience. The test to which all theories must be brought is, Do they help to elucidate the experience of the early church? If not, we may pass them by as irrelevant to an historical study. In this light certain questions which have been prominent in the history of the doctrine of the Spirit become meaningless. They have to do with logic rather than life.

It is well for us to emphasize the religious value of these experiences which the early Christians ascribed to the operation of the Spirit. To feel that they were standing in immediate relation to the great purposes of God; that they were working in accord with those purposes; and that he himself, at times, consciously and visibly, moved in their life, made the presence and power of the Almighty exceedingly real. Add to this the belief that the direct channels of the revelation of God to man which had been known to the ancient prophets were once more opened, and that too under a movement of vastly more importance, and, speaking reverently, of more concern to God, than was that of the prophets, and we have an impulse for the religious interpretation

of experience, richer, fresher, and more commanding than the world has ever seen before or since. Weinel suggests that the first century of the Christian era saw an epidemic of nervous disorders, like the mediæval St. Vitus's dance and the "prophecy" of the Camisards, assisted by suggestion and autosuggestion, and stimulated by the expectation of the speedy end of the world (pages 219-227). It may be. Certainly psychology has not yet spoken its last word upon the interrelations of the nervous and the religious life. But no psychological interpretation of the phenomena of the first Christian century will be complete which leaves out of account the tremendous power of the religious convictions as aids to the explanation not merely of the significance, but of the facts of those experiences which the early church called spiritual. Leaving aside the fact of chronological nearness to the life of Christ, it is not surprising that an age which realized so intensely its nearness to the divine should have produced a religious literature which later ages have never been able to supersede. It is of little use for the church of one age to simulate the phenomena of another. Each age must interpret life into its own language. But the principle of religious life ever stands the same, in all ages and all faiths. It is found in that contact of the divine and the human which the early church called the Holy Spirit. The section of literature which we have been studying does not represent the highest mark of its realization, for it discovered the evi-

dence of that contact only in marked and extraordinary experiences, not in the facts of daily life; but its intensive power made up in a measure for its lack of extensive application. We shall find the completion of this idea in the writings of Paul.

CHAPTER IV

The Pauline Writings

Among the many contributions of Paul to the developed thought of Christianity only one, that of the universality of the gospel apart from the law, is more striking in itself or more far-reaching in its effects than his theory of the Spirit. It is very natural that the doctrine of the Spirit in Paul should have received much careful and elaborate study. So prominent has the Pauline phase of the doctrine been in the Christian church that it has practically overshadowed every other, and the theory of traditional orthodoxy has been consciously based on what it supposed to be the teaching of Paul, the rest of Scripture being used simply to illustrate or support Pauline thought. The older theology, with its ideas of mechanical unity in Scripture, interpreted the Old Testament as containing the same doctrine as the writings of Paul, "only not so clearly revealed," while all the New Testament was interpreted as containing a doctrine exactly identical with Paul's. Later scholarship has laid aside so unnatural a theory of the unity of Scripture, and yet has not always gained as much as it might from its recognition of the variety of biblical ideas. Especially has the doctrine of the Spirit lacked the light which might have come from more careful

attention to its genetic development. The rich content of the fully developed Pauline thought can never be properly understood unless we take into account the stages by which it grew and its relation to the experience not only of Paul himself, but of the Hebrew nation and the Christian church. Then only can the doctrine be seen in its proper relations and each of its factors receive due emphasis. Then only, also, can we avoid the danger of interpreting Paul's thought by the subjective judgment of later Christian thought as to what is important or reasonable in the spiritual life—a danger to which the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, with its affinities for mystic and pietistic thought, has been peculiarly liable.

Paul's uses of "Spirit" and its derivative adjective "spiritual" have been often gathered. Any attempt to state them in summary must present material often before collected in various ways. It must proceed upon certain assumptions of exegesis, for nowhere in the entire treatment of the subject do we meet so many passages where the meaning of "Spirit" is obscure or in dispute. The question has been asked whether Paul may not have covered two or more meanings in the same use of the word. The problem was raised in an essay in Jowett's *Commentary on Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans,* and is treated at length and somewhat cavalierly in Dickson's *St. Paul's Use of Flesh and Spirit* (page 98, ff.). Dickson asserts that there can be in the mind of a writer but one meaning of

a word in each of the cases of its use, and that we must not attribute the indecision of the exegete to the mind of the author. "Exegesis can only address itself to its task with any hope or confidence of a successful result on the assumption that the author whom it seeks to interpret has not thus played fast and loose with language, but has attached to it in each instance a definite meaning, not manifold, but one" (page 101, f.).

In a general way this principle of exegesis is sound, but in the application of it certain modifying facts must be borne in mind. First, not every writer thinks so clearly as never to mingle two shades of meaning in one instance of the use of a word. Certainly Philo's use of "Logos" was not always either personal or impersonal. It may be questioned whether even in so vigorous a thinker as Paul words are always used with sharply defined distinctions. Is it always true, in Paul's epistles, that "law," for example, means one of two quite separate things—either the law of Moses or the divine commands revealed through conscience and nature?

In the second place, inclusiveness of meaning is different from ambiguity or duplicity of meaning. Inclusiveness is very common and perfectly legitimate. In such cases there is a unity in which the two meanings combine in the mind of the writer. In such cases we do not say "either-or," but "both-and." The ideas are combined in a concept, not vague and undefined, but definitely gathering both in a higher unity. It is by a concept of this nature that we

interpret Christ's meaning in the phrase "the kingdom of God." The meaning is both moral and eschatological, yet not as distinct from each other, but as both included in a more complete conception than either alone represents. We do not speak in such cases of vagueness, but of comprehensiveness. Whether there is any such higher unity back of Paul's uses of the Spirit it will be our duty later to inquire.

Yet, again, modern distinctions, often the result of ages of philosophical thinking and long courses of thought, did not always exist for the ancient thinker. The modern interpreter will not, if he wishes to become a true interpreter, carry back modern distinctions and attempt to make them apply to ancient literature. He will bear in mind the simpler stage of thought that his author represents. Often the thought of an ancient writer was vague, as is that of childhood, and words were used upon which we now sometimes put distinctions of meaning not present to those who first spoke them. For example, it is quite possible that to Philo, strange as the idea may be to us, the Logos may have been neither personal nor impersonal, because the conception of personality had not yet clearly defined itself. A modern case in point would be the popular use of the theological term "the Trinity." Is it certain that the Christian in the pew, or even always in the pulpit, attaches either a tritheistic or a monotheistic concept to the term, or may it be that he sometimes uses it in so vague a way that his thought

does not penetrate to the distinction of one and three?

The following are the uses of the Spirit, in the sense of the divine Spirit, in Paul's writings:

A. The Spirit used for God acting in the individual life:

1. In the endowment of individuals with charismatic gifts:

(*a*) Prophecy: 1 Thess. 5. 19; 2 Thess. 2. 2; 1 Cor. 12 to 14, *passim;* 1 Tim. 4. 1.

(*b*) Tongues: 1 Cor. 12 to 14, *passim.*

(*c*) Wisdom: 1 Cor. 2. 6-13; 7. 40; 12. 8 (comp. also "the word of knowledge," 1 Cor. 12. 8).

(*d*) Power to perform miracles: 1 Cor. 12. 9, 10.

(*e*) Discerning of spirits: 1 Cor. 12. 10.

(*f*) Interpretation of tongues: 1 Cor. 12. 10.

(*g*) Faith: 1 Cor. 12. 9; 2 Cor. 4. 13.

(*h*) Specific or general direction in the progress of Christian activities: Eph. 3. 5; Rom. 8. 26; Eph. 6. 18.

(*i*) Boldness in Christian testimony: 2 Cor. 3. 17, f.

(*j*) Charismata, without more specific definition: 1 Thess. 1. 5; 4. 8; Rom. 15. 19; 1 Cor. 2. 4; 2 Cor. 1. 22; 5. 5; 11. 4; Gal. 3. 2-5; Eph. 1. 13.

B. The Spirit used of God as the originating force of the Christian life, and as manifest in its ethical and religious development: 1 Thess. 1. 6; 2 Thess. 2. 13; Rom. 5. 5; 8. 2, 6, 9, 11, 14, f., 16, 23; 9. 1; 14. 17; 15. 13, 16, 30; 1 Cor. 2. 10-

13; 3. 16; 6. 11, 19; 2 Cor. 1. 22; 3. 3, 8, 17, f.; 6. 6; 12. 18; 13. 14; Gal. 3. 14; 4. 6; 5. 5, 16b; 6. 8; Eph. 2. 18, 22; 3. 16; 4. 3, f., 30; 5. 18; 6. 17; Phil. 1. 19; 2. 1; 3. 3; Col. 1. 8; 2 Tim. 1. 14; Titus 3. 5.

If we, as before, compare this use with earlier periods of Hebrew thought, we find that, aside from the one great new feature of use, the ethical usage, the former tendencies have continued to develop.

1. The use of the Spirit for God *ab intra* has now completely disappeared. Even such identifications as Acts 5, where a lie to God is a lie to the Spirit, are not found in Paul's writings. Clear thinking has taken a step forward. There was a possibility in early Hebrew post-exilic literature that God acting would come to be so identified with God in essence that the advantage which Hebrew thought possessed in a distinguishing term might be lost. This did not take place. In the Pauline thought the separation was made so plain that the danger passed entirely beyond the horizon. In Hindu thought the procedure was in the opposite direction. First, there was a monotheistic identification of all divine power. This included within itself both the first cause and its manifested activity; in Hebrew terms, both God and Spirit. Then, since result is an essential part of manifestation, and since, as in dreams, the essence which is also the active power is the sole cause of the seeming material product, cause, actor, and result were all identified, and pantheism was the outcome. This pantheism became

the more completely impossible to the Hebrew, even had he been inclined to philosophize, because he had a term which, as thought developed, led to a sharp distinction between the first cause and its manifestation.

2. Here, as in Palestinian Judaism, the Spirit acts only upon men; and, as everywhere else in the New Testament, only upon the believer in Christ and upon men in the field of Hebrew history. The entire usage is Messianic. As the idea of the organized church evolved we find the Spirit used with growing frequency for the divine control of the church as a whole. This use, however, is the same that occurs in the document which is incorporated in the early part of Acts. The basis of the conception is always individual. The church has the Spirit because its members have it. The idea that the church is itself an entity independent of its membership, and that its members have the Spirit because the church has it, is a fiction which it is impossible to take as reality so long as we keep Paul's figure of the "body, the church," where he himself keeps it, in the realm of illustration. The church as the repository of the Spirit is a Greek notion which rests on Platonic idealism and finds no sanction in Paul's theology. He knows of no Spirit-filled substance called the church, but only of Spirit-filled persons, who together make up the church.

3, 4. The positions with regard to the Messianic conception and to the Spirit as the origin of physical

life are identical with those of primitive Christian usage (see page 155, f.).

Paul's ideas of the Holy Spirit group about one conception, that of God manifest in the individual life of the Christian. This is shown (*a*) with regard to the beginning of the Christian life. To the Spirit is due its inception (Rom. 8. 2). (*b*) It sanctifies the life (1 Cor. 6. 11). The holiness and the ethical value of the life are due to the Spirit. (*c*) It directs all the expressions of the Christian life, whether of prayer, of public worship, or of any form of witness for Christ. No part of the religious life is outside the range of the Spirit's activity. At the same time there is a special emphasis on the Spirit as the source of sanctification. Now, sanctification is considered by Paul not primarily as an element in the witness of the church, although it has its value for that, but as the essential of the life that is related to God. The Christian is holy because God is holy; his body is a temple of the Spirit of God, and so must be holy. The whole matter of sanctification is an immediate inference from the holiness of God.

This takes the subject out of the range of Christian witness, where the conception of the Spirit had before rested in the early church, but not out of the range of the progress of the Messianic kingdom. The Spirit is still conceived of as working for that, and for that only. Before only the work of the Messiah himself and the propagation of the kingdom in the lines of its external growth had

been assigned to the Spirit. Paul has now brought into account the internal development of the kingdom in the individual life. These are the two hemispheres which together make the entire content of the kingdom of the Messiah. All has now been brought within the range of the Spirit's activity. Paul has made complete the theoretical apprehension of the envelopment of the world's religious progress within the folds of the purposeful activity of God, under the name of the Spirit. The progress of the conception has reached perfection, so far as its definition as a conception is concerned. The only possible enlargement beyond the Pauline idea is in the broadening of the definition of religious progress. That progress remained for him, as for the rest of the early church, limited to the work of the Messiah through the Christian church.

No question of genesis in the entire range of this study has received so much attention as has the problem of the origin of the peculiar Pauline conception of the Spirit. In fact, it is the only question of genesis in the history of this subject which has received any treatment that could be called at all adequate.

The possible sources of Pauline religious ideas are Greek, Alexandrian Jewish, Palestinian Jewish, the Old Testament, the tradition and the experience of the Christian church, and Paul's own experience. To each of these, excepting the first and third, the origin of the Pauline idea has been ascribed.

Pfleiderer (*Philosophy of Religion,* page 161) finds the origin in the Alexandrian dualism of flesh and Spirit, the heavenly and the earthly world, and compares in proof 1 Cor. 2 and Wis. Sol. 8 and 9; "but this dualism"—and this is what is distinctively new in his view—"was overcome in principle in the one person of Jesus Christ, the spiritual man who sprang from heaven and was elevated to heaven; and from this one historical point the advancing subduing of it, through the abiding dominion of the Spirit of Christ in the Christian community, is once for all secured."[1]

The derivation of Paul's idea from Palestinian Judaism is never claimed, for there was nothing in that form of Jewish thought from which Paul could have immediately derived his conception. Dickson (*St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit,* page 146, ff.) assigns the origin of Paul's use to the Old Testament, not merely as furnishing the language, but also "the warrant and encouragement" to give the language the wider scope which Paul does. Dickson finds this warrant in the prophetic use of the Spirit as the power of God in the Messianic kingdom. The difficulty with this position is that it really offers no origin. The charismatic Spirit and the Spirit as the basis of physical and mental life are the only uses which were known to the prophets. All their Messianic references find explanation under these categories, and indeed

[1] One should, however, compare Pfleiderer's *Hibbert Lectures* (p. 62) for some modification of this position.

are all charismatic. If, then, Paul puts upon them another meaning than they originally bore, the question whence he derived that meaning is still to be answered. The facts, however, exempt us from the need of raising this problem. Nowhere do the Pauline writings point to an Old Testament origin for his peculiar idea of the Spirit.

Bruce (*St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, page 243, ff.) derives the ethical idea of the Spirit's work from the charismatic idea. Paul's perception of the disaster that would come to Christian life if these gifts became divorced from reason and conscience "was probably one of the causes which led St. Paul to study carefully the whole subject" and to insert an ethical element in the Spirit's working. The common factor in the new view and the old was "the axiom that the supernatural is divine; the element peculiar to his, that the moral miracle of a renewed man is the greatest and most important miracle of all" (page 249). "Divine action, when transcendent and miraculous, is intermittent." "To eliminate this fitfulness and secure stable spiritual charismata, transcendency must give place to immanence" (page 252). "The immanency of the Holy Spirit carries further along with it . . . that his influence as a sanctifier is exerted in accordance with the laws of a rational nature" (page 253).

This is a logical statement of what is sometimes put in condensed form, as though it needed only to be stated in order to be accepted, that Paul consid-

ered "the Christian life to be as miraculous as was the speaking with tongues." The distinction between the natural and the miraculous was not one of the postulates of early Christian thought. It is certain that neither Paul nor any other Christian of the first or second generations made his philosophy of the Spirit on any such hypothesis. All the phenomena of life were "powers of God," and Paul was too much of a Hebrew to distinguish between first and second causes.

Another form of derivation from Old Testament ideas by logical processes is that suggested by Beyschlag (*Biblical Theology*, II, 208, f., Eng. tr.): "The human pneuma is to him [Paul] originally an individualized spark of the divine, which, however, could not burst into flame, because of the pressure and dominance of the σάρξ [flesh]. But there comes upon it the power of that very Spirit from which it sprang, and the smoking wick, in that element of fire, becomes a clear burning flame." So arises the new life, which, because it is a life of God, is holy, and the Spirit becomes a Spirit of sanctification. This theory would trace the origin of Paul's doctrine to the Old Testament idea of the spirit of man as coming from God. The great objection to this is that it leaves out of account the continuity of thought through Jewish and early Christian media, and assumes that Paul abandoned the conceptions of his own day to turn back to older ideas whose power, and even whose presence, cannot be traced in the literature which reflects his immediate mental

heritage. That is not the way thought usually proceeds. The charismatic Spirit had completely displaced the cosmic Spirit in Jewish thought, and one looks with suspicion on any theory of Pauline origin which ignores this displacement.

Still another type of reference of this idea to the Old Testament is that of Wendt.[1] According to him Paul derives his doctrine from the ethical-religious (sittlich religiösen) activities of the Spirit in the Old Testament. Gunkel objects to this that the fundamental thought of the apostle must come not from reading, but from experience (page 79). In addition, however, one may object that the ethical-religious is, after all, not prominent in the Old Testament and that the early Jewish-Christian thought had almost if not entirely ignored it. The theory encounters, as does that of Beyschlag, the difficulty of assuming that Paul quite ignored the Judaic and Christian thought on this subject, leaping in an unexpected way to an old and never prominent usage of a limited period of Hebrew literature.

Gunkel (page 79, ff.), with his emphasis on the environment of Paul and the Jewish meaning of the Spirit in extra-Pauline parts of the New Testament, naturally makes much of Paul's own experience as the source of his doctrine of the Spirit. This must, on any hypothesis, have been a large factor. Paul's doctrines were never scholastic or logical. They all represented life, and that life his

[1] *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist.*

own. His belief was always the explanation of his own life, but to understand his life one must take into account his surroundings. Two questions then arise: What was the contribution of Paul's environment to his idea of the Spirit? and, What elements did his own experience furnish?

The environment of Paul contained two factors which influenced his religious thinking: Judaism and the Christian church.

Paul's dependence upon the theology of Judaism is most often thought of in a negative way. He revolted from it, we say, and struck out his own path of thought through much mental strife. And yet, after all, that is only true of certain phases of it, especially of those which were intimately connected with the results of the belief in Jesus as the Messiah. It is true chiefly of ideas of salvation and of the function of the law; in general, of the realm of soteriology. In relation to other subjects it is doubtful if his ideas could be described as more than a very slightly modified Judaism. In everything not affected by the belief that Jesus was the Messiah he stood to the end on the traditional ground of Judaism. Witness his conception of idols as the representations of demons, of the Old Testament Scriptures, of eschatology.[1]

We may then expect to find the Palestinian-Jewish idea of the Spirit at the basis of his conceptions on this subject. In this he simply shares the con-

[1] An admirable presentation of this whole subject has been made in *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, by H. St. John Thackery.

dition of the early church. He presents the same idea of the Spirit as connected with the Messianic manifestation, the same ascription of peculiar wisdom or mental gifts to its power, the same belief that the history of the Old Testament times, and especially the writers of the Old Testament, were under its guidance. Not less is the Judaistic limitation of the Spirit seen. It is not operative upon nature, but only upon man, and is limited in history to Israel, with a wide expansion of manifestation in the Messianic time. That Paul was dependent upon Jewish rather than Alexandrian ideas is seen most conclusively in his utter neglect of one important element characteristic of that system of thought, the Spirit as a cosmic power. Pfleiderer sees dependence for the antithesis of σάρξ and πνεῦμα upon the Wisdom of Solomon, yet it is this very book which, more than any other extant work of the Alexandrian-Jewish school, emphasizes the Spirit as a cosmic power. Now, Paul seems not to have been without glimpses of cosmic relations in the purpose of God, as in Rom. 8. 22, but he never places the Spirit in any connection with them. The Spirit is, as in Palestinian Judaism, reserved solely for divine action upon human hearts.

When Paul came into the Christian church, bringing with him the beliefs of his Jewish theology, he came into a community which had already moved somewhat from his own former Jewish point of view. Its progress had been along the most direct and simple lines. The Messianic time

was to be a period of remarkable manifestations of the Spirit. That time had now come. Moreover, the experience of the Christian community presented a wealth of phenomena explicable most easily by this belief in the Spirit. The belief and the experience acted and reacted upon each other. The explanation which was ready to hand furnished a ground of expectation for more phenomena, and the great abundance of charismata in the early Christian church followed.

It may be that Paul's conversion is to be put within the first two years after the crucifixion. Whenever it was, the time was so early that Paul came into the Christian church while its conceptions of the Spirit were in the formative period. His own conceptions followed, for a time, the same direct path. As we have seen, he shared to the end in all the ideas of the Spirit current in the early church. It is impossible to differentiate between the Jewish basis and the early Christian development of the doctrine of the Spirit, except to say that the pneumatic experiences of the early church made a vivid present reality out of what had before been a dogma of memory from the national past and of hope for the national future. There is every reason to suppose that Paul was largely influenced in the form of his beliefs by the Christian churches with which he was in contact. It is inconceivable that several years of intercourse with the churches of Syria and Cilicia should have left no molding impress upon the structure of his thought. His claim

of independence in the autobiographical sections of Galatians does not imply any such unnatural severance from the influences of environment. That claim of independence has to do with the origin of his "gospel," and is limited to his conception of the method of salvation.

But Paul did not depend for his conception of the charismata of the Spirit simply upon Jewish tradition and the experiences of his fellow-Christians. He himself was, as all scholars recognize, a pneumatic of the highest degree. To the Corinthian church, a church in which spiritual gifts seem to have been somewhat unusually abundant, he says, "I thank my God that I speak with tongues more than you all" (1 Cor. 14. 18). He had visions (2 Cor. 12. 1, ff.). The ground of his Christianity was itself a revelation (Gal. 1. 12). The most striking and popularly valued gifts of the Spirit were parts of his own experience.[1]

Thus far Paul's thought followed the channels of ordinary early Christian ideas. The problem of real difficulty comes in the attempt to pass from this common idea over to the conception of the relation of the Spirit to the personal religious life

[1] The psychology of religious leaders is an interesting study. Few have been without visions or their psychological equivalents. Nearly, if not quite all, of the Hebrew prophets come into this category. In addition, one may mention Zoroaster, if one may trust not merely tradition, but the Gathas (see Yasna XXIX); Buddha, whose "enlightenment" was evidently of the nature of a vision; the Hindu philosophers, in whose works the terms used of the perception of the truth are such as to presuppose a kindred experience; the Yogis, who aimed directly at the production of such psychical phenomena; Mohammed, whose best religious utterances were all the result of visions; Philo (see p. 106, f.). The Christian world furnishes such classic examples as Francis of Assisi, Bernard, St. Francis Xavier, Loyola, Luther, Edwards, Wesley, in all of whom we find essentially the same psychological phenomena of "visions and revelations" which Paul describes in 2 Cor. 12 as a part of his own experience.

as a permanent religious force rather than as a temporary charismatic gift.

Whenever Paul originates new theological conceptions it is worthy of note that he takes his point of departure from what he conceives to be the central significance of the subject in question. Now, the central significance of the Spirit in Christian thought lay in its relation to the development of the Messianic mission. It furthered this development in three ways: first, by its witness to the believer that God had approved his service; second, by the direct guidance of particular plans or lines of labor which the church or its members undertook; third, by the witness to Christianity which unusual and peculiar phenomena not humanly explicable offered before the non-Christian communities.

When the question was raised of what events in the religious life could be interpreted as proceeding from the Spirit two possible tests could be applied: One was the test which Judaism had never passed beyond, that simply of the unusual and extraordinary. Whatever in the life lay outside the usual and normal belonged to the activity of the Spirit. This test seemed very obvious. It made its spectacular appeal. It was in accord with the only conception of the Spirit's work which the early church had brought over from Judaism, and for some time it seems to have been the only test that the churches consciously applied. But it had about it an uncertain penumbra. Other spirits besides the Spirit of God might produce like results; nor was it always

possible, as in the case of the maid at Philippi (Acts 16. 16-18), to precipitate a direct conflict of strength between the spirits. It was also external. There was something profounder, something more in accord with the emphasis which Christ laid upon the internal rather than the external. This was brought to light in the second test, that of value and result. To this test we find Paul passing. Any event or experience which served to further the interests of the Messianic movement might properly be explained by the Spirit, even though it were not unusual nor extraordinary. The entire discussion of gifts of the Spirit in 1 Cor. 12 to 14, with its emphasis on the various values of the gifts, its insistence upon ranking these gifts according to their use in edification, shows a complete abandonment of the old Jewish test and a definite acceptance of a ground which, so far as we know, was new among the Christian churches.

The application of such a test, however, made a further departure from the older application of the Spirit to the range of experience. It made the gifts of teaching or of administration or of any other things by which the church might profit part of the spiritual charismata, standing by the side of the charismata of prophecy and the glossolalia and claiming equal rank and dignity with them.

But among all these elements of the Christian life what was of the highest value? Not external gifts, however important they might be for the churches, but the religious life, with its outcome in the ethical

life. This formed the center of the Christian life; this connected that life most closely with the life of God. As Paul labored in the Gentile world this sanctity of life came to be seen ever more clearly to be the most important element that Christianity had to present. It meant the most for the advance of the Messianic movement. It, too, then, must be under the guidance of the Spirit.

It may be that with this argument from the test of value must be coupled, as usually in the development of the idea of the Spirit, an argument from experience. Paul had himself struggled for holiness of life. His struggle had seemed hopeless, until he had found help in the faith of Christ. Rom. 7 tells the story. We can hardly suppose that the help to holiness of life came without a sense of emotion. Victory in a long-fought mental battle, as both psychology and common experience tell us, always comes with emotion. To Paul this emotion must have seemed akin to that which accompanied the gift of the Spirit. Both reason and experience, then, united in urging Paul to bring the religious and ethical life into the sphere of the action of the Spirit.

Thus we may account for the religious use of the Spirit. How did he come to use the Spirit also as the divine force in the origin of the Christian life? Several elements may be discerned here. One is the mere logical inference from the Spirit as the source of the religious life. If from the time of its inception the Spirit has been the controlling divine

power of this life, must not the Spirit also be the source of its beginning? The religious and moral life is not a temporary endowment, to come and go at will; it is a permanent possession. If its manifestation is of the Spirit, its origin must also be of the Spirit.

One may well suppose that Paul's procedure was not by means of the conquest of territory step by step. His system of thought was never a bill of particulars, constructed inductively from details. It was rather a deductive construction. Thus his conception of Christ is not a conclusion from the details of the life of Christ, but a deduction from the principle of his Messiahship. It is probable that his conception of the work of the Spirit was also deductive. The principle was that of the unity of the Christian life. The life as a whole makes its appeal for Christianity. It cannot be divided in its witness. Now, that which constitutes the central fact of a life cannot be mere endowment, given from without, to come and to go at the command of an external will; it must be the principle of life itself. Here is psychological insight. But Paul's psychology is not a matter of inference and certainly not of philosophy, but of his own personal experience. Unity of life as a matter of experience means an absorbing intensity of interest in one thing, the domination of life by one idea. It means a concentration of purpose and attention which can only take place in intense natures. A nature, however, in which this is possible is of necessity strongly

emotional, and the unification of life in experience is of necessity linked with emotional experiences. Thus it was with Paul. His own life was caught up and absorbed in the thought of the revelation of God through Christ. That had made life new for him. He was in his own consciousness a "new creation." Tides of strong emotion that could only come from God had set through his soul and turned its channels in new directions. They were temporary prophetic ecstasies, but back of them there was an abiding force which not only made his life new, but was itself that new life, living itself out in his life. A man of less intense experience might have balanced the elements of this life—so much divine, so much human. Paul could not do this. The life was too much of a unit for that, and his sense of God in it was too large. It could not be divided, except so far as elements of temptation and sin showed that "the old man" still persisted. The new life, the life in Christ, was also the life in the Spirit. It was all the manifestation of God. So out of the intensity and strength of his emotions there came a new step in the psychological interpretation of the revelation of God to man.

In some such way as this we may venture to suppose the rich religious experience of Paul wrought with the logical processes of his mind to bring about his new conception of the range of the Spirit's working in the life of man. It grew directly out of the older conceptions. It is evident that Paul did not regard it as contradictory to these

older ideas, for he held the two together; nor, if the above account of its origin is in any measure correct, was there any contradiction between them. The new idea was only more comprehensive, and it easily replaced the older idea by a more stable and a more satisfactory conception; but there is no reason to suppose that for Paul it had the great significance of a new and radical departure which it has for us.

When we come to consider the expression of the life of the Spirit we find it passing beyond the mere range of witness, though that is never entirely absent, into the range of ethical life for its own sake. Two thoughts combine to produce this result: that the Messianic kingdom is a holy kingdom, and that the Spirit is a holy Spirit. Both these belong to Jewish theology, but now for the first time they could come to ethical realization. They had both been ancient prophetic thoughts which might, had prophecy advanced to its natural end undisturbed by either priestly or nationalistic developments, have come by the natural processes of growth to Paul's ethical position.

When, however, the priesthood placed its ceremonial definition of holiness by the side of the prophet's ethical definition emphasis began to be unduly placed on the priestly side. This was natural. Usually in ancient religions the ceremonial overcame the ethical when the two were placed in competition. Perhaps, however, it would be more true to say that the mass of men were unable to

draw a distinction between them, and that the priests themselves, by the very tendencies which produced a priesthood, were of necessity blind leaders of the blind. The very essence of the priestly tendency is the obscuration of the distinction between ethics and ceremonial. Wherever that distinction has not yet arisen in a religion the priesthood is in the line of natural religious progress. After it has arisen and ethical ideas have been clearly and distinctly set forth, as they had been in Israel by the prophets, the rise of a priesthood to prominence is inevitably a religious retrogression. There are many cases, as that of Israel itself, where history may justify it as seemingly necessary for the building of a shell so hard that it can protect the life within from external assault, but it is religious retrogression notwithstanding.

The prophets had suggested an ethical interpretation of all the life. The priests had inhibited its growth, and the power of priestly ideas must be broken through before it could become a fruitful religious principle. Paul had to do what the disciples of Jewish prophets should have been able to do several hundred years before. Not that ethical ideas had been entirely lost. They still formed the comfort of many religious souls and inspired psalm and prayer in those who humbly "waited for the redemption of Israel." Without them Paul himself would never have attained his freedom from Phariseeism. But in general they had been overgrown by a rank bramble of priestly notions.

If this seems too harsh a judgment on the Jewish priesthood, we may remind ourselves that other religions compel us to make the same estimate of the priest as, after a certain period in religious growth, a religious disaster. The Gathas bear evidence of an ethical phase of thought in the growth of Zoroastrianism. When, however, Magism intervened and purity was conceived of as having to do with earth and fire rather than with character, then Zoroastrianism developed into a burdensome ritual, a hard, merciless, persecuting religion, only able to sustain itself because, like Judaism, it had linked to itself the natural loyalty of nationalism.

Not less is the principle illustrated by the conflict of the ages which has been waged in Hinduism between ethics and the priesthood. Hindu pantheism, combined with what seems almost a racial genius for assimilation and syncretism, obscures the conflict, but it is still there. The result, as usual, has been for the vast mass of its people the complete obliteration of the ethical element of its philosophy by the priestly doctrine of caste and sacrifice. The persistence of the ethical still continues to manifest itself in such movements as the Somajes and in many humbler and more individual efforts to find and to do the right. It is not necessary to go so far from home except to show how widely this same law works. The Christian church has in all ages furnished only too many illustrations of the power of ceremonial religion to inhibit ethical growth.

In Israel a nationalism, which, like the priesthood, is a normal element of an earlier period of growth, combined with priestly domination to still further hinder ethical growth. Judaism never wholly reconciled the legal, the national, and the ethical elements of its religious inheritance, but beyond doubt the ethical ideas of the Spirit which Paul developed might have appeared much earlier had prophetism not been partially overthrown by the persistence and the dominance of these other incongruous elements. It was not that the Spirit and the Messianic kingdom were not recognized as holy, but that, as always, priesthood and nationalism had forced upon the people their own unethical, magical definitions of holiness.

Now at last we have a clear answer to the question which we have raised at various former stages of our study: Is the Spirit a permanent element of character or a temporary endowment? So long as it was an endowment at all the question was always debatable. In most cases it was temporary. In the primitive Christian church that was probably always the fact. In other cases it has seemed more difficult to come to a decision, yet the presumption must always be in favor of the interpretation of it as a temporary endowment, except where Pauline thought has itself modified the earlier conception.

This is not true of Paul's conception of the Spirit. The ethical foundation of character is not an endowment; it is an essential element of the person. This psychological truth Paul attempts to express

in his "mystic realism" of the life "in the Spirit" or "in Christ," for since Christ and the Spirit are both expressions of God's relation to man, they are used in this sense interchangeably.

In former sections questions of ontology have not been raised. The Hebrews did not discuss the problem of the ultimate nature of God, man, or the world, and it is fruitless for us to attempt to define their thought when they left it undefined. All that we have been able to say was that the Spirit was God working, without attempting a sharper distinction. In the consideration of Pauline thought, however, the question arises whether we may not at last try to define the nature of the Spirit. Here is where speculative theology has found its main biblical basis for doctrines of the nature of the Spirit, and here, if anywhere, we shall find such a doctrine.

The nature of the Spirit admits of discussion under the following divisions: 1. The Spirit as a "heavenly substance;" 2. The relation of the Spirit to God; 3. The relation of the Spirit to Christ.

1. That the Spirit represents a sort of substance is held by Holsten and Pfleiderer.[1] The latter argues that the use of speech in the term "a spiritual body" (1 Cor. 15. 44) implies a spiritual material. Gunkel (page 59) compares the "psychical body." As the body is the natural organ of the soul, so the spiritual body is the natural organ of the spirit, but that does not imply that the spirit

[1] See Gloel, *Der Heilige Geist*, p. 372.

is a substance. The meaning of "spiritual" here is seen by comparing other cases where the adjective is used: Rom. 15. 27, the Gentiles partake of the spiritual things of Jewish churches (so 1 Cor. 9. 11; 10. 3, 4); 1 Cor. 15. 44-47, a spiritual body; Eph. 1. 3, spiritual blessings; 5. 19, spiritual songs; 6. 12, spiritual hosts; Col. 1. 9, spiritual wisdom. The adjective describes that which the Spirit produces or uses for the advancement of the Messianic kingdom. It keeps Paul's test in view. It is said that ancient thought could not conceive of a thoroughly immaterial substance—that a being of any sort was placed by the necessities of their thought under the category of *"stoff."* It may be. Certainly one cannot prove that it is not so. Then one may speculate about the Spirit as being an ethereal substance, like air or fire. But all this can only be speculation, and it may be doubted whether the writers in question ever made any such ontological distinctions as these theories would credit them with. Hebrew writings deal with phenomena rather than with substance.

2. Is the Spirit God himself? Up to this point in our study the Spirit has everywhere been God considered as active in the world. The distinction between Spirit and God has been a distinction of function rather than of substance. Traditional theology has maintained that, at least in the writings of Paul, the distinction becomes one of substance.

It must be granted that Paul, like the other early Christians, takes his idea of the Spirit from a sys-

tem of thought in which a difference between God and the Spirit could of necessity be only functional. The monotheism of the Jews forbade the distinction of persons in the Divine Being. There is no evidence that the primitive Christian churches had as yet any idea on this subject different from their Jewish heritage. It may be fairly claimed, however, that with the originality of Paul's conception of the function of the Spirit a new conception of its ontology might possibly arise.

Paul's use of the Spirit presents the following phenomena as concerns the relation of the Spirit to God: (1) Paul ascribes the same results to God and to the Spirit (Rom. 15. 16; 1 Thess. 5. 23). (2) An analogy is drawn between the spirit of a man and the Spirit of God (1 Cor. 2. 11). The Spirit of God sustains the same relation to his personality that the spirit of a man does to his. (3) The functions of God are assigned to the Spirit.

It would seem, then, that Paul's position is that the Spirit is God. This, indeed, is the statement of the creeds, but the creeds distinguish between the Spirit and God. Now, Paul distinguishes between them also, only in a different way. The creeds make an ontological distinction; there is a difference *ab intra* between them. Paul makes a difference, not *ab intra,* but *ex officio,* between them. Paul uses the Spirit for God conceived as energizing in a certain way; but God thus energizing is not limited to this term, for Paul is free to use the term "God" itself for the same divine activity. That

is, the Spirit and God are not mutually exclusive. The Spirit did not mean one thing and God another. The inclusive term was "God." The Spirit might be used for a special way of divine energizing or it might not. That was immaterial. The essential thing was the realization that the Spirit's working was the actual moving of God upon the heart. God, not the Spirit, was the ultimate thought.

This disposes of the question of the personality of the Spirit. Certainly it was personal, for God is personal. It was personal, as a man actively influencing his friend is personal. Confessedly this interpretation of personality is not that of the creeds. The question is if it is that of Paul. Even if it is, that does not of necessity condemn the creeds. Paul's thought may not be final. It may be a stage on the road by which logic is advancing, and a stage at which it is impossible to rest. But at least as interpreters we must not try to read the results of later Greek speculations on the Trinity back into the simplicity of his Jewish thought. And as Christian thinkers we should not set up, as a test of Christianity, a belief which arose after his day, even if we ourselves, along with the historic church, believe it to be the logical outcome of his thought. Orthodoxy can hardly draw lines which will shut out its own great theological protagonist, and with him the entire early church.[1]

[1] One must protest against the rather common assumption that if an exegete does not find the modern sharp theological distinctions in a biblical writer, it is because of his dullness. The philosopher makes no corresponding demand in the interpretation of Plato, nor the student of religion in the interpretation of the Vedic hymns. We cannot too often repeat that

3. What is the relation of the Spirit and Christ? The relation of God and the Spirit is not one difficult to understand. We have the entire history and literature of the Jewish nation to aid us, as well as innumerable analogies from other religions. Not so with the relation of Christ and the Spirit. This has no parallel elsewhere. It was a problem new to the Christian church. It had inherently several possible solutions. Nor is it easy to know just what the tendencies of the primitive church regarding it were.

So far as those parts of Acts which reflect the early church give us any information, Christ was the recipient of the Spirit as a charismatic gift (10. 38).[1] The connection of this gift with the Messianic office is indicated by the verb "anointed" (ἔχρισεν), a term rarely used of the believers. The Messiah received the Spirit by his Messianic office, and thus far is unique, but there is nothing to show that the primitive Christians thought of Christ as standing in any different ontological relation to the Spirit from other men. The idea is dominated by the conception of the relation of Christ to God. So long as that was the relation only of the Jewish

the distinctions which are the outcome of long courses of growing thought cannot be expected to appear in writings that have not inherited this elaborate discrimination. The demand for it belongs to the stage of scientific reasoning which adopted the "box-in-box" theory in biology, and thought of the oak with all its branches and twigs as literally embodied in the acorn; of the whole human race in all its history as actually existing in miniature in the first human embryo. We have laid aside such speculations in physical science. It is as scientific to recognize the amorphous condition—vagueness, we call it in thought—where it really exists as it is to recognize definitely organized structure where that is found.

[1] Acts 1. 2, Christ "had given commandment through the Holy Spirit" is probably editorial matter rather than part of the Aramaic source. It belongs to the condensed summary by which the author has joined his dedication of the book to the history found in his sources.

Messiah the Spirit could only be the traditional charismatic presence of God in the Messiah. However much the effect of that presence may differ from the traditional conception of what its effect would be or from what its effect actually was in other men, the relation itself is not thereby made different in kind. There is nothing that leads us to suppose that the conception of this relation had reached any point of change in the pre-Pauline church.

One comes, then, untrammeled to the Pauline writings. The facts regarding Paul's usage are as follows:

1. The Spirit and Christ are identified directly in activity (2 Cor. 3. 17, 18). Paul has said that if the ministration of the letter which came through Moses was with glory, much more must the ministration of the Spirit be with glory. This ministration of the Spirit is the ministration of the Lord. So far as the ministration is concerned "the Lord" and "the Spirit" are coequal terms. It is to be remembered, however, that the whole range of thought in this passage lies in the sphere not of substance, but of operation (comp. Rom. 8. 2, "The law of the Spirit of life in Jesus Christ," and 8. 9).

2. Indirectly as well as directly the working of the Spirit and of Christ are identified, as in Gal. 4. 6. Rom. 8. 9-11 identifies the life of Christ in the Christian with that of the Spirit in him.[1] The Christian life may be spoken of as a life "in Christ"

[1] Denio (*The Supreme Leader*, p. 50) says of this passage, "There is union in the being of the Son and the Holy Spirit and in their works as well," but the passage makes no statement regarding being. The thought lies in the dynamic, not in the static, sphere.

or "in the Spirit." Both Spirit and Christ are connected with the life (comp. Col. 3. 4 with Gal. 5. 25).

3. The Spirit is "of Christ" (Rom. 8. 9). This, however, is true because the Spirit is the energizing of God for the development of the Messianic kingdom.

4. This identification of working is not absolute. Paul often distinguishes the two. It is only loosely that the two can be said equally to "reveal God." Christ is the objective revelation of God, but this objective revelation is made effective in the heart through the working of the Spirit of God. Faith is in Christ, not in the Spirit (Gal. 2. 20). Grace is from God, shown through Christ (Gal. 2. 21). The Spirit is the gift of God to develop this faith, to open the heart to the apprehension of this grace (Gal. 4. 6; 5. 5). All are combining for one result, but their identity is not absolute. God is the ground of all spiritual influences. Christ is the objective exhibition of the love and purpose of God. The Spirit is the sum of all divine influences acting upon man to make effective this revelation in the life of man. It is this life which is, so far as man is concerned, the object of all these operations. One may, then, when speaking in terms of this life, speak of God, of Christ, or of the Spirit as its source. The Christian life may with equal propriety be said to be in God or in Christ or in the Spirit. But that by no means argues that each is conceived to be of the same substance with the other.

At the same time it would be equally wrong to

make a metaphysical separation between God acting and God as the source of action, and not less wrong to make such a metaphysical separation between God revealing himself through Christ and that divine action on the heart of man which gives him power to grasp for himself and to exhibit to others this divine revelation. The Spirit is wider than the influence of the personal Jesus Christ; although, following Jewish limitations of thought, Paul confines it to the Messianic plan of God, and so finds room for the Old Testament inspiration. It is not simply the risen Christ, but it includes the sum total of influences which come from him and from the historic purposes of God which prepared for him. For Paul it includes only these.

5. In no case is the question of the identity of essence in Christ and the Spirit touched upon. The entire thought lies within the range of activity rather than of essence; of function, not of substance. If one choose to proceed to an identification of the Spirit and the "personality in which God was incarnated and through which the Spirit was manifested," as does Walker, in *The Spirit and the Incarnation,* that is perfectly legitimate as a Christian speculation, but it is not biblical theology. Paul does not raise the problem of a metaphysical Trinity; nor, whatever we may feel compelled to do as the logical result of his expressions, is there any evidence that he himself was consciously nearer to it than were the Jewish Christians in the first decade after the death of Christ.

The entire problem of the ontology of the Spirit remains to the last where it stood at the first. On this point Paul has not advanced one step beyond the most primitive Hebrew ideas. The Spirit had always been God himself, therefore always personal; but it had always been, and was still, God dynamic and not God static—God in manifestation, not God in essence. What Paul would have done with this idea had he been a Greek, or even an Alexandrian Jew, does not concern biblical theology. Whether the inferences drawn by theologians trained in Greek thought from the postulates of his positions were correct or not is also a question with which biblical theology does not concern itself. Paul was a Jew, and his thought clothed itself in Jewish form. It was not speculative, but practical, and dealt with religion rather than with metaphysics. Thus it was made a power in the ethical life, and Christianity was saved, even when placed under the influence of Greek speculative thought, from the fate which overtook both Greek and Hindu philosophical religion, of transferring salvation from a matter of character to a matter of knowledge.

CHAPTER V

The Johannean Writings

In the synoptic gospels we treated the teaching of Jesus and the synoptic narrative in different sections. In the fourth gospel that method is not available. The Johannean author has so assimilated the teaching of Jesus, in both style and content, with his own theological thought that no mere mechanical separation between the sections of Christ's discourses and the gospel narratives will serve to distinguish between the thought of Jesus and that of the author. The gospel must be first treated as a whole. Then we may properly raise the critical problem, which in any case stands still in the background, whether we can distinguish in the thought of the Johannean author any definite factors of the teaching of Christ. The question will arise in the form of the problem of Johannean origins, How far are the peculiar elements of the Johannean doctrine based on the teaching of Jesus? With the gospel the epistles of John may be coupled. It is certain that they proceed from the same source and represent the same system of thought.

In the former classifications we have distinguished the Spirit when used to represent God acting upon individuals from the Spirit when it represents God acting upon classes of persons, like the Jewish community in the Messianic time or the

Christian church. Both uses are charismatic, but only the first is original, the other being a secondary development. In the Johannean literature, however, it becomes impossible to apply this distinction. The Spirit is represented as given to individuals, but not to individuals as distinguished from the Christian community. Rather is the gift made to individuals because they are members of the community. The gift is in the mind of the author primarily to the church, and is only individual in that the recipient of an individual relation—and the possession of the Spirit is always an individual relation—can never be the community as apart from the individuals which compose it.

The divisions which have been classified as A and B, then, here fall together into one. If we use the symbol AB, it will cause no confusion and will express this unification of meaning.

AB. The charismatic Spirit. God active in the Christian church, for the development of the Messianic community: John 7. 39; 14. 17; 15. 26; 16. 13; 20. 22; 1 John 3. 24; 4. 13.

C. The Spirit used in connection with Christ: John 1. 32, 33, Spirit at baptism of Christ. 3. 34, "God giveth not the Spirit by measure" (usually interpreted of Christ). 6. 63, Christ's "words are Spirit."

D. The Spirit as the basis of Christian life: John 3. 5, 6, 8.[1]

[1] No cases are found of the Spirit as the source of the Old Testament writings or of the Spirit used of God *ab intra*. "God is Spirit" (4. 24) is

If we compare the use of the Spirit here with that in other New Testament literature, we find a difference of emphasis rather than a difference of content. In the general field of Christian ideas, with its common background of Jewish concept, certain phases of the Spirit here gain prominence. Some differences of use occur, but modify old uses rather than present any uses which are new.

1. The most notable difference is the total disappearance of the use of the Spirit for individual endowment of miraculous charismatic gifts. Yet we cannot be sure that this difference is not rather seeming than real. The Spirit is thought of as endowing the Christian community, which means nothing else than the endowment of individual Christians. If there is no mention of the Spirit in connection with prophecy, vision, wisdom, or other things which Jewish and early Christian thought commonly explained by spiritual influence, it is because there are no instances recorded where such interpretation is called for. The one case of prophecy which the Johannean writings narrate is that of the high priest Caiaphas (11. 49). A Christian writer to whom the Spirit had come to be intimately connected with devotion to the sacred memory of his Lord might well hesitate to ascribe this prophecy to the Spirit, even while recognizing that God was

an affirmation concerning the nature of God as affecting the method of worship, not concerning the Spirit of God. The thought of the passage is that God, being spiritual rather than material, must be approached by a worship whose content is spiritual rather than material. The passage does not properly fall under our subject.

able to make the enemy of the Messiah utter a divine oracle.[1]

2. There is here no reference to the Old Testament as the word of the Spirit. This difference is probably also purely incidental. It is hardly conceivable that the writer did not hold the general Jewish and Christian conception that the Old Testament writers were under the guidance of the Spirit.

3. The limitation of the Spirit to the Messianic usage is the same as in other Christian writings.

4. The conception of the Spirit as the basis of physical life is also absent here, as in other Christian literature.

The Johannean teaching of the Spirit, with all its peculiarity, is less remote from the common Christian teaching than it seems to be upon first impression. Its beginning is the ordinary Christian Messianic conception of the Spirit. The relation of the Spirit to the Messiah himself is not essentially different from that in the synoptists or in the writings of Paul. God gives the Spirit without measure to the Messiah, and through him it is mediated to the disciples. All this rests ultimately on Jewish hopes such as are expressed in Joel 2. 28. We have seen such hopes in the late Jewish and early Christian literature. The function of the Spirit is to

[1] Wendt (*Gospel of John*, p. 202, f., Eng. tr.) regards the fact that there is in the discourses "no forecasting of those miraculous gifts of the Spirit which played so great a part in apostolic and sub-apostolic Christianity" as an element of proof that the source from which they were taken corresponds substantially to the teaching of Christ. He regards 16. 13, "He will show you things to come," as indicating "prophetic prevision" and belonging to the additions of the editor (p. 163). It is possible, however, that the words may not be a promise of predictive power, but of spiritual insight into the significance of "that future which is even now coming" (see Westcott *in loco*)

guide the disciples in their witness for the Messiah. Here again the idea differs in no essential respect from that of the synoptic teaching of Christ, or from the conceptions expressed by Paul or other Christian writers, on the same subject. The Spirit is confined, in its direct working, to the Christian disciples. Yet God designs to bring the whole world to himself. The Spirit is given to the Christian, then, not for his own behoof or delectation, but that he may the better bear witness for Christ. The Spirit witnesses to him, and he to the world; and so the Spirit works upon the world.

All this thought of the Spirit, with the exception of 3. 5-8, starts from the idea of charismatic[1] gifts. It has its historical origin in the Old Testament conception of prophecy turned to New Testament Messianic uses. In one respect, however, it differs from the primitive Christian idea. This gift of the Spirit is not special and temporary, given for the needs of a special occasion and passing away when its purpose is fulfilled; it is an abiding gift. Its value is for the permanent structure of the Christian life. The older Jewish connection of the Spirit with the extraordinary and unusual has been entirely displaced by its connection with the usual and normal.

In this respect the Johannean position takes a step beyond that of Paul, though making no new progress in thought. Paul regarded the Spirit as

[1] The reader will recall that this word means any divine gift for a special purpose, and is not limited to the miraculous.

a permanent part of Christian life, but he also held and freely expressed the older Jewish idea of the Spirit as an occasional charismatic gift. There was no express contradiction between the two, but, on the other hand, there was no attempt to unify them. The Johannean position drops the older side altogether, and only keeps the newer. All this makes an harmonious picture. It is not quite that of the primitive Christian thought; it is not quite that of the Pauline thought; but it is self-consistent and perfectly explicable from the trend of early Christian conceptions. At one point, however, the Johannean literature is brought into still closer relation to the Pauline. The peculiarity of Pauline thought is its conception of the Spirit as not only the abiding power, but the source, of the Christian life. In one passage the Johannean gospel takes the same view. John 3. 5-8 can be explained only as expressing the idea that the Spirit is the source of the Christian life. Instead of coming only after the departure of Jesus, as in 16. 7, the Spirit is present then or at any time when any soul enters "eternal life." It is not impossible that the form of expression, "water and the Spirit," may be suggested by John's promise of the Messiah's baptism by the Spirit (Beyschlag, I, 283). The idea of the Spirit as the source of Christian life, however, does not find expression elsewhere in the New Testament except in Pauline thought.

Whence come these Johannean conceptions? Many of them occur in the discourses of Jesus.

May it not be that the peculiar Johannean view of the Spirit comes from the teaching of Jesus? If so, then the Pauline doctrine has some basis in the words of Jesus, and the high-water mark of Christian thought on this subject was reached by our Lord himself.

It is not a violation of the proper objectivity of scholarship to say that it would be a grateful result could this be found to be the case. The loyal disciple of Christ would be glad to see the highest development of a course of thought on so important a religious subject manifest in germ, even if not finding complete expression, in the teachings of the Master rather than in the thoughts of even his most honored disciple. The question is whether the facts, so far as they can now be recovered, would allow this view to be taken.

Let us gather up the uses of the Spirit which occur in the Johannean representation of the teaching of Christ. We find that they include the following classes of Johannean usage:

AB. The charismatic Spirit: 14. 17; 15. 26; 16. 13; 20. 22.

C. The Spirit as the basis of Christian life: 3. 5, 6, 8.

John 3. 5, 6, 8, representing the Spirit as the origin of the Christian life, is at the farthest remove from the synoptic teaching of Christ. Obviously it will not do to say that this idea of the Spirit could not have stood in the preaching of Christ by the side of the ordinary Jewish charis-

matic view. We find that the two did so stand together in the writings of Paul. But even so the cases are not parallel. The Spirit was an element of very great importance in Paul's system of thought. It filled a large measure of the horizon in the explanation of Christian phenomena both for himself and for his contemporaries. We can see how this new factor of his thought on the subject took shape. With the teaching of Jesus it was different. The Spirit was not prominent. It would be impossible to explain how a new interpretation of the Spirit could have grown up in the mind of Jesus. The Pauline idea would be unnatural in the teaching of Jesus, an isolated phenomenon without connection. It is also strange, if this be a real factor in Christ's teaching of the Spirit, that only the fourth gospel contains any allusion to it. Gunkel (page 82) naturally questions if such teaching can be that of Christ, and decides that it must rather be the author's.[1] Whatever its origin it is improbable that it belonged to the original teaching of Jesus.

The references to the Spirit in the last discourses of Jesus belong to a different class of ideas. The Spirit is here the Messianic charismatic Spirit, given not only to comfort the disciples, but, through their testimony, to "convict the world" (16. 8). It will come only after the departure of Jesus (16. 7), and promises to the disciples the divine guidance

[1] Wendt, it is true, makes it a part of his apostolic "source" (p. 68), but on the supposition that the Spirit is here psychological, not theological, and corresponds to "eternal life," as in 7. 63.

in their future need. It is thus far the correlative of Christ's promise in the synoptists that when, after his departure, the disciples are brought before kings and rulers for his sake, the Spirit shall speak through them. Only in one respect is the Johannean representation an advance upon the synoptic. There the Spirit is evidently a charismatic gift upon occasions of need. Here it is represented as a divine power which will be with them "forever" (14. 16), which will "abide" with them (14. 17), in contrast to Christ, who must "go away." There we have only the Jewish charismatic Spirit. Here we have a factor of the Pauline element of the Spirit as an abiding presence, controlling the life not merely in cases of special need, but in its continual Christian activity; manifesting itself not merely in occasional miraculous expressions, but in a continual divine teaching (14. 26; 16. 13) of the significance of Christ's message to the church and the world. John gives us this much of the Pauline idea, as distinguished from the Jewish, but Paul's idea of the basis of this permanence of the Spirit in Christian life, namely, that the Spirit is itself the origin of the life, is not found in John's account of the last discourses. How can we explain this mingling of uses? Is it possible that it may go back to the teaching of Jesus? If so, it might have arisen from an expansion of the ordinary Jewish temporary charismatic conception into the conception of the Spirit as a permanent charismatic gift. This would be a natural evolution of thought, and

would fit the general character of Christ's teaching. Jewish thought had approached the line of distinction between the two ideas before, if, indeed, it had not, as some have maintained, actually crossed it, in its thought of the Spirit as the source of wisdom and prudence. Certainly we cannot confidently affirm that this could not have been a teaching of Jesus.

In spite of this, however, the probabilities seem to be against its being a teaching of Jesus, for the following reasons: 1. It is not found in the synoptic teaching of Jesus. 2. The development of thought usually takes place in topics which are within the center of attention. In Christ's teaching the center of attention was not occupied by the Spirit. 3. The idea of the Spirit as a permanent possession being common in the Christian world before the writing of the fourth gospel, it would be natural that it should enter this gospel as one of the unconscious modifications of the original teaching of Jesus. Since, then, it is difficult to account for the idea as a part of the teaching of Christ, but easy to account for it as a Christian addition, the probability lies against its coming from Christ.

Does this carry with it, however, the probability that the entire teaching of John 14 to 16 regarding the Spirit did not originate with Christ? Not at all. There is no adequate reason why the central thought of the charismatic Spirit may not belong to Christ's last talk with his disciples. In fact, such a thought as this would be a most natu-

ral, one might almost say an inevitable, element in a farewell discourse of Jesus to them. We may go farther. There are two lines of thought regarding the future relation of Christ to his disciples running through this discourse. According to one Jesus himself will return to his orphaned followers. According to the other the Father will, at his request, send the Spirit. Now, if one feels compelled, on account of a sense of their lack of harmony, to deny one or the other of these elements to the original teaching of Jesus, it must be the first, not the last. Christ's future presence with his disciples belongs to the author's Christological scheme, but the Spirit as the future guide of the disciples is verified as Christ's teaching by the synoptic gospels and the natural conclusions from Jewish Messianic thought. Not only, then, is there no ground for rejecting from Christ's teaching the general doctrine of the Spirit in John 14 to 16, but there is every ground for retaining it. But the probabilities are that the Spirit was originally, as in the synoptists, a temporary gift for special needs. If after passing through the Johannean medium the Spirit appears in these chapters as a permanent possession of the Christian, there has only happened to it what has happened to other factors of Christ's teaching in the fourth gospel. There has, not unnaturally, gathered about it a penumbra of early Christian thought and interpretation. As in other cases, also, the question of separation between the original teaching and the

addition is not one of the dissection of words and clauses, like the analysis of the Pentateuch, but of the dissection of thought. It is not a problem of documentary criticism, but of historical criticism.

Whence did the Johannean author obtain the Pauline elements in the views which he presents? This is a question involved in the general problem of the origin of Johannean theology, a problem which has not even yet received an adequate answer. Without doubt the Johannean author was a religious genius, from whose deep mystical nature there came an emphasis on certain aspects of Christian life and thought that needs no other explanation. But back of all emphasis lies the question of a theological substrate. Even a mystic does not discover theology by intuition. The power of a religious genius lies rather in the discernment of certain relations and the ability to make prominent certain elements in the common religious thought of his time. Such power our author shows with a clearness that few have equaled. He forces religious thought to the central idea of union with God. This would, however, lead to no new or original conception of the Spirit. In fact, it would, if it had any effect, tend to minimize that idea, to make the Spirit of less importance as the soul approached God more closely. This author is hindered by no Jewish fear for the dignity of God which should make him hesitate to bring God into contact with man. He uses the same freedom of

expression for the close relation, the union, of God and man which mystics have ever used. The use of the Spirit by such a writer can only be traditional. His own thought does not need it. Weiss (II, 409) says, "The full joy of believers is not, as with Paul, a work of the Spirit, but a result of abiding in Christ (15. 11), of their own prayers being heard (16. 24), and of Christ's intercession (17. 13)." This is the true mystic position. Weiss draws the distinction between the outpouring of the Spirit in 3. 5, as the *starting point* of the moral new birth, and the Pauline conception of the Spirit as the *principle* of the new moral life. But wherever the Spirit occurs in early Christian thought it is not treated as occasion, but as cause. It stands in a causal relation to whatever phenomenon is ascribed to it, whether that be a temporary gift or a permanent life. One can hardly conceive that in the Jewish background of Christian thought it should not always have been regarded as a cause. When it came to be applied to Christian life it could hardly have been regarded otherwise than as the cause of that life. Such would also be the most natural meaning of 6. 63, "My words are Spirit and life," interpreted by the preceding clause, "It is the Spirit that quickeneth."

To state it in other words: There are two possible ways of expressing the divine origin of the new religious life of the Christians. One is to regard it as proceeding directly from the soul's relation to God. This is the method natural to the

mystic. The other is to make not God, but the Spirit of God, its source. This belongs to the Judaic-Pauline growth of Christian expression. Now, both these are found in John. The great body of the gospel belongs to the first class. The entire expression of the epistles also belongs to the first class. Isolated expressions of the second class lie in their context quite unassimilated. They are not a part of the author's system of thought. Whence did they come? They occur in the discourses of Jesus, but, as we have seen, their Pauline elements are quite as much out of accord with his teaching as with that of the author. They must, however, have come to the author as a part of the teaching of Christ, but molded and colored somewhat by a developed Christian thought. So far as we can trace their origin, it is Pauline. How widely the Pauline conception had become extended in the Christian church by the time of the writing of the fourth gospel, and by what means it had molded the expression of the discourses of Jesus found in this gospel, are questions to which no answer can be given. The facts, however, seem fairly clear.[1]

[1] Weiss and Beyschlag take different views of 3. 3–5. Beyschlag regards John's idea as Pauline: "In John, as in Paul, the Holy Spirit is the principle of the life from God which distinguishes the Christian from the natural man" (II, 452). Weiss says, "The Holy Spirit is never, as exclusively with Paul, regarded as the principle of the new moral life" (II, 409, note). Beyschlag's view is based on the identity of the Spirit with the glorified Christ, while Weiss sharply distinguishes between the two. The latter seems to hint at a double notion of the basis of Christian life in the following (II, 375, note): "As the whole idea of being born of God is specifically Johannean, so the idea, occurring in the speeches of Christ, of being born of water and the Spirit (3 5) is nowhere further realized by the apostle." Weiss is here distinguishing between what I have called the mystic conception of an immediate relation of the believer to God and the Judaic-Pauline conception of that relation as mediated by the Holy Spirit. Weiss, however, does not use that distinction further. Its full recognition seems to be the only way to explain the peculiar contradiction in John.

One element of the criticism of the Johannean writings must enter into the final settlement of this problem. It is the question of the Alexandrian character of these writings. That certain factors in them, notably the Logos doctrine, have at least Alexandrian affinities has long been admitted. How far this Alexandrian influence goes, how much of the thought of the gospel it affects, whether it is only a touch of the environment in which the gospel was produced or is an essential part of the author's mental furnishings, are still open problems. Quite as open, but lying in another sphere, is the question of whether the gospel cannot be divided, and the Alexandrian element traced only in one source or group of sources. The full consideration of these problems lies outside of our investigation. The general question, however, of Alexandrian material in the gospel enters into the problem of the doctrine of the Spirit in the Johannean writings. It is possible to discuss the relations of Alexandrian thought to the doctrine of the Spirit without affirming any certain conclusions regarding the questions of detail suggested above. The problem of Alexandrian affinities in the fourth gospel has been largely discussed on the basis of the doctrine of the Logos in the Prologue. But if the gospel is so thoroughly Alexandrian as some have asserted, not only the Logos doctrine, but other elements of thought, would naturally be affected. Among these we might naturally expect to find the Spirit. Upon examination, however, the Johannean doctrine of the Spirit

does not prove to be Alexandrian. The following differences are noted:

1. Alexandrian thought considered the working of the charismatic Spirit to lie wholly in the sphere of the unusual and extraordinary. It pertained to prophecy, exceptional skill and wisdom, and the like. It was not a part of the mental furnishing of every good man or of every worshiper of Jahveh. Johannean thought, on the other hand, has ceased to emphasize the unusual as a proof of the Spirit's possession. The Spirit is a necessary and normal element in the Christian's life. Without it he would be left in ignorance (John 14. 26; 16. 13), without proof of God's abiding in him (1 John 4. 13), and without power to advance the Messianic kingdom (John 16. 8). In the matter of the function of the charismatic Spirit the Johannean theology is more nearly akin to Pauline than to Alexandrian thought. This leads naturally to the second distinction.

2. Alexandrian thought treated the charismatic Spirit as necessarily only a temporary possession. It might have been a permanent possession had man not sinned, but, having sinned, he has lost the abiding presence of the Spirit (see page 106). The Johannean writings, as we have seen, represent the Spirit as the permanent gift of God to the believer. This difference is dependent on the preceding point, for it belongs rather to problems of the function than of the nature of the Spirit.

3. Alexandrian thought regards the Spirit as

ultimately equivalent to the Logos. It is one of the powers of God, all representing essentially the same reality (see page 95, ff.). One might well expect, therefore, if the Alexandrian affinities are strong, that the author of the fourth gospel would regard the two as equivalent; but there is nothing in his use of the Logos and the Spirit to lead us to suppose that he did. The fact that on the points noted above Johannean thought does not agree with Alexandrian also makes against the agreement of the two on this point. So does the fact that the Christian author develops his thought in the light of the historical person of Christ. For the Alexandrian writers speculative truth was the most important thing in the horizon. For the Johannean writer all thought and all speculation were dominated by the figure of the man Jesus Christ. Along with this there was the common Christian emphasis on the Holy Spirit as present in the Christian church. Christ and the Spirit were to Christian thought more distinct and living ideas than were the Logos and the Spirit to the speculative thought of Alexandrian Jews. The distinctness of the figures of Christ and the Spirit would tend against the identification of their natures, as Alexandrian thought identified the Logos and the Spirit. Only a writer in whom the philosophical feeling dominated the historical could so far isolate himself from the influence of his Christian surroundings as to lose the sense of ontological distinction between the glorified Christ and the Spirit. That this author uses

the return of Christ and the coming of the Spirit as different expressions for the same historical process does not argue the ontological identity of Christ and the Spirit, but only that their function is in that respect the same. On exegetical grounds there seems to be no reason to regard the relation of Christ and the Spirit as different here from that relation in other parts of the New Testament. On the whole, Alexandrian philosophy throws no light on the origin or the meaning of the Johannean doctrine of the Spirit. There is no evidence that the two systems of thought were at this point in the least affiliation.

When we turn to consider the place of the Spirit in the Johannean system of thought three subjects present themselves: the relation of the Spirit to the believer, the relation of the Spirit to Christ, and the relation of the Spirit to God.

It was said above that the thought foremost in the mind of the author is the Christian community, not the individual believer. Yet the individual does not disappear, and the problem of divine relation remains, as it must always remain, a personal problem. The author's conception is not out of accord with the historic Jewish conception of the Spirit as God guiding, and lies within the Christian idea of the Spirit as God guiding the development of the Messianic kingdom through the believers. He lays emphasis upon the idea that the Spirit takes the place of the embodied Christ, but this is not wholly new. The first two chapters of Acts ex-

press the same idea (Acts 1. 2, 5, 8; 2. 33). He also holds that, although the Messiah had the Spirit (3. 34), it was not given to the believers till after Christ's resurrection (14. 16, f.; 16. 7; 20. 22). It could not then be the causal principle of the Christian life, for that life of union with God which he calls "the eternal life" was open to all men in all time. According to the Prologue (1. 9) this life depends on the Logos, who has ever been the light of God, not upon the Spirit. The Spirit is peculiarly the divine means of extending the work of Christ. His function is entirely subordinate. His work is, as Beyschlag puts it (I, 281), prophetic rather than ethical. It is to instruct the believers, to call to mind what Christ has taught, to lead them out into a fuller revelation of God, that God may through them convict the world without. We notice a distinction between this and the Pauline view. There the Spirit is also for the development of the kingdom of the Messiah, but by means of the development of the ethical life of the individual believer. The religious life was the Spirit of God living itself out in the believer. The Johannean idea is of the Spirit as preparing men for witness. We see also a difference between this and the primitive Christian ideas, as, for example, in the Lucan writings. There the Spirit fills men for witness, directly leads them to their work, and guides them in its performance. That is Jewish in its content, growing directly out of the old charismatic conception. Here it stands at a farther remove from the old concep-

tion. The Spirit instructs as well as guides, while the initiation of Christian action lies with the soul in communion with the Father through Christ. This also is in accord with the common mystic thought.

Another and kindred function in the epistles is that of the Spirit as a witness and pledge of the acceptance of the believer by God (1 John 3. 24; 4. 13; 5. 7, 8). These passages imply some means of judging of the possession of the Spirit, whether by the exhibition of spiritual gifts or by a mystical consciousness or in whatever way it may be. Probably the author has in mind the possession of love as the pledge of the Spirit's presence (1 John 4. 7-13). He who has Christian love may thereby know that the Spirit dwells in him. 1 John 4. 1-6 couples with the assurance of the Spirit's possession the confession of Jesus as the Messiah. As a matter of course the whole Christian life in its power for witness is based on that confession. The Spirit is here, as in the last discourses in the gospel, charismatic. It follows upon faith, rather than supplies the ground of it. The Spirit is the result of the abiding of Christ in the believer, and it is also the witness of that abiding. Paul likewise (Rom. 8. 16) uses the idea of the Spirit as witnessing in the heart of the believer, but there the Spirit is the origin of the life of faith; here that life is produced by God, and the Spirit comes, charismatically, not to cause the life, but to strengthen it.[1]

[1] Beyschlag (II, 452) takes the opposite view. He does not find the full expression of the position that the Spirit originates the Christian life in the epistles, but he asserts that in 1 John 2. 20–27 the "anointing" (χρῖσμα)

Passing from the relation between the Spirit and the believer to that between the Spirit and Christ, we enter upon a field which has received much study and in which diametrically opposite opinions have been advanced. Two views have been held: one, that the Spirit is but a personification of the glorified Christ; the other, that the Spirit represents a distinct personality. The first is held by Beyschlag, and is the controlling element in his entire interpretation of the Johannean conception of the Spirit. The teaching of Jesus, he holds, contained two figures to express the future relation of the Messiah to his followers: one, that of the continued presence of the Messiah with his disciples; the other, that of the Holy Spirit which would be present with the disciples. The last was founded on the Old Testament prophecy of the Messianic time. These two modes of teaching "mutually exclude each other as forms of representation." The contradiction can of necessity, however, be only one of form; the underlying idea must be a unity. The Holy Spirit in the believer and Christ in him must be one and the same thing. "He is the Spirit and the life of Christ in the believer; he is—and this is the solution of the whole riddle—the Christ in us (Rom. 8. 9; comp. verse 10)." The Spirit cannot come until Christ has departed, because the Spirit is the glori-

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refers to the Spirit, and that "the author simply presupposes the sanctifying side of the possession of the Spirit." Why make him here presuppose what he nowhere else in the epistle expresses? Beyschlag takes the "anointing" to mean the Spirit as the source of the Christian life because he identifies the Spirit and the glorified Christ. If that identification is not accepted, Beyschlag's interpretation falls with it.

fied Christ—a "pictorial representation" of his presence. Yet there remains "a twofold distinction" between the figure and its reality: First, the figure is narrower than the reality. "Christ is not limited to the Spirit, but also remains in his perfect personal existence with the Father above the world." Second, the activity of the Spirit is dependent on the historical personality of Christ. The Spirit can bring nothing new into the world, but can only develop the meaning of Christ. Reuss also holds that the Johannean author attempts to make no personal distinction between Christ and the Spirit.

The view that the fourth gospel makes a personal distinction between Christ and the Spirit is presented by Stevens, in his *Johannean Theology* (page 194, ff.). The argument as formulated is exegetical. The Spirit is called "another comforter," *ἄλλος παράκλητος*, Christ himself being one, according to 1 John 2. 1, and is distinguished from Christ by his dependence on Christ. If a person at all, then, he cannot be the same person as Christ. The use of pronouns indicates personality, for "John, except when prevented from so doing by the grammatical gender of *πνεῦμα* (Spirit), uniformly designates the Spirit by masculine pronouns implying personality" (page 196). A series of activities only appropriate to persons is ascribed to him—speaking, teaching, bearing testimony, holding fellowship with the disciples, and the like.

These are the well-known exegetical arguments for the personality of the Holy Spirit. They do

not meet the position taken by Beyschlag, of the Spirit as a "pictorial representation," where all the elements of personality are confessedly present, but, of course, only as a part of the figure.

One is led to question whether either of these views takes into account sufficiently the Jewish historical background of the doctrine. Had the doctrine of the Spirit begun with Christianity, it must have meant either a representation of Christ or a distinctly separate person. But it came into Christianity with its content already formed. The Spirit was not only the representative of God; it was God himself, acting in the world through the Messianic kingdom. As far as the Messiah represented God, so far the functions of the two were the same; but there is no reason to suppose that the problems of personality entered the thought of the writer at all. Beyschlag and those who think with him are right in affirming that the presence of the glorified Christ and of the Holy Spirit in the world must be one in significance. It is true that the Spirit and Christ are both representations of the divine care for the disciples and of the divine control of the Messianic kingdom. One form of expression comes from the teaching of Christ and the feeling of the value of the historic person of Jesus for Christian life, and the other from the traditional Jewish ideas molded by Christian concepts and also expressed, although not prominently, in the teaching of Christ himself. But because the two expressions represent the same divine move-

ment in history it does not follow that they represent the same personality in the usual sense of the word. Doubtless it would be more logical that they should, but conceptions determined by tradition do not always follow the line of least logical resistance. It would have been somewhat unnatural if the traditional distinctions between the Spirit and the Messiah had been so speedily swallowed up in the personality of the Messiah.

Does it follow, then, that the Spirit and the Messiah were conceived of as distinct personalities? One fails to see that the Johannean theology makes a stronger demand for this than does the Pauline theology or the conceptions of primitive Christianity. The expression in the Johannean theology is somewhat different from that in the last two, but the essence of the idea lying behind the expression seems not diverse. As the Johannean thought draws together Christ and God, so it draws together Christ and the Spirit, the historic expression for God acting, yet without making philosophical affirmation about their personalities.

The Johannean writings add nothing to the common Christian idea concerning the relation of the Spirit to God. The Spirit comes from God; he is the Spirit of truth because he witnesses to the truth of God in the believer; he is the pledge of the abiding presence of God in the heart. The relation of God to the Spirit, however, seems to be no more one of identity than it is elsewhere in Christian writings. It is true, as Walker, in *The Spirit and*

the Incarnation, says, that we cannot draw distinctions between God, Christ, and the Spirit. That, however, is true only in a dynamical and not in a statical sense. In one sense the Spirit is God acting in the world. That lies in the field of operation, of phenomenon; that is dynamical. In the field of ontology, the statical sense, there is no affirmation of either distinction or identity. The question of identity and distinction of substance had not yet arisen. Christianity was as yet unphilosophical.

It is of little use to force back later theological distinctions into the more naïve and simple literature of the New Testament. The assumption sometimes made, that the Johannean writings may be expected to yield a ground for such fine philosophical distinctions because they are more or less tinctured with an Alexandrian philosophical flavor, is quite without warrant. On the subject of the Spirit, moreover, the Johannean author is not Alexandrian. Alexandrian philosophy, also, itself is peculiarly vague on the point of the personality of its divine "powers." That philosophy had evidently not only never come to any clear conclusions on the subject of the personality of the Logos, the Spirit, and the other powers of God, but had not even been conscious of any question regarding it. Neither his Palestinian nor his Alexandrian affiliations, then, would lead us to expect clear statements on the subject of the personality of the Spirit from the writer of the Johannean books.

After all, his contribution to Christian thought lies in quite a different field from the conception of the Spirit. Regarding that subject Paul, not the Johannean writer, took the last step of biblical progress.

PART III

CONCLUSION

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Conclusion

THE key to the entire history of the development of the idea of the Spirit is experience. The study of this development is primarily a psychological study. Men explained the origin of certain experiences which were to them vital, vivid, profoundly real, and religiously significant by the thought that God was moving in them. This was the idea as far back in Semitic antiquity as we can trace the conception of the Spirit. This is the idea in the New Testament period, when once more men felt themselves to be the subjects of the direct activity of God, who was working out his eternal purposes by means of their lives.

But it was not upon any and all sorts of experiences that men felt they could place this explanation of divine origin and force; it was only upon those experiences in which, for some reason, they believed that the hand of God could be seen. Primarily that meant upon experiences accompanied by strong emotion. It was preeminently so at the first. The earliest application of the idea of the Spirit of God that we can find in Hebrew history is to the prophetic ecstasy. This was supremely emotional. To understand its meaning to those who experienced or witnessed it we must leave our modern realm of logic and reason and transfer ourselves into an earlier and cruder

stage of thought, where emotion and imagination ruled supreme. In this stage men surrendered themselves to emotion as they do not in our day. There was the same tendency to be swept away by emotion that one finds in childhood. All early history and all crude races in late history show that same subjection to emotion. Their experiences under its influence had to them supreme value. They were the most intense experiences in their lives. Naturally they were regarded as of the most value. That necessarily meant for a religious race that a religious interpretation was put upon them and that they were thought of as coming from God. In all periods of Hebrew history when there was a vigorous doctrine of the Spirit there were also intense emotional experiences. This was not less true of the New Testament period than of early Hebrew history. It is probably difficult for us to exaggerate the depth and strength of the emotion of the first generation of Christians as they thought of how God had at last once more come close to man, chosen them personally for his high mission, and, as they believed, would in a few years close the history of this age with the coming of the Messiah and the establishment of his kingdom. Should we be inclined to depreciate a time because it made emotion so prominent, it might be well to remember that in all periods, even in our own boasted age of reason, the supreme importance has, after all, been attached to things of the emotions. People will persist in believing that poetry is higher than prose

and that love is worth more than logic. It is not, then, a degradation of the idea of the Spirit of God to recognize that it had its origin, as it has always had its best appreciation, in periods rich with emotion, and that any adequate study of it is primarily a study of human emotions.

There are, however, elements in its history which are not emotional. When the Spirit was assigned to artisan work, like that of Bezaleel, emotion could hardly have been thought to play a part in it. But such a use has an important limitation. The Spirit was never so used by any person of his own experience or that of his contemporaries. In all cases in Hebrew literature where living experiences were explained as coming from the Spirit of God there was an element of emotion to serve as the basis of that explanation. All these things lead us to the assertion made above, that the key to the entire history of the conception of the Spirit of God is experience, and, we may now add, emotional experience.

Taking this as the starting point, let us review briefly the stages of development through which the idea passed. The concept seems to have been used first for the intense emotions which induced or accompanied the early ecstatic prophecy that appears in such narrations as 1 Sam. 10. How far back into the pre-literary period this use extends it is impossible to say, nor is the question one of special importance. In some of the earliest strata of the Hebrew historical books we find the term al-

ready extended from ecstatic prophecy to warlike prowess. The popular hero who led the nation in war or did deeds of mighty valor was also said to be under the power of the Spirit, though he never claimed the experience for himself. Here also one need not look far to find an emotional content. He who knows his Iliad will not need to be reminded of the fierce frenzy of the ancient warrior. But now there begins to appear the second factor in the development of this idea, that it must have a value for the national religious life. From the point of view of the period the word "national" is superfluous. All religion was national, never merely individual. Whatever emotional experience helped the growth of the nation was from the national God; it was the power of the Spirit of Jehovah.

But with the growth of an ethical religion the old ecstatic prophecy fell into a measure of disrepute. There was a strife of prophecy against prophecy, and the older and cruder went down before higher ideas. But the older prophet, because of his ecstasy, had been peculiarly "the man of the Spirit." The later prophets used the Spirit less as the explanation of their prophetic activity, so that in the Deuteronomic literature the term has quite disappeared in this sense.[1] But meantime a new emphasis has been thrown upon it, which introduces another factor in the development of the idea. The idea has been, on the human side, emotion

[1] As has been shown by Dr. Shoemaker in "The Use of רוח in the Old Testament and of πνεῦμα in the New Testament." *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1904.

religiously interpreted. But it is also possible to look at it from the divine side. Here it is—and this is the third factor—God active in the human life. When, however, the idea began to be used less often for the explanation of individual effort it was natural that the limitation of its meaning to the human life should disappear, and that it should be thought of as God active in any sphere of his creation. This is what took place in the exilic period: The Spirit of God brooded over chaos and made creation. God sends forth his Spirit, and the beasts of the field live; he withdraws it, and they die. All the history of Israel has been under the guidance of the Spirit. The Spirit led them in the wilderness. The Spirit will be with the Messiah at his coming, and in that Messianic age God will give the Spirit to all.

By the time of the post-exilic period the emphasis of the idea had passed quite definitely from the notion of emotional experiences to the notion of God acting; and, since there had also been a growth of reverence for God which had resulted in practically putting him afar off from man, it now became impossible to interpret present experiences as from the Spirit. Even when the deep springs of religious and patriotic heroism were touched, as in the Maccabean revolt, the Spirit was not used of their origin. Thus widely had the term departed from its original use. One might well suppose that it had entered upon a new field so remote from the old that it would never return.

On its human side, then, the Spirit as the explanation of experience became in the Jewish period a memory of the past and a hope for the future. On its divine side, as a name for God acting, it became a dogma. As a dogma one step more was possible for it. The distinction between God acting and God absolute, between the dynamic and the static, might be lost, and the Spirit come to be used as the exact equivalent for God. In Hebrew thought this step was never taken. There were approaches to it, but the absolute identification of the Spirit and God was avoided.

That combination of Greek and Jewish thought which we call Alexandrian Judaism added no new factor to the history of the development. It went back, under the influence of ideas borrowed from the Greek conception of the oracles, to the earlier and cruder Hebrew stage in which the Spirit was used to explain ecstasy; then it used that cruder conception in an attempt to explain all the prophecy of the Old Testament. In this way it became the precursor of much later theological doctrine of inspiration, but it contributed nothing to the biblical development of the idea.

Thus the matter stands at the beginning of the New Testament period. The Spirit is a memory of God's presence with his people in the past and a hope for his presence once more in the person of the Messiah who should come in the future. The idea of the Spirit as God acting in the external world seems already to have disappeared. It is

thought of only in connection with God's action on men.

Now comes Christianity, with its claim of Jesus as the Messiah. With it there is a new wealth of emotional experiences. Since the Messiah has come all these experiences may once more be interpreted as from the Spirit. So may all experiences which advance the purposes of God in the new Messianic movement. Theoretically this opens the way for the assignment to the Spirit of much besides the emotional. Practically it would seem that in the first few years of Christian history the Spirit was kept somewhat closely for the explanation of those experiences of the Christian church in which there was at least an element of emotion. Still such factors of experience as wisdom and judgment were occasionally assigned to the Spirit. The tendency to expansion was present. There is, however, no hint in our literature that any tendency existed toward a form of expansion upon which Hebrew thought had once entered and then drawn back, that of the explanation of the cosmic process as the work of the Spirit. The thought of the Christian church connected the Spirit too closely with human experience to allow of this. The thought of the Spirit in the world outside of man can only arise under one of two conditions: either when the connection of the Spirit with experience has been lost, and the idea has become a name for God acting, as was the case in the exilic and post-exilic Hebrew period; or when the distinc-

tion between the relation of God to persons and his relation to the impersonal parts of the creation has been lost. Christian theology has never lost sight of that distinction. It is to be hoped that it never will. The Spirit of God belongs of right only to the action of God on human hearts. It is a term for the action of the divine Person on human persons. Such is its New Testament meaning and its only correct use.

Now, with its meaning fairly fixed to human experiences, the last factor in its development enters. I have spoken of it as belonging to experiences, in the plural. It was the explanation of specific events in life, of special mental powers or emotional periods, considered individually. Throughout its history the Spirit had been in large measure God acting in temporary endowments. In large measure, I say, for even Hebrew thought had touched now and then in its later periods the idea of the Spirit as an abiding ethical force in life, in the same way that it had touched many things that were fundamental in later Christian life and ethics. But, as with so many of these things, that idea was so rare that it could almost be called sporadic. It did not become dominant. Paul grasped the idea of the unity of the religious life, and spoke of the Spirit not merely as God acting in an occasional extraordinary and emotional experience, but as being the divine source and basis of all the Christian life. For him the Holy Spirit is the cause not only of religious experiences, but of religious

experience. The test of the Spirit of God in a man is no longer subjective emotion, but the objective value of his life for the progress of the will of God as working itself out in the church. Emotional experiences do not, indeed, lose their value; they are still gifts of the Spirit, but are not to be reckoned as of first importance. The place of prime importance is held by the religious ethical life in its unity, conceived as divinely originated and guided.

The unification of all the religious life under the Spirit is the last stage in the biblical development of the idea. It is the last stage that ever can come in its development, unless there be retrogression; for nothing more complete, in the relation of God to the human soul, can be conceived than the idea that the entire religious life originates from and is guided by God acting immediately on the human spirit. In biblical literature itself, then, the conception of the Spirit reaches its perfect end.

But what of the theological doctrine of the Spirit? What of the personality of the Spirit in the Godhead and the procession of the Spirit? With these things this study has nothing to do. It leaves them to historical and speculative theology. They belong to the ages after the biblical writings have closed. Professor Clarke begins his *Outlines of Christian Theology* with this sentence: "Theology is preceded by religion, as botany by the life of plants. Religion is the reality of which theology is the study." The subject with which we have been concerned in this book is religion, not speculative

theology with its distinctions drawn from Greek philosophy. It is a very fundamental fact of religion. There can be no religion at all in any strict sense without the recognition of the primal fact of God acting in the heart of man, which the Hebrews called the Spirit. The biblical writers do not attempt to explain this fact. They believe it, they use it for the explanation of the phenomena of life, they find religious strength and comfort in it; but they do not philosophize about it. In the sense in which the word is used above there is little biblical theology of the Spirit of God. What theological inferences men drew later from the biblical religious use of this idea, and whether those inferences were correct or not, are subjects whose discussion does not lie within the purpose of this book. That purpose is to deal with the religious fact which the biblical writers explained by the Spirit of God. If this little book has helped to make that fact more vivid or the development of its meaning in the biblical literature more clear, it has served its purpose.

May the people of God see with ever-growing clearness what is meant by the most complete New Testament expression of this basal religious ideal, "Live in the Spirit"!

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